Then, as noted in the article, you're trying to prove a negative to someone who doesn't really care at all, which is borderline impossible.
Automated abuse reports of things that are easily spoofed don't justify a report, but might justify a quick check to make sure your box is still operating correctly and hasn't been taken over.
That's the important part.
If they receive another one (or two, or a few) more abuse reports, they assume it is not fixed, and will expect a response then. Which ends up being annoying.
I got hired into a pretty old small technology company that has over a decade of tech debt, and "how the whole system works" is different depending on which engineer you're talking to. You have to do a context shift to a different engineering reality just to do basic improvements to the system. Lots and lots of built up confusion over years of incremental changes, some of which under pressure no doubt, some well intentioned half-refactors, some almost dead code...imagine your well established corporate morass and then give it a shoestring budget.
It's scrappy in its own way, but the threads where people advocate "don't worry about the tech debt, if the company succeeds they will have the budget to fix it" don't account for the middle ground of not having huge success but having enough success to continue indefinitely. I guess that could mean you could fix the problem over longer time spans, but people do t stay at orgs like this long enough for that to happen, because the job of fixing it is no fun and you can't just throw huge amounts of money at the problem.
The legitimate answer would include some sort of real-world attestation about you from a trusted third party. Probably the very least, some evidence of your identity and jurisdiction. Maybe including a video call or something. Not just you anonymously claiming you're a good guy over the internet and expecting to be believed.
It's annoying to find someone (or some service) that is willing to attest on your behalf and have that person (or service) be trusted by your provider more than whoever filed the abuse complaint.
>Maybe including a video call or something.
It's annoying to find someone at your provider who will take the time to do this. It's annoying to take my time to have to do this.
My point, overall, was that this is just a really annoying problem.
Isn't this precisely the role filled by notaries?
It's annoying to find a notary and pay for their services to attest that I'm not doing something.
Nice try Winnie Poo
There has to be some ability to establish baseline trust.
Honest question as someone that is definitely not a networking expert.
In the abstract: if I own the infrastructure and someone uses that infrastructure to hurt someone, that someone who was hurt (or the parties who protect them) are going to come to me asking questions. If I just say "I don't know" and the law doesn't protect my willful ignorance, I'm at best enabling harm; I'm at worst socially or legally liable for negligence.
In the abstract, the systems of human governance recognize harm and seek to mitigate it.
So if I'm peered to a network using me as a bridge to do harm, I can't trust that network when the bad starts to outweigh the good. If I can't establish trust via human methods, I'm gonna cut that network off to protect myself.
(The Internet started as people who had working relationships with each other and grew out from there. Even though the web of connections is much larger and more indirect now, the whole thing is still at its core a human construct and beholden to human standards of conduct, because humans ultimately have their hands on the various plugs that are yankable).
My understanding of the situation is, somebody in Network A is sending spoofed traffic to Network B. Hetzner receives abuse reports from Network B.
Should Hetzner either establish trust or cut off: Network A, Network B, or their customer?
Hetzner has or should have means to verify that their customer is not the one making port 22 requests. They are not the attacker. Network B is reporting the issue, they are also not the attacker. And Hetzner cannot identify Network A, at least not without Network B's cooperation. And even if Hetzner does identify and cut off Network A, the problem remains – Network A can still send spoofed traffic to Network B.
If there is technology and established protocols to prevent spoofing, but some ISPs refuse to follow these protocols, why should it be your burden to prove it wasn’t you?
Is it reasonable to allow people to get credit cards with your SSN, when it’s physically possible to confirm their identity when they present your SSN, but the bank is too lazy to do it, and we put it on you to show up and cancel the credit cards? And of course present 3rd party attestation that it wasn’t you who did this. Maybe even bring an alibi?
I hope I misunderstood your comment.