Self-Awareness Might Not Have Evolved to Benefit the Self After All
sciencealert.com
sciencealert.com
Not another "survival of the species" confusion. Social cohesion helps the survival of the individual genes. If anything, our society is actually rather precarious for species-level survival due to its self-destructive nature. Genes are not selected based on species-level survival.
Taking the selfish-gene interpretation further, it could be argued that they're not selected based on individual-level survival either, unless "individual" means the genes themselves instead of the carrier. As long as the genes get to reproduce, the individual can be cast off like old shoes.
I can also imagine there could be a mechanism for "survival of the species" as emergent behavior from the collective interactions of individual selfishness. Looking at human society these days, it doesn't seem that way though.
It seems extremely evident to me. Humans expanded from a small group of primates limited to a specific region of east Africa to being globally endemic, with a population of billions, and modifying diverse ecosystems to optimize for our own survival, all within the span of a few hundred thousand years.
In terms of population, the past century has been a grand success, far above any local damage caused by immense selfishness of an individual or small group. Who knows, maybe such seemingly destructive tendencies are even contributing to further the collective.
I'm not sure I'm following. Individual selfishness seems to be driving rapid expansion and propagation of the human species -- where do you see any threat?
> But on a long timeline of centuries and millenia, somehow "collective selfishness" is working out well.
What do you mean by "collective selfishness?" I'm not sure I'm aware of anything that exists that matches how I am interpreting that phrase.
> Who knows, maybe such seemingly destructive tendencies are even contributing to further the collective.
What destructive tendencies are you referring to?
Sure, this may result in the conclusion that consciousness is just an evolutionary by-product of other, useful things, but when a by-product is posed as a biological problem it's usually from the angle of wasting resources. If consciousness is just a logical result of plain awareness of sensory stimul and thought there are no further resources wasted on it beyond those needed for awareness and thought. The philosophical problem of how to understand consciousness is orthogonal.
IIRC the portia spider can plan a route to a prey, and follow it even if the prey is not in plain sight all the time, which allows it to be a moore successful predator. IMO that implies some level awareness of its environment.
But it seems clear that at times we consciously steer our autopilot in a new direction by choice. Some number of repetitions and that becomes the new autopilot behavior.
Actual conscious thought and control is too metabolically expensive and slow to use much of the time but it has its uses.
I was about to write some long winded reply to why this doesn't make sense . Is this such a crazy thought? Do people really feel like they are in control of themselves? After spending a lot of time thinking about this, I cannot understand how I make decisions.
I literally cannot tell you what I am going to do next. I can say that I am going to end this reply. But I have no idea when or why I am going to stop here.
It's absurd to believe quantum physics can in any way be the right theory of the world at a small scale.
Why?
> There's no plausible scientific model that would allow for that to take place without breaking causality.
Indefinite causal structures show up quantum theory [1].
All hinges on what is meant by the opaque "breaking causality".
That's why there is a problem explaining consciousness in the first place. The more we dig the more elusive it is
However, there is no actual "decision" to be made there. It's a random choice, and it's not that random choices are not conscious decisions.
It's much harder to devise an experiment that looks at actual, meaningful, decisions. And I'm not talking about something extreme like "do I love this person" or whatever, just a real decision, like the ones you might make in an RPG ("do I help or kill this NPC").
Obligatory reference to Peter Watts' Blindsight, as well.
> Blindsight is available online under a Creative Commons license.
Here's the novel:
https://www.rifters.com/real/Blindsight.htm (HTML)
https://www.rifters.com/real/shorts/PeterWatts_Blindsight.pd... (PDF)
http://www.rifters.com/real/shorts/PeterWatts_Blindsight-v1.... (ePUB)
Even that is illusory most of the time. It takes deliberate effort and method to limit bias and personal preference.
But there are experiments out there that have shows ‘conscious decisions’ about an action coming after the action rather than before.
It seems to be a common pattern when encountering novel situations to analyze them consciously, make deliberate choices prior to taking action, but then to recall those prior decisions in future situations that involve equivalent inputs, repeating the same actions over time, to the point that we effectively "store" our past decisions as conditioned responses that the subconscious can apply directly. Things become "second nature" over time, and develop into habituated actions, but that doesn't mean that there was no conscious thought involved in the experiences that formed them in the first place.
Self-awareness is a spectrum instead of a binary anyway.
