Even with a 90% interception rate, 300 nukes would be enough to kill tens of millions of citizens of any country from the blast alone. If an enemy leader isn't deterred by that, 2700 extra nukes aren't going to change their mind.
The bombs are there because “the only way to avoid being the victim of a nuclear first strike (that having the enemy hit you with their nukes) was being able to credibly deliver a second strike.”
“Thus the absurd-sounding conclusion to fairly solid chain of logic: to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, you have to build so many nuclear weapons that it is impossible for a nuclear-armed opponent to destroy them all in a first strike, ensuring your second-strike lands. You build extra missiles for the purpose of not having to fire them.”
https://acoup.blog/2022/03/11/collections-nuclear-deterrence...
A submarine is inherently less predictable, yes, and in terms of ratcheting down tensions that is not always great.
There’s also some more science fiction level technologies proposed like using the nuclear signature of a sub’s reactor or using space based LIDAR to detect signs of the wake of a submerged submarine but I’ll defer judgment on those for now. But longer term I wouldn’t completely count them out.
That said, IMO hardly matters, sea/air leg of triad can be replaced by redundant / distributed land, not silos but road mobile TELs in hardened shelters probably for MUCH cheaper per warhead - PLA/PLARF model. Can have 1000s of cheap TEL trucks / fake warheads to play shell game and be just as impossible to decapitation strike as a few SSNs with 20 missiles. Mobile land leg just politically not sensible because it means unambigiously painting target on homeland, not just empty silo fields in bumfuck nowhere. IMO half the reason of sea/air leg now is they're out of sight/out of mind doing distant patrols. No one wants to see a nuclear TEL driving down the highway and process implications. If anti missile defense improves, cost/benefit of limited magazine SSNs gets even worse - a tube on a 2.5B+ nuke boat cost 100m to acquire + likely very expensive operation costs per shot to field. You can buy 500+ HEMTT 8x8 to hull around solid fuel ICBMs for that price. PRC can probably buy 1,000. Economics of nuke boats as delivery platforms outside of psychology does not seem to make sense, but civilian psychology when it comes to nuclear planning is very important.
Darpa toying with ACTUV expliclity because it was _dirt_ cheap vs relying on large surface combatants + air for ASW - small hulls with 10-20k per day operating cost vs 500k-800k per day ASW destroyer (US costs). It would be cheap to build out a fleet of ~50 small autonomous / minimally manned surface/subsurface fleet to follow the handful of SSNs on deployment at any given time. 30-80 ACTUV for surface ASW (US costs) is already 5-10 shadowing each deterrent patrol SSN. Economy of scale enters picture even if nuclear powered - danger is mostly political, parking reactors in adversaries EEZs. PLA relative cost vs USN acquiring/maintaining SSNs likely much cheaper / lopsided. Look at PRC's 80 type 22s that existed basically on the hope that it can deter the 1-2 carriers US normally throws in theatre.
As for mobile TEL / mobile land triad, like 30k+ HEMTT+LVSR has been built, and that's just Oshkosh Defense building tactical trucks. # of USD 300-500k heavy/tactical trucks globally in 100,000s. Add in land infra/tunnel/harden costs and you won't get close to 100m per shot. Can probably get Oshkosh to hammer out budget decoy TELs with autonomous driving without any of the the expensive TEL/launch hardware. Say what you will about US industry, US auto still pretty capable of building things that roll on wheels vs US ship building. SSNX is projected to be 5-7B per unit (200m+ per launch tube), that buys you a lot of road mobile launchers. E: USN plants to acquire like 30 of them. I would be very surprised PLAN needs to spend 150-200B on a ASW UAV fleet to counter that. That's ~400-600 054s frigates. An ACTUV drone would cost fraction of manned frigates. I think you're dramatically underestimating just how expensive US SSN force is / will projected to be and how economics will incentivize scope of counters.
No. Most fundamentally because secret deterrents are, by definition, unverifiable.
But I think that's giving Brett too much credit here. His argument rests purely in the realm of game theory and logical-sounding ideas. In actual practice, the US military has never in its existence ran an analysis of how many nuclear weapons would be necessary to achieve strategic objectives in any specific scenarios.
Brett later points out that:
> This buildup, driven by concerns beyond even deterrence did lead to absurdities: when the SIOP (‘Single Integrated Operational Plan’) for a nuclear war was assessed by General George Lee Butler in 1991, he declared it, “the single most absurd and irresponsible document I had ever reviewed in my life,” Having more warheads than targets had lead to the assignment of absurd amounts of nuclear firepower on increasingly trivial targets.
Brett notes this, but it doesn't seem to give him pause or to cause his to reevaluate the validity of the doctrines he cites, even though those doctrines were largely written to justify what he rightfully describes as absurdities.
The US military has always, from the moment the nuclear bomb was invented, operated with the mindset of "more nukes is better". There is no conceivable number of nukes that would make the military go "okay, that's enough, we have enough to achieve our strategic objectives in any plausible scenario". As the quote above points out, giving them more nukes just makes them assign more per potential target.
The only administration that chose to conduct a survey of the SAC's war plan for deploying nukes, the fucking Bush administration under Dick Cheney, found that the plan was ridiculously overkill (hence the quote above) which directly lead to the US signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.[1]
HN commenters in this thread are giving a bunch of rationalizations why the US's nuclear policy is perfectly reasonable game theory, but any times military analysts with clearance actually looked at the US's nuke arsenal and the plans to deploy it, their conclusion was the same: "We have way more than we need".
[1] https://asteriskmag.com/issues/01/the-illogic-of-nuclear-esc...
Citation needed.
This document is a description of the targeting process, which existed even when the actual output of that process was "every single city in Russia and China with a population greater than 50,000"
You don't need to bomb every station of a train line to cripple the line. If you want to stop car production, you don't need to blow up the car factory, the bolt factory, the windshield factory, and every single rare earth mine in the country.
Yet those are the kind of assumptions the US doctrine relies on.
Quoting from [1]: again:
> Another jaw-dropping example: One part of the nuclear war plan called for destroying the Soviet tank army. As a result, JSTPS aimed a lot of weapons at not only the tanks themselves, but also the factory that produced the tanks, the steel mill that supplied the factory, the ore-processing facility that supplied the steel mill, and the mine that furnished the ore.
[1] https://asteriskmag.com/issues/01/the-illogic-of-nuclear-esc...
Alternatively if non-linear greenhouse process cause something like "all clouds disappearing suddenly", then nukes could be part of a last ditch effort to induce a nuclear winter to allow us time to find Ling term solutions.
Lastly, it is the USA. Why have 300 weapons when you can have 3,000.
And the theory will only be conclusively disproven if someone pushes the button.
I don't think two nuclear armed powers have ever declared war on each other - despite two nuclear armed powers currently being in active conflict (India and China) and another few being incredibly geopolitically unfriendly (India/Pakistan and Israel/Iran).
The whole idea behind MAD initially was that if Russia decided to get ideas in Europe, the Western powers would stop them with a nuclear curtain. That's why France has a "warning shot" nuclear doctrine, and the US hasn't ruled out Nuclear First Strike.
IMO, for what it was trying to stop, it worked. Ask people in China and India - it seems to be working for them as well.
EDIT: as an amendment to this: would Russia have been so bold as to invade Ukraine if the 1994 surrender of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal hadn't happened?
It’s kinda like economics. We can’t really prove anything in economics works the way we think it does, but we have a bunch of REALLY GOOD suggestions to support our hypotheses.
MAD isn’t a natural law - it’s a social construct, very much like economics.