You leak basic metadata (who talked to who at what time).
You leak 100% of messages with "business account", which are another way to say "e2e you->meta and then meta relays the message e2e to N reciptients handling that business account".
Then there's the all the links and images which are sent to e2e you->meta, meta stores the image/link once, sends you back a hash, you send that hash e2e to your contact.
there's so many leaks it's not even fun to poke fun at them.
And I pity anyone who is fool enough to think meta products are e2e anything.
actually its a nominated end point, and then from there its up to the business. It works out better for meta, because they aren't liable for the content if something goes wrong. (ie a secret is leaked, or PII gets out.) Great for GDPR because as they aren't acting as processor of PII they are less likley to be taken to court.
Whatsapp has about the same level of practical "privacy" (encryption is a loaded word here) as iMessage. The difference is, there are many more easy ways to report nasty content in whatsapp, which reported ~1 million cases of CSAM a year vs apples' 267. (not 200k, just 267. Thats the whole of apple. https://www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids/pdfs/202...)
Getting the content of normal messages is pretty hard, getting the content of a link, much easier.
Its not signal, but then its never meant to be.
https://engineering.fb.com/2023/04/13/security/whatsapp-key-...
For iMessage, Apple can just add a fake iDevice to your account and now iMessage will happily encrypt everything to that new key as well and there's zero practical visibility to the user. If it was a targeted attack and not blanket surveillance then there's no way the target is going to notice. You can open up the keychain app and check for yourself but unless you regularly do this and compare the keys between all your Apple products you can't be sure. I don't even know how to do that on iPhone.
and show that fb eclipse everyone by a insane margin it's scary!
about your point on business accounts, the documents i reviewed included dialog tree bots managed by meta. not sure if not having that change things... but in that case it was spelled out that meta is the recipient
In whatsapp, the report button is on the same menu that you use to reply/hide/pin/react.
Once you do that, it sends the offending message to meta, unencrypted. To me, that seems like a reasonable choice. Even if you have "proper" e2ee, it would still allow rooting out of nasty/illegal shit. those reports are from real people, rather than automated CSAM hashing on encrpyted messages. (although I suspect there is some tracking before and after.)
Its the same with instagram/facebook. The report button is right there. I don't agree with FB on many things, but this one I think they've made the right choice.
Not to say that deliberately making yourself blind to what's happening on your platform will always be a bulletproof way to avoid liability, but it's a much more defensible position than being able to see the illegal activity on your platform and not doing anything about it. Especially in the case of seriously serious crimes like CSAM, terrorism, etc.
The issue is law enforcement doesn't want that kind of access. Because they have no manpower to go after criminals. This would increase their caseload hundredfold within a month. So they prefer to punish the entity that created this honeypot. So it goes away and along with it the crime will go back underground where police can pretend it doesn't happen.
Telegram is basically punished for existing and not doing law enforcement job for them.
Apparently, they have. Sorry for your bet.
I bet that if they really asked, they pretty much asked Telegram to build them one click creator that would print them court ready documents about criminals on their platform so that law enforcement can just click a button and yell "we got one!" to the judge.
That's not true. For one things, it is expensive. For another, there's a chance people will find out and you'll lose all your criminal customers... they might even seek retribution.
> I bet that if they really asked, they pretty much asked Telegram to build them one click creator that would print them court ready documents about criminals on their platform so that law enforcement can just click a button and yell "we got one!" to the judge.
You seem to believe, without having looked at the publicly available facts of the matter, that the problem is law enforcement didn't say "pretty please". The fact of the matter is that they've refused proper law enforcement requests repeatedly; if anyone has been rude about it, it's been Durov.
Meta can provide conversation and account metadata (Twitter does the same - or used to do at least), or suspend accounts
Learn more: https://about.meta.com/actions/safety/audiences/law/guidelin...
Yes, WA messages are supposed to be e2e encrypted. Unless end-to-end encryption is prohibited by law in your jurisdiction, I don't see how that question is relevant in this context.
It is supposedly end-to-end encrypted. And in a shallow way. Also the app is closed source and you can't develop your own.
It's basically end-to-end-trust-me-bro-level encrypted.
That should scare a lot of us.
This tells me most of the people implementing this are either too-scared of the consequences, or they think what they're implementing is ethical and/or the right thing to do. Again, both are scary thoughts we should be highly concerned about in a healthy society that talks about these things.
One other potential explanation: FB and these large behemoths have compartmentalized the implementations of these features so much that no one can speak authoritatively about it's encryption.
The simplest explanation: when peope start at facebook/meta they leave their ethics at the door on the first day in the role.
It’s cynical, but does explain a lot: many people will pick the fat paycheque over their ethics any day, particularly in the US (where money is king)
The secondary business idea it to tie their users logins to their real world identities, to the point of repeatedly locking out users who they live under threat and refuse to disclose their real name.