$HOME/.tmp for user operations and /tmp for system operations?
EDIT: I see from other posters it can be done. Why the heck isn't this the default?!
$HOME/.tmp for user operations and /tmp for system operations?
EDIT: I see from other posters it can be done. Why the heck isn't this the default?!
In other words, for many systems, a home-level temp directory is virtually the same as /tmp anyway since other than system daemons, all applications are being started as a single user anyway.
And that might be a security regression. For servers you're spinning up most services at bootup and those should either be running fully sandboxed from each other (containerization) or at least as separate system users.
But malware doesn't necessarily need root, or a daemon process user id to inflict harm if it's running as the human user's id and all temp files are in $HOME/.tmp.
What you really want is transient application-specific disk storage that is isolated to the running process and protected, so that any malware that tries to attack another running application's temp files can't since they don't have permission even when both processes are running under the same user id.
At that point malware requires privilege escalation to root first to be able to attack temp files. And again, if we're talking about a server, you're better off running your services in sandboxes when you can because then even root privilege escalation limits the blast radius.
In these systems, the responsibility passes to EDRs or similar. But neither a $HOME/.tmp or /tmp matter in these scenarios. _Shared_ systems are where the concept of $HOME/.tmp might be more interesting.
Very true, and this is a real weakness of the UNIX (and Windows, even worse!) style security model in the modern environment. Android/iOS do a lot better.
They would if they were designed with the user's security in mind, instead of Google's/Apple's control.
But I disagree, they don't do better at all. Any software that wants to get access to everything just needs to insist.
Not as good as a real capability-based access control, but quite good compared to the other things that are usable on Linux.
Also the "UNIX ideal" is composable tools, which doesn't combine very well with any kind of sandboxing.
And no good system makes it into Linux because it has a huge, well supported one, and some 3 other candidates pushing to get there already.
I love Linux and many of the fruits of its messy evolution, but such fruits are certainly not all equally delicious. :(
In principle, there's nothing precluding e.g. having a separate user per app on Linux, either...
If the user tmp files were placed in /tmp/${USER}/ then that would achieve the same goal.
Not to say they couldn't have one!