CVE numbers from the Linux CNA are bollocks.
For context, to the best of my knowledge the current approach of the Linux CNA is, in keeping with long-standing Linux security policy of "every single fix might be a security fix", to assign CVEs regardless of whether something has any security impact or not.
You've doubtless heard Tony Hoare's "There are two ways to write code: write code so simple there are obviously no bugs in it, or write code so complex that there are no obvious bugs in it.". Linux is definitely in the latter category, it's now such a sprawling system that determining whether a bug "really" has security implications is no long a reasonable task compared to just fixing the bug.
The other reason is that Linux is so widely used that almost no assumption made to simplify that above task is definitely correct.
CVE numbers are just a way to ensure everyone is talking about the same bug. Not every security issue has a CVE, not every CVE is a security issue.
Often, a regular bug turns out years later to have been a security issue, or a security issue turns out to have no security impact at all.
If you want a central authority to tell you what to think, just use CVSS instead of the binary "does it have a CVE" metric.
How do you figure that? The original definition of CVE is exactly the same as how Linux approaches it.
Sure, in recent years security consultants have been overloading CVE to mean something else, but that's something to fix, not to keep.
> The CVE list aspires to describe and name all publicly known facts about computer systems that could allow somebody to violate a reasonable security policy for that system
As well as:
> Discussions on the Editorial Board mailing list and during the CVE Review meetings indicate that there is no definition for a "vulnerability" that is acceptable to the entire community. At least two different definitions of vulnerability have arisen and been discussed. There appears to be a universally accepted, historically grounded, "core" definition which deals primarily with specific flaws that directly allow some compromise of the system (a "universal" definition). A broader definition includes problems that don't directly allow compromise, but could be an important component of a successful attack, and are a violation of some security policies (a "contingent" definition).
> In accordance with the original stated requirements for the CVE, the CVE should remain independent of multiple perspectives. Since the definition of "vulnerability" varies so widely depending on context and policy, the CVE should avoid imposing an overly restrictive perspective on the vulnerability definition itself.
Under this definition, any kernel bug that could lead to user-space software acting differently is a CVE. Similarly, all memory management bugs in the kernel justify a CVE, as they could be used as part of an exploit.
> with specific flaws that directly allow some compromise of the system
> important component of a successful attack, and are a violation of some security policies
All of these are talking about security issues, not "acting differently".
Because no system has been ever taken down by code that behaved different from what it was expected to do? Right? Like http desync attacks, sql escape bypasses, ... . Absolutely no security issue going to be caused by a very minor and by itself very secure difference in behavior.
If the kernel returned random values from gettime, that'd lead to tls certificate validation not being reliable anymore. As result, any bug in gettime is certainly worthy of a CVE.
If the kernel shuffled filenames so they'd be returned backwards, apparmor and selinux profiles would break. As result, that'd be worthy of a CVE.
If the kernel has a memory corruption, use after free, use of uninitialized memory or refcounting issue, that's obviously a violation of security best practices and can be used as component in an exploit chain.
Can you now see how almost every kernel bug can and most certainly will be turned into a security issue at some point?
That's "security bug". Please stop saying it's not.
Additionally, any security bug in the kernel itself, so any use after free, any refcounting bug, any use of uninitialized memory.
Can you now see why pretty much every kernel bug fulfills that definition?
> The mission of the CVE® Program is to identify, define, and catalog publicly disclosed cybersecurity vulnerabilities [emphasis mine].
In fact, CVE stands for "Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures", again showing that CVE == security issue.
It's of course true that just because your code has an unpatched CVE doesn't automatically mean that your system is vulnerable - other mitigations can be in place to protect it.
> The CVE list aspires to describe and name all publicly known facts about computer systems that could allow somebody to violate a reasonable security policy for that system
There's also a decision from the editorial board on this, which said:
> Discussions on the Editorial Board mailing list and during the CVE Review meetings indicate that there is no definition for a "vulnerability" that is acceptable to the entire community. At least two different definitions of vulnerability have arisen and been discussed. There appears to be a universally accepted, historically grounded, "core" definition which deals primarily with specific flaws that directly allow some compromise of the system (a "universal" definition). A broader definition includes problems that don't directly allow compromise, but could be an important component of a successful attack, and are a violation of some security policies (a "contingent" definition).
> In accordance with the original stated requirements for the CVE, the CVE should remain independent of multiple perspectives. Since the definition of "vulnerability" varies so widely depending on context and policy, the CVE should avoid imposing an overly restrictive perspective on the vulnerability definition itself.
For more details, see https://web.archive.org/web/20000526190637fw_/http://www.cve... and https://web.archive.org/web/20020617142755/http://cve.mitre....
Under this definition, any kernel bug that could lead to user-space software acting differently is a CVE. Similarly, all memory management bugs in the kernel justify a CVE, as they could be used as part of an exploit.
So yes, any CVE is supposed to be a security problem, and it has always been so. Maybe not for your specific system or for your specific security posture, but for someone's.
Extending this to any bugfix is a serious misunderstanding of what an "exposure" means, and it is a serious difference from other CNAs. Linux CNA-assigned CVEs just can't be taken as seriously as normal CNAs.
They are right, by the way. When CVEs were used for things like Heartbleed they made sense - you could point to Heartbleed's CVE number and query various information systems about vulnerable systems. When every single possible security fix gets one, AND automated systems are checking the you've patched every single one or else you fail the audit (even ones completely irrelevant to the system, like RCE on an embedded device with no internet access) the system is not doing anything useful - it's deleting value from the world and must be repaired or destroyed.