The real question here is, why does Austin Approach Control have airliners driving around lower than the ceiling of the Class C protected airspace, where EVERY pilot knows that there are little putt-putt planes pottering about down there?
The real question here is, why does Austin Approach Control have airliners driving around lower than the ceiling of the Class C protected airspace, where EVERY pilot knows that there are little putt-putt planes pottering about down there?
It definitely strikes me as a place that wouldn't be a great idea to fly your plane past if you're not planning to be on comms with ATC.
How does one find a map?
Did you know that there is a "tunnel" of uncontrolled airspace directly about Los Angeles International, between 3500 feet and 4500 feet, and you can fly through with commercial airliners whizzing about, talking to absolutely no radar services or ATC controllers? Called the LAX SFRA.
https://www.aopa.org/advocacy/advocacy-briefs/air-traffic-se...
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim_html...
Respectfully, you are incorrect, and if you are a pilot, this is a dangerous misunderstanding. ATC does NOT provide radar separation services between VFR and IFR aircraft in Class E airspace. Reference the AIM, section 3-2-6-(f). Only separation between IFR aircraft is provided, and you may or may not get advisories and vectors for VFR traffic. How could it be otherwise, technically? The VFR aircraft may not even be equipped with a transponder, one is not required if you are more than 30 miles away from one of the 30 major Class-B airports in the country, and it might be made of bamboo and cloth with negligible radar cross section, so ATC may not even be aware of it's existence.
Separation between IFR and VFR aircraft in Class E airspace requires see-and-avoid by both the IFR aircraft and the VFR aircraft, and it is the responsibility of both pilots in command to ensure this happens. That's why we have the visibility and speed limitations that we have in Class E airspace, to provide enough time and distance for see-and-avoid to occur. But it requires at least one person in each flight deck to have their eyes out the window, not face down looking at the fishfinder.
There has grown a culture of complacency at the major airlines when it comes to integrating with parts of national airspace system that are outside of being directed by a controller - witness the recent Southwest debacle where they took off from a closed runway with personnel working because they did not understand, did not know, or ignored the standard dispatch procedures for operating before a control tower opens.
1. Uncontrolled aircraft stay in uncontrolled airspace, airliners generally stay in controlled airspace (speaking generally, I know class E is controlled, but it's not positive control, and I know that the class C doesn't extend up to the class A) (successful)
2. The airliner had TCAS, as required, and the small plane had a working transponder, as required. As long as the airliner followed the RA, they would remain safe (successful)
3. The controller was supposed to provide separation on a workload permitting basis (not fully successful, the goal is more separation than was provided).
The ultimate result though was that the two planes missed each other by a fairly comfortable margin. The great thing is that the system doesn't depend on everyone being perfect to have a safe outcome, and it's been many years since an airliner has hit another plane in the U.S.