This appears to be a clear fault from the companies where the buck stops - those who _use_ CS and should be validating patches from them and other vendors.
This appears to be a clear fault from the companies where the buck stops - those who _use_ CS and should be validating patches from them and other vendors.
Companies get hit by zero days all the time. I have worked for one that got ransomwared as a result of a zero day. If it had been patched earlier, maybe they wouldn't have gotten ransomwared. If they start intentionally waiting two extra days to patch, the risk obviously goes up.
Companies get hit by zero day exploits daily, more often than Crowdstrike deploys a bug like this.
It's easy to say you should have done the other thing when something bad happens. If your security vendor was not releasing definitions until 48 hours later than they could have, when some huge hack happened becuase of that obviously the internet commentary would say they were stupid to be waiting 48 hours.
But if you think the risk of getting exploited by a vulnerability is less than the risk of being harmed by Crowdstrike software, and you are a decision maker at your organization, then obviously your organization would not be a Crowdstrike customer! That's fine.
What you cannot choose, however - at least to my knowledge - is whether or not to auto-update the release channel feed and IOC/signature files. The crashes that occured seems to have been caused by the kernel driver not properly handling invalid data in these auxilliary files, but I guess we have to wait on/hope for a post-mortem report for a detailed explanation. Obviously, only the top-paying customers will get those details...