A bunch of optic fibers have been cut, but the network was badly designed without redundancy (as evidenced by the current denial of service).
Strategic points (the attacks occurred at junctions of several axis) were left insufficiently guarded.
The location of these points also shouldn't have been made available to bad actors.
French people are not surprised because there are always problems with train when lots of people need them to go on holidays. Usually at this time of the year it's getting hot, and it's one or more electrical transformer that gets burned by high heats. When copper price get high, cables are usually stolen to be sold as metal. And there are also strikes.
There is an economic balance to be found between the cost of securing and maintaining the infrastructure vs fixing the problems once they occur. Probably can be better, but others probably have it much worse.
@liotier, I've been rate-limited and cannot reply to you directly, so I'm editing my response into this comment. My apologies.
I didn't intend any slight to French infrastructure or those designing and securing it, just the dynamics of the problem. It is easier to attack than to defend, particularly in physical security. I'm sure critical infrastructure is well taken care of. Do you know if TGV is considered as critical as the other sites you noted? I'm curious of your opinion about what level of expertise and intelligence collection it required to carry this out.
I can throw burning fuel into a manhole or at a street cabinet, and it doesn't take much insight to find one that carries important traffic - take your pick near a military base or a nuclear power plant. But the attack will be ineffective, because the attacker needs to know what other bits of infrastructure carry the backup circuits - and take them out simultaneously. And, of course, for the important stuff such information is classified. So, an effective attack on French critical infrastructure is more difficult than it seems at first glance.
So now I'm concerned, do we know who did it and why ?
And I recall hearing a month ago or more that Russia would likely try something, because they aren't allowed in the Olympics as Russia, because of the invasion of Ukraine. So they want to mar the Olympics out of saving face, or spite, or revenge, or whatever. (Sorry, I cannot cite a source...)
Radicalism in foreign policy leads straight to open war.
We can just go and supply Ukraine with a shit ton of Abrams, Taurus or lift the usage restrictions that currently forbid Ukraine to strike targets deep in Moscow.
All of that is certainly better than just accepting Putin's escalations.
So you are prescribing dangerous policy on guessing.
And besides: that's the cost of doing "plausible deniability" missions like Russia has done for over a decade now - remember the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and "they're totally not Russian soldiers" or the time they shot down a passenger plane? Fuck around, find out, it's time to have some good old-fashioned revenge for all the bullshit Russia has pulled and gotten away with until now.
Does that guarantee this is safe to do?
>> We can just go and supply Ukraine with a shit ton of Abrams, Taurus or lift the usage restrictions that currently forbid Ukraine to strike targets deep in Moscow.
There are no guarantees or anything when it comes to Putin not reacting to something done against him, but it is a certainty that he will escalate if not pushed back, because that has been both his personal and his country's M.O. for decades.
At the end this is a risk we have to be willing to take, otherwise it will be the Baltics next that's up for grabs. Or maybe Hungary, that one won't even need soldiers the way Orban is going.
What did you mean by this then?
>> There's no need to guess
.
> At the end this is a risk we have to be willing to take
Are me and my family included in this obligation?
> otherwise it will be the Baltics next that's up for grabs.
Are you guessing again?