China's Banking System Headed for Crisis, Reports Say
asiasentinel.com
asiasentinel.com
I wonder if this is because the US tends to take a hands-off approach until it’s too late, usually prompting an overcorrection, while China seems at least a bit more proactive.
I’m very curious if anyone has credible studies explaining how the Chinese financial sector seems to survive through the persistent claims of impending failure.
Various Australian PM's have been dismissive towards China for popularist political reasons, aside from that the China watching below the surface tends to be good.
In the national press recently (last week) we have:
As Beijing quietly heads into economic oblivion while Washington lights up, expect tougher times ahead
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-23/china-approaching-eco...
which outlines how playing the long game has worked to China's advantage for some time, and how the scale of recent turns in fortune make for a ditch that could take time to reach the bottom and time again to climb out.
It makes sense, doesn't it?
The US seems to be destroying itself apart from within, and if the US falls or became weaker than China, Australia + NZ and other western countries who deal in the Pacific don't have much of a chance.
It's the best possibly strategy China could choose: Just wait.
Growth has been poor, the economy saw deflation, housing prices and the stock market are losing value, youth unemployment, bank debt, etc.
It’s one thing when it’s a transient event and you start to see a recovery, but China hasn’t, even after government intervention.
Will the economy “collapse”? Who knows, and what does “collapse” mean anyways?
But are the sign suggesting severe economic problems that are likely to have a big consequence on China's future? Seems like it.
In the 2000s, it was speculative banking, effects of currency manipulation, unstable growth
In the early 2010s, it was fear of a slowdown due to trade/stock/commodities
And in this decade so far, it’s property and a throwback to the 2000s.
Searching for “China long term economic problems 20XX” (replace XX with any year) has given me:
2022: COVID-19 restrictions causing impact on the property market (https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-slow-motion-financial-c...)
2019: A quarter of bad investment, weakening car sales, increased tariffs from the US: (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/business/china-economic-g...)
2017: More concern about slowing economic growth (https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/10/chinas-economic-problems-are...)
2015: More slowdown (https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-economic-growth-slows-to-...)
2013: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-economy-grows-ro...
2011: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/business/global/chinas-ec...
2006: Overproduction, deflation, property value concerns: https://www.cnn.com/2006/BUSINESS/03/12/eyeonchina.economy/i...
I struggle to see this as anything more than a multi-decades-long attempt to suggest that China couldn’t possibly eventually become the world’s largest economy.
"boy who cried wild" -> "boy who cried wolf"
A forced merger exactly is the mechanism by which the US FDIC removes failing banks from the system. There's a sort of auction offered over the weekend to potential acquirers, with the FDIC subsidizing the deal if necessary, and shareholders of the acquired typically wiped out.
It could be used for banks, insurance companies, and various other services the government deems required.
In return for th added risk, shareholders could expect higher returns, or they could choose to insure their shares against the risk of them ending up with a negative value.
And what lower counterparty risk? Now each investor is personally on the hook. Instead of walking away without their investment, now they are responsible for any loss. That’s higher risk.
Obviously such a thing I don't think has ever happened in modern times, but it's what would happen if all the insurers in the chain couldn't meet their obligations - the debt falls back to the insured person.
Look up Establishment companies in the Gulf Middle East then. If you've heard of stories of people being jailed for bankruptcy in the Gulf, most of the times, it is this. People set up Establishment companies because they are relatively cheaper and only need a local Arab to start up. Then when the companies end up in trouble, they get saddled with debt on an unlimited and personal liability basis, which causes them to be jailed, sometimes often with the Arab too. Usually the Arab's debts are wiped out by the government in annual amnesty programmes, but the foreigner is trapped till he pays or till the creditors write off the debt.
Not to mention, there's always an LLC option present in all of these countries but quite a few folks cheap out and then get rekt.
You’re describing a partnership. We had far more banking crises when banks were partnerships (and before deposit insurance).
* China's banking turmoil: 40 banks vanish, Jiangxi leads collapse: https://www.msn.com/en-ie/money/other/china-s-banking-turmoi... | https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40944836
* Small banks in China are running into trouble. Savers could lose everything: https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/23/economy/china-bank-runs-prote...
40 banks disappearing is really not much (unless you had money at that bank) given the scale the same sentence implies. Looking it up, 40 is less than 1% and these are small banks. I'd presume this isn't that big a deal.
If the failures are small, previously common, and at a manageable rate that isn’t accelerating then this could be a temporary blip. If the failures are larger, previously rare, and occurring at an accelerating rate then this could be the start of a Chinese banking collapse.
This seems like it also differentiates the "financial economy" from the "real economy". The borrowers continue to pay the new owner, the depositors are made whole, and actual productive enterprises continue to tick on. The only ones punished were the investors who took a risk on bank management that wasn't doing an adequate job of managing risk. That feels like what SHOULD be happening.
Endless bailouts have distorted the risk mindset of banks, and letting them fail should help restore discipline.
I don't really see how this is possible. If the government didn't want a collapse to happen, they can always print more RMB and loan it to the struggling banks on 'pay it back in 100 years' type terms and kick the can down the road till it isn't a problem anymore.
China’s government stepped in and corrected big during the Evergrand thing, but it isn’t a big secret that China is super leveraged into junk real estate. The complete lack of transparency makes it super hard to tell what is rumors, but it wouldn’t be a huge surprise to see a major correction in China.
It would be a huge surprise to see a major correction.