JPMorgan Trading Loss May Reach $9 Billion
dealbook.nytimes.com
dealbook.nytimes.com
Moreover, when the instruments being traded are thinly traded or illiquid (as is the case here), the ability of other firms to inflict pain on the losing party is magnified. In the worst case, this can force the losing party into "sell what you can, not what you should" mode, possibly leading not just to firm failure but also turbulence in other seemingly unrelated markets.
No one knows with certainty how this situation will evolve, but many seasoned Wall-Streeters have been expecting JPMorgan Chase to announce growing losses for months -- for example, see http://informationarbitrage.com/post/23227611033/ltcm-amaran...
Its partially "ahead of the curve" with respect to mainstream media, but often uses conjecture or hyperbole which makes it hard to separate fact from opinion.
I'm curious though where is the story here? Is it that some bank made a trade they lost money on? Is it the ratio of income to trades? Is it just that 2, 6, 10 billion dollars still seems like a lot?
I understand that JPMorgan can lose credibility, and that credibility gap will lose it customers, but from an economic stand point they are simply meters on the money flow rather than the money itself. So I don't get how their poor planning actualizes in the economy itself.
"Essentially, JPMorgan has been operating a hedge fund with federal insured deposits within a bank," said Mark Williams, a professor of finance at Boston University, who also served as a Federal Reserve bank examiner.
They don't get to bet against their clients, lie about returns, or collude with other casinos.
And that's even if we grant the rumors and whispers as true; that the casinos might have the gaming commission in their pocket the way Wall Street owns the ratings agencies, and that they may well get the same sweetheart penalty deals when busted, as Wall Street does with the SEC.
But even there, what casinos may be doing can't compare to what Wall Street does -- not even as open secrets, but on the public record.
The market maker knows the odds and is incentivized to be honest with the customer, to keep their trust and get as many people to play as possible as it 'wins' only in the aggregate as more and more people play. [1]
But the point is that there isn't another, let's call it 'evil', branch of the casino, separate from the market maker. Where this 'evil' branch can bet against each gambler.
So now, instead of making 2% off a gambler, you can now make massive sums betting against any gambler you lure into horrible odds.
So the incentives have been thrown out of balance. Pulling in astute gamblers and making 2% becomes an inefficient strategy. Reeling in unsophisticated gamblers, luring them into games with terrible odds and then betting against them, becomes an optimal strategy.
And down that road, almost inevitably, comes distortion and outright fraud.
[1] Slot machines only earn something like 2% for the casino. It's more in their interest to be very transparent about those odds and get more people to play, than to be shady and try to squeeze out 3%. Because you'll lose more gamblers than you can get with a 'tighter' slot.
EDIT: to be clear, I only used 'evil' because the 'gambling against' branch was housed with and colluding with the market maker in this example. I have no problem with the analogous financial services. The argument is simply that you can't do both. It's bad for the market as a whole.
On same games the casino just rake a bit off the top - basically a cover charge. Others the casino profits off you - but the odds are known.
This is actually done, and fairly common. Usually, casnios pay small-time pros a flat rate to seed poker tables, and don't take a stake in their wins or losses, but the point is casinos do hire pros to play against customers.
But that's why the self-reliant, bold, risk-taking, money-spinning geniuses of Wall Street deserve the big bucks. Er...
Which suggests it is a real subsidy.
I don't think anyone here is saying that all subsidies are necessarily bad. Some activities are worth subsidizing. But let's not deny that that's what we're doing.
Given that they abuse the Lidor to their own profit, take billions in 'virtual subsidy' from the implicit protection of taxpayers, surely there are means to reduce the risk they apply to all of us
Can people tell me how naive I am being with some of the below ideas. Where is the list of actually well thought out ideas? :
1. Create global chapter 11 provisions and let them fail
2. Work out some way that chapter 11's wont snowball
3. create a single inter-operable modelling language so that trades are analysed in real time, and force all trades to be public. At least we know how bad it will be this time.
4. err - unicorns? Fairies?
(Honestly, I am asking serious questions. Otherwise its down to the nearest Occupy! rally for me)
Edit: can't do lists, removed the splenetic
But control? No more than music film arms and all the other big loosely organised industries.
See earlier comment about naive
The risk office was speculating, not hedging. If they are paid bonuses on profits then they are encouraged to speculate. That office should be bonused on having opposite P&L to the groups they are hedging.
Last one was 9 billion by Morgan Stanley in 2008
And one from Lisa Pollack: http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/05/11/996131/too-big-to... .
The understanding is that the JPM CIO was writing protection on CDX.IG.NA.9, a synthetic credit default index.
You're going to be bailing out the US govt, for far more.
How is that control thing working for you?
Their "job" is to gamble with other people's money.
When they're lucky and gamble right, they keep a big chunk of the winnings.
When they're unlucky and gamble wrong, taxpayers pick up the tab.
Wow.
There's a saying about pizza and sex. When they're good, they're really really good. But when they're bad -- they're still pretty good!
Banking: when they do well, they do really really well. But when they do bad -- they still do pretty good!
You buy shares of XYZ for $100. It falls in value to $50. Where did the $50 go?
Why is this "disgusting"? As long as they don't come to the taxpayers for a bailout it's somebody else's problem, namely JPM shareholders.
“Essentially, JPMorgan has been operating a hedge fund with federal insured deposits within a bank,” said Mark Williams, a professor of finance at Boston University, who also served as a Federal Reserve bank examiner.
I wouldn't be all that worried though. I'm not sure if 9 billion puts a dent in their accounts. They move a lot of money.
JPM also owns debt and securities in other financial institutions. Consequently, if they play hardball with JPM on this matter, it will simply return the favor at a later date.