On Building Systems That Will Fail (1991)
larch-www.lcs.mit.edu
larch-www.lcs.mit.edu
When I had to drive into Boston as opposed to taking the train as a commute, 6:15am was about the latest I could leave for it not to be completely insane.
As we approach the present, corresponding to a personal computer, the graph really should become more complicated since one consequence of computers becoming super-cheap is that increasingly, they are being embedded in other equipment. The modern automobile is but one example. And it remains to be seen how general-purpose the current wave of palm-sized computers will be with their stylus inputs.
Note the six points mentioned in the final "Conclusions" section;
First it is important to emphasize the value of simplicity and elegance, for complexity has a way of compounding difficulties and as we have seen, creating mistakes. My definition of elegance is the achievement of a given functionality with a minimum of mechanism and a maximum of clarity.
Second, the value of metaphors should not be underestimated. Metaphors have the virtue that they have an expected behavior that is understood by all. Unnecessary communication and misunderstandings are reduced. Learning and education are quicker. In effect metaphors are a way of internalizing and abstracting concepts such that one's thinking can be on a higher plane and low-level mistakes are avoided.
Third, use of constrained languages for design or synthesis is a powerful methodology. By not allowing a programmer or designer to express irrelevant ideas, the domain of possible errors becomes far more limited.
Fourth, one must try to anticipate both errors of human usage and of hardware failure and properly develop the necessary contingency paths. This process of playing "what if" is not as easy as it may sound since implicit is the need to attach likelihoods of occurrence to events and to address issues of the independence of failures.
Fifth, it should be assumed in the design of a system, that it will have to be repaired or modified. The overall effect will be a much more robust system, where there is a high degree of functional modularity and structure, and repairs can be made easily.
Sixth, and lastly, on a large project, one of the best investments that can be made is the cross-education of the team so that nearly everyone knows more than he or she needs to know. Clearly with educational redundancy, the team is more resilient to unexpected tragedies or departures. But in addition, the increased awareness of team members can help catch global or systemic mistakes early. It really is a case of "more heads are better than one."
I know only a little about his history at GE. And I don’t have any reason to defend the guy, just curious what the view is these days.
> with Jack Welch style management everywhere
If it's not everywhere, it's worth mentioning that this is a boogeyman people cite rather than a reality.
1) Wikipedia - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Welch
2) Was Jack Welch the Greatest C.E.O. of His Day—or the Worst? by Malcolm Gladwell - https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/11/07/was-jack-welch...
3) Short-term profits and long-term consequences — did Jack Welch break capitalism? in Npr - https://www.npr.org/2022/06/01/1101505691/short-term-profits...
4) What Jack Welch Got Wrong (Just About Everything) by David Gelles (author) - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-jack-welch-got-wrong-jus...
He was dubbed "Neutron Jack" (a reference to the Neutron Bomb) for eliminating employees while leaving buildings intact. He was the main reason USA lost its manufacturing base and completely screwed up how Management was/is practiced.
The US commercial environment experienced a bit of a step change in 1971 - and, realistically, probably a lead up of pressure before that date.
A bit of systems thinking and it is probably not fair to say he is "the main reason". He was the first executive who figured out how to get best results in what at the time would have been a poorly understood new regulatory world that rewarded of financialisation.