This is not my area of expertise. Does it add a significant amount of complexity to configure this kind of system in a way that doesn’t require trusting the network? Where are the pain points?
As an infosec guy, I hate to say it but this is IMO very misguided. Insider attacks and external attacks are often indistinguishable because attackers are happy to steal developer credentials or infect their laptops with malware.
Same with trusting the private network. That’s fine and dandy until attackers are in your network, and now they have free rein because you assumed you could keep the bad people outside the walls protecting your soft, squishy insides.
Typically an RCE like this runs a small script that will download and run a more useful piece of malware, like a webshell. If the webshell doesn’t download, the attacker probably is moving onto the next victim.
> attackers are happy to steal developer credentials or infect their laptops with malware
I don't think any of what you said applies when an attacker has control of a developer machine that is allowed inside the network.
Obviously this can apply to insiders in a typical corporate network, but it also applies to trust in a prod VPC environment.
This kind of thinking is why secops often develops an adversarial relationship with other teams — the teams actually making money.
I’ve seen this dynamic play out dozens of times and I’ve never seen it block an attack. I have seen it tank productivity and break production systems many times however.
PS: The biggest impact denying outbound traffic has is to block Windows Update or the equivalent for other operating systems or applications. I’m working with a team right now that has to smuggle NPM modules in from their home PCs because they can’t run “npm audit fix” successfully on their isolated cloud PCs. Yes, for security they’re prevented from updating vulnerable packages unless they bend over backwards.
I am a DFIR consultant, and I've been involved in 20 or 30 engagements over the last 15 years where proper egress controls would've stopped the adversary in their tracks.
What do you consider proper egress blocking? No DNS? No ICMP? No access to any web proxy? No CDP or OCSP access? Strict domain-based filtering of all outbound traffic? What about cloud management endpoints?
This can get to the point that it becomes nigh impossible to troubleshoot anything. Not even “ping” works!
And troubleshoot you will have to, trust me. You’ll discover that root cert updates are out-of-band and not included in some other security patches. And you’ll discover that the 60s delay that’s impossible to pin down is a CRL validating timeout. You’ll discover that ICMP isn’t as optional as you thought.
I’ve been that engineer, I’ve done this work, and I consider it a waste of time unless it is protecting at least a billion dollars worth of secrets.
PS: practically 100% of exfiltrated data goes via established and approved channels such as OneDrive. I just had a customer send a cloud VM disk backup via SharePoint to a third party operating in another country. Oh, not to mention the telco that has outsourced core IT functions to both Chinese and Russian companies. No worries though! They’ve blocked me from using ping to fix their broken network.
private artifact repos with the ability to act as a caching proxy are easy to set up. afaik all the major cloud providers offer basic ones with the ability to use block or allow lists.
going up a level in terms of capabilities, JFrog is miserable to deal with as a vendor but Artifactory is hard to beat when it comes to artifact management.
This alone can keep multiple FTEs busy permanently.
“Easy” is relative.
Maybe you work in a place with a thousand devs and infinite VC money protecting a trillion dollars of intellectual property then sure, it’s easy.
If you work in a normal enterprise it’s not easy at all.
I’m both a developer and a DFIR expert, and I practice what I preach. The apps I ship have a small allowlist for necessary external endpoints and everything else is denied.
Trust me, your vulnerabilities aren’t theoretical, especially if you’re using Windows systems for internet-facing prod.
Most Linux-pedigree tools don’t support authenticating proxies at all, or do so very poorly. For example, most have just a single proxy setting that’s either “on” or “off”. Compare that to PAC files typically used in corporate environments that implement a fine grained policy selecting different proxies based on location or destination.
It’s very easy to get into a scenario where one tool requires a proxy env var that breaks another tool.
“Stop complaining about the hoops! Just jump through them already! We need you to do that forever and ever because we might get attacked one day by an attacker that’ll work around the outbound block in about five minutes!”
They do work. My best analogy is it's like working at TSA except there are three terrorist attacks per week.
As far as privacy goes, by the same analogy, I can guarantee the operators don't care what porn you watch. Doing the job is more important. But still, treat your work machine as a work machine. It's not yours, it's a tool your company lent to you to work with.
That said, on HN your workers are likely to be developers - that does take some more skill, and I'd advise asking a potential provider frank questions about their experience with the sector, as well as your risk tolerance. Devs do dodgy stuff all the time, and they usually know what they're doing, but when they don't you're going to have real fun proving you've remediated.
The secondary effects are entirely dependent on how your microservices talk to their dependencies. Are they already talking to some local proxy that handles load balancing and service discovery? If so, then you can bolt on ssl termination at that layer. If not, and your microservice is using dns and making http requests directly to other services, it’s a game of whack-a-mole modifying all of your software to talk to a local “sidecar”; or you have to configure every service to start doing the SSL validation which can explode in complexity when you end up dealing with a bunch of different languages and libraries.
None of it is impossible by any means, and many companies/stacks do all of this successfully, but it’s all work that doesn’t add features, can lead to performance degradation, and is a hard sell to get funding/time for because your boss’s boss almost certainly trusts the cloud provider to handle such things at their network layer unless they have very specific security requirements and knowledge.
In my experience, that access control is necessary for several reasons (mistakes due to inexperience, cowboys, compliance requirements, client security questions, etc.) around 50-100 developers.
This isn't just "not zero trust", it's access to everything inside the cluster (and maybe the cluster components themselves) or access to nothing -- there is no way to grant partial access to what's running in the cluster.