And since that new Rust compiler might not have much of an optimizer (if it even has one at all), then you recompile rustc with your just-compiled rustc.
* Bootstrapping a language on a new architecture using an existing architecture. With modern compilers this is usually done using cross compilation * Bootstrapping a language on an architecture _without_ using another architecture
The latter is mostly done for theoretical purposes like reproducibility like reflections on trusting trust
Yes, I think it's silly too but other people disagree and they are free to work on whatever they want. Do I think it's a mostly pointless waste of time? Obviously, I do. Still, I guess there are worst ones.
Note that the Rust project does use cross-compilation for the ports it supports itself and considering the amount of time they use features only available in the current version of rustc in rustc, I guess it's safe to assume they share my opinion on the usefulness of keeping Rust bootstrappable.
Just because something has already been done, does not mean there’s no worth in doing it- nor that there is only worth in doing it for educational and/or experiential purposes :)
If you change your question to "why does anyone care about bootstrapping?", the answer would revolve around that aforementioned supply chain attack vector.
For details, you could check out:
- Reading the 1984 paper "Reflections on Trusting Trust", for which Ken Thompson was given the ACM Turing award: https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_Ref...
- Or watching this short Computerphile video on the above: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJ7lOus1FzQ
- You can read about the GNU Guix endeavor to achieve a 100% bootstrapped Linux development environment (using zero pre-compiled binaries), starting from a 357-byte HEX file: https://guix.gnu.org/en/blog/2023/the-full-source-bootstrap-...
Perhaps you're comfortable with the lack of assurances that non-boostrapable builds entails (everyone has a different appetite for risk); some others aren't though, and so they have an interest in efforts to mitigate the security risks inherent in trusting a supply chain of opaque binaries.
Pypy, for instance, implements RPython, which is a valid subset of Python. The compiler is written in RPython. The compiler code is limited on features, but it only needs to implement what RPython includes.
I haven't really been following Zig, but I still felt slightly disappointed when I learnt that they were just replacing a source-based bootstrapping compiler with a binary blob that someone generated and added to the source tree.
The thing that makes me uncomfortable with that approach is that if a certain kind of bug (or virus! [0]) is found in the compiler, it's possible that you have to fix the bug in multiple versions to rebootstrap, in case the bug (or virus!) manages to persist itself into the compilation output. The Dozer article talks about the eventual goal of removing all generated files from the rustc source tree, ie undoing what Zig recently decided to do.
If everything is reliably built from source, you can just fix any bugs by editing the current source files.
OK, so you decide to use Compcert C. You now have a proof that your object code is what your C code asked for. Do you have a formal proof of your C code? Have you proved that you have not allowed any surprises? If not, what is your Rust compiler? Junk piled on top of junk, from this standpoint.
On the other hand, you could have a verified WASM (or other VM) runner. That verified runner could run the output of a formally verified compiler (which Rustc is not). The trusted base is actually quite small if you had a fully specified language with a verified compiler. But you have to start with that trusted base, and something like a compiler written in C is not really enough to get you there.
Oh, and why do we trust QBE?
And why would it be easier to manually inspect (prove correct) the output of every phase than to manually inspect (prove correct) the source code? The compiled code will often lose important information about code structure, how abstractions are used, include optimisations, etc.
I usually trust my ability to understand source code better than my ability to understand the compiled code.
The Dozer article explains, under "The Descent Principle", how rustc will eventually be buildable using only source code [0] (other than a "512-byte binary seed" which implements a trivial hex interpreter). You still need to trust a computer to run everything on, though in theory it should be possible to gain trust by running it on multiple computers and checking that the result is the same (this is why any useful system bootstrapping project should also be reproducible [1]).
It's not objectionable to have non-portable source code anyway. I think it's fine having architecture-specific assembly code, just as long as it's hand-written.
The problems arise when you're storing generated content in the source repository, because it becomes unclear how you're meant to understand and fix the generated content. In this case it seems like the way to fix it is by rerunning the compiler, but if running the compiler involves running this incorrect blob, it's not clear that running the compiler again will produce a correct blob.
I wonder if anyone is monitoring these commits in Zig to ensure that the blobs are actually generated genuinely, since if not it seems like an easy way for someone to inject a KTH (Ken Thompson Hack): https://github.com/ziglang/zig/commits/master/stage1/zig1.wa...
It is much easier to add support for a platform to the compiler backend than to write a new, full compiler with its own, new bootstrapping method.