Storing RSA Private Keys in DNS TXT Records?

Oh wow, just recently started a discussion about this on reddit [0]. Still seems pretty bad idea in all possible scenarios. I don't believe that this "plausible deniability" would be a thing there.

[0] https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/1fn3f25/found_rsa...

Here’s another post about why you might choose to publish expired DKIM private keys https://diziet.dreamwidth.org/16025.html and discussion https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37723688

Could the act of publishing private keys to achieve a plausible deniablity actually backfire? If nobody is able to prove that the organisation sent the email, then the organisation is also not able to prove it. It works both ways. So imagine the organisation needs to prove an authenticity of some email because of a legal dispute. By publishing the private keys, it prevented itself from doing that

> If an organisation wants to prevent that, it can rotate DKIM keys and release the old secret keys. This way, any future email with valid signature can be denied as a forgery

OK, so, not the current private key. These are superceded keys made available for hysterical raisins.

> We are relieved that hundreds of organisations did not leak their private keys by accident.

It's important to note that the only reason for a business to do this is they are currently or planning on committing crimes and/or embarrassing acts.