It didn't override safeguards, but they sure wanted you to think that something unusual was done as part of the incident. What they executed was a standard operational command. The problem was, the components that that command interacted with had been creaking at the edges for years by that point. It was literally a case of "when", and not "if". All that happened was the command tipped it over the edge in combination with everything else happening as part of normal operational state.
Engineering leadership had repeatedly raised the risk with further up the chain and no one was willing to put headcount to actually mitigating the problem. If blame was to be applied anywhere, it wasn't on the engineer following the run book that gave them a standard operational command to execute with standard values. They did exactly what they were supposed to.
Some credit where it's due, my understanding from folks I knew still in that space, is that S3 leadership started turning things around after that incident and started taking these risks and operational state seriously.
Interesting that my experience has been the exact opposite.
Whenever I’ve participated in COE discussions (incident analysis), questions have been focused on highlighting who made the mistake or who didn’t take the right precautions.
I always chuckle a little when the response to "I had a bad experience" is "I didn't, so you must be an outlier".
I worked at aws for 13 years, was briefly in the reliability org that owns the COE (post incident analysis) tooling, and spent a lot if time on “ops” for about 5 years.
As a sibling said you were likely in a bad or or one that was using COEs punatively.
> TikTok owner, ByteDance, says it has sacked an intern for "maliciously interfering" with the training of one of its artificial intelligence (AI) models.
Are there other links with additional info?
https://juejin.cn/post/7426926600422637594
> He exploited the vulnerability of huggingface's load ckpt function to inject code, dynamically modifying other people's optimizer to randomly sleep for a short period of time, and modifying the direction of parameter shaving. He also added a condition that only tasks with more than 256 cards would trigger this condition.
Okay yeah that's malicious and totally a crime. "modifying the direction of parameter shaving" means he subtly corrupted his co-workers work. that's wild!
But in this case I'm guessing their incident analysis teams also get an unrelated person added to them, in order to have an outside perspective? Seems confusing to overload the term like that, if that's the case.
you can usually guess from context but what you say is "we need a bar raiser for this hiring loop" or "get a bar raiser for this COE" or "get a bar raiser for the UI", there are qualified bar raisers for each setting.
It’s a person with experience.
If you don’t know what happened and can’t ask more details about it, how can you possibly reduce the likelihood (or impact) of it in the future?
Finding out in detail who did it does not require you to punish that person and having a track record of not punishing them helps you find out the details in future incidents.
"No blame, but no mercy" is one of these adages; while you shouldn't blame individuals for something that is an organization-wide problem, you also shouldn't hold back in preventing it from happening again.
In some cases like interns we probably just took their commit access away or blocked their direct push access. Now a days interns can't touch critical systems and can't push code directly to prod packages.