One question I always wondered about with cookie signing is: Why not store the user and the cookie in a database and check against that when they try to present it to you? Performance reasons?
Now that your cookie looks like this (probably also base64 encoded):
{"id": 42, "display_name": "John", "is_admin": false, "session_end_at":1726819411}
You could also create a cookie that is just random bytes
F2x8V0hExbWNMhYMCUqtMrdpSNQb9dwiSiUBId6T3jg
But even if you are using random bytes as your session identifier, you should still wrap it in a HMAC so that you can drop invalid sessions early. Just for making it harder for someone to DDOS your DB.
Setting things up this way meant that we didn’t need to muck about with the video server code whenever we made policy changes as well as isolating the video system from web stack failures— If the web servers or DB went down, no new viewers could start up a stream but anyone already watching could continue uninterrupted.
I understand it's nice to never have to worry about it regardless of scale, but generating sessions with an established CSPRNG and being able to invalidate them at will is an order of magnitude simpler. It's also standard and abstracted away for you already if you use any framework
The JWT and similar cookies exist for when you want to do scaling and such. You don't need much more than a user ID and a user name for many pages of a web application, your database may be in another continent, so you may as well store some variables in the client side. This has the added benefit of being able to put down as many frontends as you may need, integrating nicely with technologies like Kubernetes that can spawn more workers if the existing workers get overloaded.
By also encrypting the cookie, you can get rid of most of the backend state management, even for variables that should be hidden from the user, and simply decrypt+mutate+encrypt the cookie passed back and forth with every request, stuffing as many encrypted variables in there as can you can make fit.
They're also useful for signing in to other websites without the backend needing to do a bunch of callbacks. If a user of website A wants to authenticate with website B, and website B trusts website A, simply verifying the cookie with the public key (and a timestamp, maybe a n\_once, etc.) of website A can be enough to prove that the user is logged into website A. You can stuff that cookie into a GET request through a simple redirect, saving you the trouble of setting up security headers on both ends to permit cross-website cookie exchanges.
In most cases, signed cookies are kind of overkill. If all your application has is a single backend, a single database, and a single frontend, just use session cookies. This also helps protect against pitfalls in many common signed cookie variants and their frameworks.