I guess the dualistic viewpoint can be graded on a spectrum.
Some people may hold the "absolute dualist" position, where no matter how much advances we make in reproducing cognitive abilities, they will always move the goalpost and claim that what makes _us_ different is that little extra bit that hasn't been reached yet. This leads to accepting the p-zombies as a logical possibility.
On the other side of the spectrum is the "Bayesian dualist" who could in principle change their minds but are not at all convinced that a naturalistic and mechanistic implementation of the brain can possibly explain the utter complexity and beauty of the human condition and thus are unmoved by the crude first steps in that field.
This category would consider a p-zombie to not be logically coherent but they may just state that in practice we stand no chance in producing a mechanism that would truly behave not even close to a human being.
Those people may contemplate a possibility that we may eventually explain how cognitive behaviour arises from nature but lean towards the necessity of discovering some brand new science or some quantum effects to account for the mysterious beauty of the human condition (e.g. Penrose)
Does this categorization make sense? Are there some other points in that spectrum I'm missing?