U.S. Commercial Real Estate Is Headed Toward a Crisis
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That said, yes FANG and a few of the big big corporations are adamantly trying to get/keep people back in the office. Many of these companies also just finished building multi-billion dollar campuses. Imagine the heads that will roll when they finally admit to themselves that these campuses were a total waste of money, and don't even have much re-sale value because no one needs corporate CRE anymore.
This is more true than I think a lot of people realize, even where I am in fairly rural east coast USA, many of the office buildings in town have been vacant since the pandemic. No one needs these structures anymore. Even traditionally in-person venues like doctors' offices are slowly starting to shift a double digit percentage of their appointments to video calls. The writing is on the wall.
sell sell sell
There is also something to be said about the political environment. White-collar workers, particularly tech workers, aren't popular. Tech jobs in urban centres are on the consensus chopping block. That means the space they occupied, these offices, are obsolete--irrespective of WFH v RTO.
The office space sprawl of today will adjust to small-scale, experimental industry space, with a heavy emphasis on automation and custom engineering (industry v2).
Well after the collapse of today’s inflated commercial real estate.
It’s understandable that doctors haven’t gone all in on WFH. Their profession more or less requires being hands on with patients, but that’s not the only meaningful work there is.
But my work supports businesses that employ people, see patients, and provide robust tax revenues to local communities. That’s meaningful, and it doesn’t require anything more than my office at home.
I think you’re right about industrial spaces. A friend of mine works for a company that creates building automation technology, and even their hardware engineers have automated a lot of the physical testing infrastructure. Not even those teams are in-office every day at his company anymore.
EDIT: Not quite https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB
Readily accessible, public data that the Fed updates weekly[1] clearly shows $9.943 billion at peak and currently sitting on $8.142 billion.
This is also why you'll see deals like X months free, because that's a way to say "Look, they're paying the requested rate!" but in reality they're earning less money per month due to the free months. This goes for residential real estate like apartments as well.
I have pension fund lenders on current projects and past projects and they absolutely did not care about (or even inquire about) incentive packages affecting NER so long as the stabilized NOI meets the debt servicing ratios.
I have dozens and dozens of market value appraisals for projects I’ve done and projects I’ve looked at doing (vendor provided) by appraisers all across the country and I have never, ever seen one that takes into account inducement packages.
Can I ask out of curiosity, are you located in the maritimes?
I realize the source of confusion here — I said NOI is based on NERs in my first comment when I should have said market value. NOI would indeed typically be stabilized at market face rents, and then we would apply below the line adjustments for off-market rents, abatements, leasing/capital costs, etc.
Solvency is capital-stack agnostic. The debt can make it worse. But the question of how it's financed is being ignored because it isn't particularly pertinent.
Your statement couldn’t be more incorrect. Debt to equity/assets is the key consideration. Too much debt in a capital stack by definition decreases solvency (all else equal)
Oof, HN and its armchair finance.
Solvency is leverage agnostic because it doesn’t directly change with leverage. You don’t cite the source for your quote, but it should be obligations or liabilities, not debt. When liabilities exceed assets, you’re insolvent. Being debt free doesn’t guarantee solvency.
In practice they’re related because interest expense flows through to the income statement. But that is indirect. And you can lever something up infinitely without changing its solvency profile. (You change its risk, which in this sense means the probability is becomes insolvent in the future. Within the context of real estate, where extend and pretend is common, this distinction is highly relevant.)
The CRE problem is not a creature of debt. It’s a function of a previously-useful asset becoming, suddenly, less useful.
While I agree with that, the reason it's become a national economic problem is because of the scale of the problem. I probably would not be as big a deal if interest rates never went so low.
Sure. But that’s about cost of capital. Not debt. If it had all been financed with equity it would be a bit more resilient. But it would still be a massive problem.
I am a past CFA charterholder and spent a number of years doing deep fundamental analysis of public equities so not exactly armchair finance.
I think the disconnect in our discussion is the use of the word agnostic and that capital stack “isn’t particularly relevant”. “All else equal” more debt decreases solvency and less debt increases solvency. It isn’t guaranteed in either direction, but to state that it is agnostic massively downplays the relevancy of debt in the capital stack to solvency. The fact that other variables (productivity of the assets, non-debt liabilities, etc) can also impact solvency doesn’t translate to “capital stack isn’t relevant”. These are directly related and incredibly important to assessing solvency.
