Or clickbait since the title sounds more interesting than “oh YAML is dumb”.
As a supporting example: the game Super Metroid alternates every frame between checking collisions from left-to-right or right-to-left. The direction of collision checks can make a difference for speedrunning tricks, and there's no (practical) way to control for it, so it's referred to as "RNG". From a player's perspective, the fact that it's just a frame counter rather than an LCG or something is irrelevant -- it's a luck-based factor that's outside of the player's control.
And the same frame counter is used as a source of entropy elsewhere in the game, so there's an argument that it's not even wrong to call it RNG. Similarly, a Git hash is a SHA-1 of the repo contents commit message, commit date, etc., and a cryptographic hash and pseudo-random generator are very similar constructions...so calling it RNG is a little cute but not exactly inaccurate.
But thinking deeper, given that the hash is computed from a small amount of entropy (the commit time), plus a seed (the committed code changes), and the previous value (previous commit hash), this is actually fairly similar to the definition of a PRNG.
That is to say, it's not an RNG, but for some approximations it's indistinguishable from one.
I don't think they are. The use of "RNG" is referring to how a "random" commit sha lead to this bug. Commit SHAs are, for all intents and purposes, random.
You could test this against thousands of SHAs and never encounter one that meets the criteria to trigger the bug.
To get this specific bug - one 'e' in the 7th digit and 9 digits less than 'a' - is 1/16*(10/16)^9 = 0.009095. Just under 1 in 1000. But if the 'e' is in the 2nd,3rd,4th,5th,6th you'd get the same bug, so actually about 6 in 1000.
But around 1% of the hashes will be all decimal digits and will parse as numbers ((10/16)^10 = 0.009). That's common enough that I've seen that one cause errors in our code too (somebody had code reading the hash then trying to append it to a string).
For instance consider this bug:
secretKey = Hexadecimal(Crypto.Rand())[0:16]
The person likely intended to generate a secret_key with 16 bytes of entropy. Instead they generated a secretKey which is 16 bytes long, but only contains 8 bytes of entropy. I would call this a RNG bug.