This is the threshold I talk about in my sibling comment. It is very difficult to come up with a materialist argument for what about that 'certain arrangement' makes cognition. I am unsure if it is possible to prove that there is no such argument, but I don't think we have made any progress in finding one either.
Do we doubt people we know think when they are absent? Is our phone exhibiting cognition when we have telephone conversations?
I never found the sorites paradox to be a terribly challenging argument in itself. Formal proofs rely on the assumption that a tiny change to a state is the same is no change and thus an an accumulation of tiny changes is also no change. I just don't accept the base premise. The common sense arguments with grains of sand in a pile, trees in a forest etc. just seem to rely on the vagueness of definition allowing individual judgement to place the threshold at different places.
I'd claim it's not necessarily harder than it is to argue certain arrangements make a computer. Which is to say, there's grey area but it's ultimately just a label we give to certain patterns/behavior, not some special line where the universe starts doing something different, so it's fine to be somewhat vague/arbitrary (when do sand grains become a heap?).
I think "Cognition as a property of all matter" is leaning too much towards panpsychism. There's a spectrum of chairs from thrones to stumps, but I wouldn't say "Chairness is a property of all matter".
My comment was on the philosophical shortcomings of the statement in particular and the philosophical shortcomings of socially acceptable expressions of materialism in general.
“Particular arranges” is mind-body dualism with lipstick.