Likewise if you consider the outcome differences between two people who differ in attractiveness versus differing in self awareness, then those with more of the latter trait seem more likely to succeed, even if they're completely isolated from society.
It could be that it won out as an adaptation from an evolutionary perspective because it has more than one category of benefit but to say that it evolved strictly for the social benefit does not seem serious.
When a flower gets more sunlight from one side than from the other, it starts to turn to that side. Is that different from a person who walks somewhere because they like to? Most people I ask say "Well, the human can say 'I'". But a computer can also say "I". Where is the threshold to call it "self-awareness"?
In other words, would you apply this to any system, or only biological ones. Is a sunflower turning to the sunlight as "programmed" as the thermostat?
Although, there is a difference; while an organism is the one saying "I" and not the cells or tissues. In a social group it's an individual (or group of them) that says "We".
An organism is a colony of cells and in that colony only some cells are responsible for thinking / communication.
On the flip side (or maybe not) there's epiphenomenalism and the narrative theory of the self.
Personally I think there's more evidence for the view that consciousness is a post hoc justification for unconscious actions than there is for it's "consciousness all the way down".
To me they seem the same. When you say "3 stones make a trio of stones" you don't mean that a "trio" existed somewhere outside of the stones and now moved into the stones, do you? You just gave a name to this specific formation of a stone, another stone and yet another stone.
I don't think they're necessarily inconsistent (hence "or maybe not"). But I do think that one person is unlikely to believe both of them.
Surely 'self-awareness' is intended to be about reasoning that the output shaft turned because [...], that the turn was made towards sunlight because [...]. I think this is what you're getting at with the human being able to say 'I', but I don't think you can gloss over that in that case, because it's the whole point isn't it?
You say "reasoning" is needed. Ok, but how is that defined? Say you "ask" the cog why it turned by rattling it. Then it will rattle the other cog and, therefore, point you towards it. And you might say "Oh, I understand. You turned because the other cog pushed you". You might say that is just a mechanical mechanism. But if you look at human behavior close enough, it's just a mechanical mechanism too.
In my experience, when you try to define and prove it in a way that is not fuzzy, you come up with a definition that also matches the cog.
Or it was a side-effect of creating empathy (mirror neurons,) which is useful to not short-sightedly do eye-for-an-eye, thereby killing off your social context every Thursday. Perhaps this allowed us to become more aggressively competitive/greedy, while still preserving family social cohesion.
If you (1) can feel empathy but (2) it still feels a little bit different from your own emotions, it doesn't seem far-fetched that it would lead to self awareness. The (2) could happen simply because the eyes' bandwidth is much higher than story telling is, making your own experiences feel more nuanced.
I also don't agree with trying to find a single reason for self-awareness. Lots of evolutionary adaptations are beneficial in more than one way. Our bloodstream delivers nutrients to cells. Our bloodstream is also distributes immune cells throughout our body. Our bloodstream also clots when we have a cut and carries cells to help repair damaged tissue. Why can't self-awareness be beneficial in multiple ways as well? Why can't it have multiple reasons for evolving?
It's very useful from an evolutionary standpoint to have an accurate internal model 'me', which you can project into hypothetical scenarios and learn from them, reducing risk and the amount of trial and error (and so increasing survival). I like the Hofstadter view that consciousness arises from the 'strange loopiness' of this self-awareness of the 'I' model.
Any social benefits are secondary, rather than the driving force, and are a result of this model and differentiating 'me' from 'you'.
I think its trying to say that self-awareness developed for the purpose of social cohesion, to help communicate emotions with the group.
Fair enough, but i thought that had already been a popular theory for a very long time. Am i incorrect about that or do i just misunderstand what is new about their theory?
I didn't know about this theory and I'm glad the writer made an article about it.
Yes, the "Curse of knowledge" cognitive bias can cause the intelligent to be unintelligible.
(Meaning that we may not be smart enough to be able to explain why and how we are smart enough to explain our cognition, if we can explain it at all)
This doesn't necessarily mean we'll easily achieve this understanding, as the computation required might be extremely complex and time-consuming. But it does suggest that the explanation of cognition isn't fundamentally beyond reach, even if we're using the system to explain itself.
The short description: you have an initial idea of the state (an estimate) and you take sensory input (literally from sensors like thermometers, cameras, potentiometers, etc.) and solve constraint equations that both refine the estimate of the system as well as tell the system what to do to achieve some objective. The objective could be something like prevention of an inverted pendulum attached to an electric motor from falling over.