They'd just invest more in not having to reverse on appeal. Handling these kinds of incentives with rules and strictures gets messy fast.
Too often, we throw our hands up and declare legislation impossible "because companies will just get around it in ways, X, Y, and Z". The solution is to write better laws that also remove X, Y, and Z as options. And also X0, X1, Y0, Y1, Y2, Z0, Z1, Z2, Z3, and Z4. The world is complex and regulation can be complex, too. You'll never fix things by giving up and saying "We can't write the perfect law--oh well, let's just let companies do whatever they want!"
I think the letter of the law should stipulate the spirit of the law (almost a TL;DR right at the beginning) so that jurists can later take that into account when deciding if the law was broken.
That happens a lot with finding loopholes in housing related legislations. If there is a proposal that would hurt investors, they lobby against it for a while, buying time to figure out an alternative method, and by the time it passes, they don’t really care because they’ve circumvented it anyways.
I see why it would also suck if we fast tracked most of the legislations though.
That happens anyway though, as much of law in Common Law systems is only settled by precedents, jurisprudence, etc. Even the US's Constitution interpretation is up to the courts when questions arise, that's the courts' job anyhow.
At least working with the spirit of the law allows ways to prevent loopholes in a way that the letter of the law process only allows if new legislation is passed to cover those loopholes.
Judicial review of the constitutionality of laws is itself an invention of the courts, in fact. (And probably a good idea, but it’s something the courts had to decide they had, not a role or power plain in the law). So that specific thing being their job is… something they decided was their job, which is kinda funny.
1. Interpretation should not be limited to the letter of the law but should reconstruct the legislative intent from the texts, taking into account the unity of the legal system, the circumstances in which the law was drafted, and the specific conditions of the time when it is applied.
2. However, the interpreter cannot consider a legislative intent that does not have at least a minimal verbal correspondence in the letter of the law, even if it is imperfectly expressed.
3. In determining the meaning and scope of the law, the interpreter will presume that the legislator has adopted the most appropriate solutions and has expressed their intent in suitable terms.
It doesn't help make the meaning of the text more determinate, but it may shift where the battle is fought.
The theory of strict construction is a protection in our legal system. Otherwise you'll end up with a system similar to the insurance you're complaining about - generalized rules, you won't know the outcome going into it, and they can find ways to make the rules for the desired outcome. (This stuff happens in the legal system today, it would just get immensely worse)
Real talk, the US spends more on socialized medicine per capita than all of Europe, nobody should get reelected, no foreign aid rendered nor bombs dropped until we receive what has been long paid for.
They want you to focus on the former sort of "solution" than the one I provide and that's why you probably are first hearing of mine now.
Funnily enough, as far as I have been able to figure, this is basically the unifying element of all developed-country healthcare systems outside the US, which have a lot of variety but all seem to do this, one way or another.
Some do it with comprehensive direct price controls that are pretty much exactly “it’s illegal to charge too-high prices” (Japan), some through state monopsony (Great Britain), some through limited price controls but the very-credible threat of adding more if providers get too greedy (Singapore), and many through some combo of the above, but the effect always boils down to price controls.
If that buyer decides your price is too high, you sell around 0 units.
You can often receive these treatments if you wish to pay privately. Only the very wealthy do this, a small market.
Drug companies in the US prefer to sell units at the prices that the buyers in those nations are allowing them VS not selling them at all. That's why they do it. Then turn around and say they can't do the same in the US as it would bankrupt them.
The difference is in the US, Medicaid is quite happy to pay prices that are multiples of what other nations are paying. They sort of pretend this is all some sort of accident or due to some complexity that you wouldn't understand but it's just theft.
[edit] apologies if I’ve misunderstood, though—the above is not intended as one of those “rephrase your point into something you definitely weren’t saying” sarcastic things people do sometimes, I’m really trying to follow along.
Reimports of drugs produced in the United States back from Canada are prohibited for safety reasons. You know because those Canadians are famous for tampering with drugs for unclear reason and benefit. It's all a farce.
That would be the goal. Get it right first time around.
And to the extent that costs do go up for appeals processes, there's no guarantee that the resulting setup has margins that incentivize doing right by customers at all.