Early in the piece, they marvel that it's somehow OK to email magic login links to people, but not to SMS logins. Yes: among other reasons, that's because there's nobody an attacker can realistically call on the phone or bribe at a neighborhood cell phone store to rehome an email account. Nobody wants to do away with SMTP more than I do, but everybody has it, and most people (by an overwhelming majority) host it with their absolute most secure provider.
Get past the SMS/SMTP thing. You're doing a low-sensitivity CMS application. It would be bizarre for you to have a Passkeys implementation. It's even weird for you to do login-with-Google or SIWA. Just mail magic links! Be done with it!
TOTP is dead tech. Implement the full gamut of OIDC provider logins --- most of which have better TOTP implementations than you'll come up with (but also tend to steer their users away from TOTP) and forget that it exists.
I'd like to have a coda here about how things get much harder if you're a high-sensitivity application. But they don't. Mostly what happens is that OIDC signon gets much more important.
The bit about TOTP secrets being worse, harder-to-rotate passwords also misses the point of why passwords are bad and why unmasked TOTP seed storage is not in fact that big of a deal, but who cares? Just don't do TOTP.