I don't agree. This is plausible within a coesive electorate, but it feels like moving the problem. What guarantees that the experts are trusted by the voters? And more importantly, assuming that at some point the system (experts) is trusted, how is the trust in the voting system retained over time? (e.g. in case of disagreement over the results)
I have argued in another thread like GP that because the ultimate purpose of voting systems is to collectively take decisions, and because disagreements are very common when deciding, the system needs to be able to justify itself to retain the electorate's trust. Otherwise it will eventually be replaced by a different voting system (or tyranny).
A proxy for this is of course simplicity. If the voting system is clearly understood by everyone, it is more easy to persuade a losing party that the outcome is correct. Conversely, if a voting system needs high expertise to be understood, it is more difficult to bring everyone to agree on the result. So the latter is less robust than the former, especially if the disagreement is over a result that is close to a tie. A self-correcting mechanism is important to keep the voting system in place.
In appendix B of your thesis you raise an interesting point I had not considered.
> As an extreme example, consider the case where a voting system lacks verifiability, is trusted by the public, and is compromised by a foreign superpower: the people have lost their democracy and do not even realize it. Compare that to a hypothetical case where a voting system has perfect verifiability, thus can not be compromised (without triggering a new election etc.), and, for whatever reason, is not trusted by the people.
> Clearly, the outcome where people are suspicious of a perfectly functioning voting system is superior to the outcome where people are blindly trusting a compromised voting system. We hope that this outlandish example is enough to support our argument that verifiability is more important than trust.
The external threat is a very valid point but I do not think that this is sufficient to absolutely conclude that verifiability is more important than trust. If the system is rigged, it may eventually displease the electorate to the point that it will eventually be replaced.
Unless, the rigged system doesn't displease the electorate and is essentially a hidden benevolent dictator, which would be an interesting situation. Only in that case verifiability could unambiguously be more important.