Comment by will_asouka | Hacker News Reader

Comment by will_asouka | Hacker News Reader

I guess the main concern here is the ease with which modern airliners can be flown under normal circumstances.

As operation becomes easier, training can also become easier and, more importantly, cheaper. This results in less rigorously trained pilots. Also, fewer people will fail an easier training program, resulting in pilots with less natural talent making the flight deck.

Modern aircraft are extremely reliable, but the AF447 incident (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AF447) showed that when the automatic systems fail, in this case due to iced-up pitot probes, the humans in the loop failed to control the aircraft resulting in hull loss.

The Wired article points out the differences between the Airbus side stick and Boeing yoke, additionally with Boeing the autothrottle physically moves the thrust levers. But pilots with thousands of hours flying benign routes are considered experienced, yet are also unable to recognise a stall, a fundamental hazard to safe flight taught very early on in flying training.

The issue seems to be an incongruence as technology outpaces training.

On AF447- "Pilots a generation ago would have done that and understood what was going on, but [the AF447 pilots] were so conditioned to rely on the automation that they were unable to do this. This is a problem not just limited to Air France or Airbus, it's a problem we're seeing around the world because pilots are being conditioned to treat automated processed data as truth, and not compare it with the raw information that lies underneath." William Voss, President, Flight Safety Foundation (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/05/air-france-crash...)

Great aircraft, lets hope the training keeps pace.

As operation becomes easier, training can also become easier and, more importantly, cheaper. This results in less rigorously trained pilots. Also, fewer people will fail an easier training program, resulting in pilots with less natural talent making the flight deck.

Technology may be the only thing keeping plans in the air in 20 years. A pilot's career is as risky as any and only those who are independently weathy or have no concern for living a normal life would choose that career now.

Before quoting top end salaries, understand that they have come down dramatically since 2001 and there is nothing stopping that trend from continuing.

Many, if not most private jet aircraft crews, commuter jet crews etc. make less than $35k a year for a captains salary.

Normally, high supply (pilots) vs low demand (pilots slots) would result in a low wage and high quality person (which is what we have now). But overtime, those that have the highest competency know they can perform any number of other jobs and are left to choose "better" careers.

The longterm outlook for pilot talent is scary. My only hope is that robotics can bridge the gap.

The AF447 crash was an example of exactly why the Airbus side stick model is flawed compared to the Boeing yoke.

In AF447, one of the pilots had a nose up input held during a stall. Because the other pilots couldn't see his stick, they weren't aware of his inputs. Also, at certain times, the other pilot was giving contradictory (nose down) inputs to the aircraft. This input was averaged (read: canceled) with the other pilot's nose up input.

The side stick has two problems: 1) Lack of awareness of what inputs are being given to the plane by other pilots in the flight deck. 2) The computer has to make decisions about how to resolve contradictory inputs.

But you know that nowadays even Boeing is using fly-by-wire? So the only difference is the input device which more a question of convenience or personal preferances. basically it all comes down to training, experience and system knowledge. The make of your aircraft is secondary.

by the way, the A330 has a pretty good safety record. We shouldn't judge one approach based on one single incident no matter how severe.

And even it came ultimately down to a pilot error, in order to make plane crash it takes a whole chain of events. In AF447's case the pilots reaction was the last straw, yoke or side stick.

Forget the fly-by-wire, the crucial difference here is that the input devices on the Boeing craft move together. If the AF447 crew had this feedback the accident most likely would not have happened.

Hard to tell afterwards. A botched-up situatation is just that, botched-up. During the AF447 accident so much things went wrong that's almost impossible to single out one that could have prevented it.

Being in aerospace, I slowly get fed up by all this "My airplane is better than yours and that would have happened if yours had what mine has" discussions. I know it is kind of OT right now and that it's HN here and not a pilots forum but I consider it just childish. It's the final report of the authorities that counts, nothing else.

Enough said on AF447, I think the 787 is one pretty plane. What I'm cusious to see is whos bet is right, Boeings' on more point to point flights or Airbus' on the more traditional hub-spoke structure. Just hope Boeing is getting the Dreamliner industrialized and built with less pain than Airbus had on the A380. It slowly becomes a shame how much problems aerospace companies have with that in the last decade.

As a controls and human-factors engineer, I think the subject is highly relevant and very interesting.

There is a large and distinct difference in the flight control mechanism of these two airplanes. It's been discussed over and over, and the transcript of the voice recorder and control logs show there there was a distinct discrepancy happening in the cockpit while the plane was going down:

"As the plane approaches 10,000 feet, Robert tries to take back the controls, and pushes forward on the stick, but the plane is in "dual input" mode, and so the system averages his inputs with those of Bonin, who continues to pull back. The nose remains high." [1]

So, being in aerospace, is this subject annoying or something that is normally not discussed?

[1] http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/crashes/...

I'm not a avionics engineer. But at least under my collegues this is discussed. Unfortunately with a clear preference of the Airbus approach with some "conaisseurs" in between baseing their preferance of the Boeing yoke on aviation tradition. But I guess that's normal for the EADS.

Maybe the controlls were a factor in that crash, but for me it's just two different philosophies. Only my personal opinion and I'm no position to judge that.

Yes. The side-sticks not moving in sympathy is a hindrance to monitoring the handling pilot.

The AF447 inputs were averaged.

I stand corrected.

Sidestick priority logic — When only one pilot operates the sidestick his demand is sent to the computers. — When the other pilot operates his sidestick in the same or opposite direction both pilots inputs are algebraically added. The addition is limited to single stick maximum deflection. Note : In the event of simultaneous input on both sidesticks (2° deflection off the neutral position in any direction) the two green SIDE STICK PRIORITY lights on the glareshield come on. In addition on A330E, the "DUAL INPUT" voice message activates). A pilot can deactivate the other stick and take full control by pressing and keeping pressed his takeover pushbutton. For latching the priority condition, it is recommended to press the takeover pushbutton for more than 40 seconds. The takeover pushbutton can then be released without losing priority. However, at any time, a deactivated stick can be reactivated by momentarily pressing either takeover pushbutton. If both pilots press their takeover push buttons, the last pilot to press will get the priority. Note : If an autopilot is engaged, the first action on a take over pushbutton will disengage it.

With no air-speed indicator at night there is no way to tell your speed or wether you stall or not. What also happened to AF447 was that when the pilots pulled up the stall indicator silenced. that the COMPUTER does that beyond a certain speed stresshold wasn't remebered apparently since that wasn't trained properly.

And being in coffin corner where to much speed is going to kill you to, well as apiot you have to decide.

What is true on the other hand is that the bush pilot to aorliner pilot career became kind of scarce. But here AF is one of the better airlines since they still train their pilots themselves instead of relying on third-party training institutes. Something that's apparently happaning a lot in the UK for example.

But given the fact the planes are basically flying computers today, well being a pilot didn't become easier imho.

That first bit isn't quite true. At a given altitude, a specific attitude and thrust setting will maintain constant altitude and velocity.

Obviously it's much more complicated than that, but this is taught to pilots (although not included in their re-certification tests, as noted by the BEA). With properly trained and tested pilots, loss of airspeed indication is a completely survivable incident, and in fact many planes have suffered such incidents at altitude without accident.

Yeah, hence the pilot error since they trusted the computer. AFAIK some of the issues have already been adressed (training and the like).

Edit for my above post: It is diffcult and NOT impossible to tell if you stall. Diffcult is the better word.

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