[1] https://semiengineering.com/nanoimprint-finds-its-footing-in...
[2] https://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/business/china-to-bui...
[1] https://semiengineering.com/nanoimprint-finds-its-footing-in...
[2] https://www.electronicsweekly.com/news/business/china-to-bui...
There was a startup in Fremont, Lyncean Technologies, that had a 10 watt EUV source based on a small synchrotron.[2][3] They supposedly got to 10 watts. But that was too weak for EUV semiconductor work. They struggled for years to find a market, and went bankrupt in 2022. Here's the video of the equipment auction.[4] If, with this new optical system, only 20 watts are needed, that technology is worth reviving.
Something YC might be interested in.
An accelerator source is much cleaner than the laser tin-zapping thing AMSL uses. It's amazing that works as a commercial product.
[1] https://euvlsymposium.lbl.gov/pdf/2014/39af88b9d637418d86614...
[2] https://web.archive.org/web/20220119174924/https://lynceante...
The Science/Engineering to make this work is nothing short of magic! There are actually two lasers; the first one to reshape the spherical tin droplet to concave shape and the second one to vaporize it to plasma generating EUV range light.
The Extreme Engineering of ASML’s EUV Light Source by Asianometry - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Ge2RcvDlgw
Canon and Nikon don't need to be bleeding edge. Majority of the chip fabrication market is 20nm, 28nm, and 40nm along with analog chips (60nm+).
The sub-20nm chips will become more common as more and more fabs get turned on and EUV eventually gets commoditized, but the RoI isn't there yet for most electronics aside from high margins consumer electronics like GPUs, high end cellphones, etc.
> Chinese universities and companies are working on particle accelerator based EUV sources
Both the Chinese (SMIC) and the Japanese (OIST) attempts don't have great yield rates (the OIST project above is barely 50% of ASML's and SMIC's is reported to be similar).
Both will crack it eventually, but the order book for ASML's High NA EUV (3nm and below) is entirely Intel, Samsung, and the American fabs for TSMC for the next 3-4 years so by the time a competitor is ASML comparable, a significant subset of high end US and SK fabs will have transitioned to 3nm.
Surely the vast majority of fab income derives from these small nodes, just based on the sheer pricing disparity between complex semiconductors and everything else.
Few leading node machines = machine manufacturer/fab can charge high margins
Multiple trailing node machines/suppliers = machine manufacturers/fabs begin to compete on price, driving down margins
A good example of this principle is the diffusion of analog chip and memory chip fabrication in the 1990s to early 2010s (US/TW/JP/SK in 1980s-90s to MY/SG/PH in the 90s to CN in the 2000s).
The ongoing diffusion of specialized DUVL processes like 20nm, 28nm, and 40nm is another great example (US in the 2000s to TW/SK in the 2010s to CN in the late 2010s/early 2020s).
Nowadays companies like PSMC are selling the entire end-to-end Fab IP for 28nm/40nm processes to companies in JP, IN, ID, US, etc, further diffusing the know how.
if A has $500 and B has $500 (and each put money away at the end of the year), tariffs on A are meant to 'eliminate' the compounding interest of the market. so over long horizons B ends up ahead. A still makes progress (but substantially further behind from where it could have been).
my example is more true of sanctions than tariffs. i've noticed many misguided tariffs from countries with less noble aims recently.
the US chip sanctions are viewed happily by the entire industry - except China. This means other countries have a chance to further displace China in the sector. Not agreeing with a certain sanction is fine but my point stands: they are meant to hobble countries long term.
Taiwan doesn’t consider itself part of China.
So the US view is in line with the practical facts on the ground.
And China wouldn’t need to saber rattle if they had credible “alternate” facts or didn’t feel they were the ones “hobbled”.
You mean like this? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CHIPS_and_Science_Act
In fairness, I don't know all the inner workings of what was already in place and how much more they had to do initially, it just feels peculiar that the denied interested parties(large Japanese companies) never achieved it.
[0] https://www.bbc.com/news/business-65022389
[1] https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/36Kr-KrASIA/Semiconductor-f...
[2] https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3206470/greates...
[3] https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3126124/chinas...
(A lot of these sources mention the same incidents, they are not all separate, just wanted to give more than one source)
On top of that - an underappreciated aspect of lithography is yield. It's likely China can already beat ASML in a lab setting with <5% yield rates, but that's not a competitive process. What makes TSMC so valuable is their relatively high yield on cutting-edge node technology, alongside their fairly large capacity to supply multiple businesses at once. China has to design a scalable EUV alternative, bring it up to acceptable/profitable yield and quality control, and then scale it to replace the demand for most of the domestic chip clients. It's a lot of work, and it would not surprise me if we saw a lot of China's chip efforts echo their confident-but-slowed progress in engine design.
I full well expect that China is interested in producing silicon at-cost for the defense industry. It remains to be seen if they even have competitive designs though. Their premier domestic ISA, LoongArch, is based on 40-year-old MIPS architecture design. Cut off from international designs, it's not really clear how strong China's engineering chops are.
CATL, DJI, Douyin & post-grad engineering programs all over the US suggest the answer is "very strong." Underestimating China is not good for anyone wishing to remain competitive
To my knowledge, China's most advanced domestic lithography is a dubious 7nm chip with unknown yields made entirely with DUV, not EUV. This is really quite poor and I invite you to share more updated sources if you think that I'm underestimating them here.
Since when have EVs required high-density silicon? China's EVs are impressive, but it's 100% more of an endorsement of their lithium supply chain than their silicon one.
> They're at the top of telecom tech as well
That's a funny rendering of events. Didn't Huawei get forcibly removed from the market after they refused to let governments audit their security? I don't think that's an industry-leading attitude compared to Cisco. The only thing Huawei can win on is low prices, which really isn't a priority of telecoms when you're trying to sell backdoored hardware.
Additionally - telecom tech doesn't require advanced silicon either. Most WiFi routers and Ethernet switches are made with the same silicon the US already manufactures in GlobalFoundries and Intel fabs. The fact that China has 24nm DUV is not at all impressive when half the world was already exporting similar density silicon for cars and routers.
So... yeah, I do need to look at better examples if I want to trust their word. From both the examples you've given me it seems like China is focusing on cheap low-density hardware that anyone can make, but China can make cheaper thanks to their political prisoners and labor camps. Not only is it unimpressive, it's not even a slight example of how China can put modern silicon nodes into mass-production.
You are describing 2010-era fab technology, when talking about EV and telecom chips. I just hope you know that's what you're bragging about here.
Maybe they do turn things around, in the long-run. But the US can invest just as hard, and they haven't burned their bridges with ASML/TSMC. On top of that, the US can license IP from companies like ARM that previously weren't even shared with China to avoid unlicensed clones. The US wants their IP and global industry to prop them up here, and I don't think it's crazy to suggest they've got the upper-hand right now.
Important to contextualize "a while" is really last 10 years - post Tianamen weapons sanctions catchup was still in era where PRC tertiary production was fraction of current talent production with massive brain drain. Turbojet catchup was contingent on 10 years of generational tertiary catchup, 10 years of integrating talent into workforce, which semi is benefitting from out of gate/not as cripplingly bottlenecked on. Hence catchup gap/rate likely lessened under current conditions where there's increasingly less talent shortage, with trend of outright talent advantage, i.e. PRC IC white paper from 2018 targetted pumping 30k IC talent per year, now likely around ~550k/700k they think needed for entire domestic IC supply chain (was at ~400k in 2018). Meanwhile everyone else is projecting talent shortfall, so the ultimate catchup is post 2030s when PRC has 700k+/700k semi with likely surplus while western semi try to maintain lead with talent shortage, all the while PRC indigenous semi will chip away at the 300B+ IC imports currently being paid to western semi to support their R&D towards maintaining lead.
> forced to import foreign technology
Question is how long / at which point will PRC be fine with with relying indigenous, rumored indigenous 12nm production line coming online soon. Industrial policy can spam that... then what are the incentives? I argue they would be MORE incentivized to disrupt/degrade TSMC responsible for ~90% of high end nodes even with after CHIPS that disproportionately support the west. The fastest way for PRC to close gap then is to deny west advanced nodes, already largely denied to it. Some PRC planner is crunching the math that if everyone forced to make do with mostly 12nm chips, then PRC is going to have advantage in cost/scale in production AND renewable energy for operation costs. The flip side of the competitive coin and TSMC delimma is to make adversaries less competitive via denial. US can maintain peacetime advantage with lawfare, PRC can erode that advantage with warfare.
> US can invest just as hard, and they haven't burned their bridges with ASML/TSMC
But will it be as effective? Developments around Intel not promising. Even with CHIPs there's no sign US is going to plug talent shortage gap. US can buy the machines, build the fabs, the current bottle neck is still US talent production with respect to semi. Are they going to figure out how to get US fab workers to work as hard as TWnese even with proper compensation?
Also PRC hasn't burnt bridges with ASML/TSMC, US export controls attempted to burn that bridge against their wishes. But current ASML net sales to PRC due to stockpiling ~50% of their global total. They'd be happy to sell kitchen sink to PRC absent export controls.
> they've got the upper-hand right now
I don't think anyone's disputing that. I'm pointing out the contraints to catch timeframe for PRC is likely smaller than vs aviation, and ability for western semi to keep gap less due to current projected talent shortfalls. And once PRC establishes comprehensive semi supply chain, one that does not require multinational coordination, it will have certain competitive advantages. Also the entire point is to pivot away from western tech stack to avoid the ip/licensing fees and chip away US dominance in computing in general. PRC getting their semi up = starting condition for PRC eventually competing against trillions of value of US SaaS. PRC not just unhappy US control semi hardware, it's also unhappy US controls global software/appstore ecosystems. But that IMO much harder and broader battle, but one that is coming.