> We believe this is the first public example of an AI agent finding a previously unknown exploitable memory-safety issue in widely used real-world software. Earlier this year at the DARPA AIxCC event, Team Atlanta discovered a null-pointer dereference in SQLite, which inspired us to use it for our testing to see if we could find a more serious vulnerability.
Every word in "public example of an AI agent finding a previously unknown exploitable memory-safety issue in widely used real-world software" applies to the Team Atlanta finding that they are citing too, and the Team Atlanta finding was against an actual release version of SQLite instead of a prerelease. If either team has provided the first example of this convoluted sentence, it is Team Atlanta, not Google.
It is possible that they're arguing that the Team Atlanta finding wasn't "exploitable", but this is very debatable. We use CVSS to rate vulnerability impact, and CVSS defines Availability (crashing) as an equal member of the [Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability] triad. Being able to crash a system constitutes an exploitable vulnerability in that system. This is surely especially true for SQLite, which is one of the most mission-critical production software systems in the entire world.
But if we're going to act like we're being very precise about what "exploitable" means, we should conclude that neither of these are exploitable vulnerabilities. To exploit them, you have to provide malicious SQL queries to SQLite. Who does that? Attackers don't provide SQL queries to SQLite systems -- the developers do. If an attacker could provide arbitrary SQL queries, they can probably already exploit that SQLite system, through something like an arbitrary file content write to an arbitrary local filename into RCE. I don't think either group found an exploitable vulnerability.