To some degree you have to trust the software you are using not to mess things up.
Similarly, when I questioned, "why can't users turn off ZScaler in an emergency" we were told that it wouldn't be compliant. But it's completely implementable at a technical level (Zscaler even supports this). You give users a code to use in an emergency and they can activate it and it will be logged and reviewed after use. But the org is too scared of compliance failure to let users do it.
Users are not prisoners left in the burning building without a fire escape.
This is one of those cases where you don't disable emergency systems to defend against rogue employees. If people abuse emergency procedures, you let the legal system sort it out.
Huh.
I can see why this needs to exist, but hadn't thought of it before. Same deal as cryptography and law-enforcement backdoors.
> logged and reviewed after use
I was going to ask how this has protection from mis-use.
Seems good to me… but then I don't, not really, not deeply, not properly, feel medical privacy. To me, violation of that privacy is clearly rude, but how the bar raises from "rude" to "illegal" is a perceptual gap where, although I see the importance to others, I don't really feel it myself.
So it seems good enough to me, but am I right or is this an imagination failure on my part? Is that actually good enough?
I don't think cryptography in general can use that, unfortunately. A simple review process can be too slow for the damage in other cases.
The notion that you may take on risk to net alleviate risk is somehow lost on a lot of people in these conversations.