Sorry, I should not have said that.
> the use of the word agnostic and that capital stack “isn’t particularly relevant”
Consider metrics conventionally considered capital-structure agnostic. All of them are affected to some degree, in practice, by borrowing more or less. (Whether through interest expense or risk perceptions by investors, employees and customers.) Within the context of commercial real estate's size in our economy, whether it's financed with debt or equity is irrelevant to its value drawdown. The root of the problem, as OP suggests, is not in debt.
There is a separate problem in our banking system tied to CRE valuations. That's a debt problem. But that's a derivative of the fundamental problem of the properties' values going down. Those values would have gone down irrespective of how much was borrowed because the properties are being used less. (Nobody is choosing WFH because their office landlord is leveraged.)
Make it 4-5%, contingent upon (or give additional subsidies for) making significant percentage affordable rentals. Use the cash to cut the centers out of the building to daylight the large floor plates.
Residential rents for much more/ft than commercial so shouldn’t be a problem floating existing commercial mortgages. Maybe there’s even a program to borrow against the future higher stream of income to get non-performing loans current so these banks hold the existing paper instead of taking the write down.
There is no shortage of capital in real estate. Simplify approvals and the builders will come.
All these are expensive things to do, because office buildings were built to be office buildings. It's not impossible to convert them to housing, but there aren't as many cases as you'd expect where it makes economic sense to do so.
> The clock is ticking
> a reckoning
> full-blown financial crisis
I've been hearing about this since at-least 2021. How long will it take for this 'crisis' to come to fruition.
For instance in commercial real estate, vacancies are (and for some classes have been) through the roof for a long time.
It’s unlikely this is entirely a nothing burger.
Not saying you're right or wrong but that's not a sound basis for judgment
As were the other 15 crashes that didn’t happen.
Though you may of course try to identify possible triggers early and try to defuse them in advance.
This crisis has been ongoing this year like a slow burn. Investors directly related to these assets know they are making heavy losses
But - this is a full blown crisis in a small segment of real estate of only large cities. As such, this is affecting only a small fraction of investor portfolios. Moreover, the bank lenders who engaged in CRE lending have the backing of a very active Federal Reserve - see SVB.
This is not going to have anywhere close to the kind of impact the US housing crisis had in 2008.
Watching it yesterday was a shocker though -- I had forgotten (having been so young) that the 2008 financial crisis had roots so much earlier.
But then I reminisced a little more: this was based on what I recall actually going on at the time. I was a kid at the time, who got his first minimum wage high school job working side by side with a lady who was there because her husband had his pension stolen at WorldCom.
A certain class of elites really got away with a lot then, and were never held to account. Instead, their elite grifting culture just spread wider and wider. We tried in 2011. If you were alive then, you know how big Occupy Wall Street was getting. You remember how big Bernie was.
But they figured out how to use social media to divide us and redirect our anger into right vs left politics instead of ultrarich crooks vs everybody else working hard. Even I had been starting to forget until Jim Carrey shook me out of my millenial reverie.
The youngest kids if they have any political consciousness now it's solely channeled safely into the left vs right pattern, unable to effect meaningful change to the robber baron economy. Smartphones and recommendation algorithms truly were a powerful technology that generated great value after all-- for just a very small elite that can use it to hold off any accountability for their monstrous crimes.
Crises foreseen and dealt with can be slowly deflated. If growth stays on track that seems plausible for CRE debt.
From that point on, it's a case of how well the banks can push the can down the road, absorbing small percentages of bad debt every year from profits, versus being forced into insolvency by the FDIC. There is a lot of leeway in this, as long as the bank still has revenue. During much of the eighties the entire US banking system was technically insolvent, but the Fed essentially just papered over it. The Italian and Japanese banking systems managed this for decades - its only an actual loss when the bank recognises it after all, so you get the zombie bank phenomenon.
There is a much better understanding since 2008 of how not to crash a banking system, so I suspect this will continue to be managed out. But if any other sector goes down, or Trump gets elected (since his policies would blow up the entire financial system if actually enacted), then all bets would of course be off.
We arent even down to pre post covid prices on ordinary used cars, and dont get me started on collectibles craze.
There are two tiers of businesses now, those that rent their space and have expensive prices because of it and those that own and don't have to pay rent which shows off as lower prices.
A CRE crises will not affect us the way the GFC did . We may see a few banks go belly up however.
Ah ah ah.