If your adversary is a nation state, you've already lost.
Which gives me another opportunity to quote from my favourite Usenix paper:
"In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@ virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them. "
Figure 1:
Threat: Ex-girlfriend/boyfriend breaking into your email account and publicly releasing your correspondence with the My Little Pony fan club
Solution: Strong passwords
Threat: Organized criminals breaking into your email account and sending spam using your identity
Solution: Strong passwords + common sense (don’t click on unsolicited herbal Viagra ads that result in keyloggers and sorrow)
Threat: The Mossad doing Mossad things with your email account
Solution:
• Magical amulets?
• Fake your own death, move into a submarine?
• YOU’RE STILL GONNA BE MOSSAD’ED UPON
-- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf