In Russia's War on Ukraine, Effective Satellites Are Few and Far Between (2022)
rferl.org
rferl.org
The flat-footedness of Russia's response to the nearly two-week-long incursion of Ukrainian forces into the Kursk region of Russia speaks to exceedingly poor capabilities or utilisation of remote-sensing, signals, and human intelligence by Russia.
From a discussion elsewhere, apparently Russia's surveillance satellite resources are limited and highly aged, which may explain at least part of its poor showing here.
That is a very common problem in well-entrenched autocracies, especially in closed and censorious societies.
(Also, here in late 2024, I suspect that most of "Russia's" satellite intel capability is actually "friendly Chinese" satellite intel capability. Which has its own set of issues - starting with China's wanting to avoid an actual Russian victory, and ending with Putin's emotions about dependence on China's self-serving charity.)
But even a tell'em-what-they-want-to-hear establishment is ultimately limited by their raw data-gathering capabilities.
Your observation raises the question I'd also had about what China's own capabilities are.
(And how reliable China's interpretation/analysis organisation's communications are.)