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Comment by adastra22 | Hacker News Reader

There is not any reason to NOT run hybrid cryptography schemes right now, when the use case allows for it.

I do worry though that early standardization might lock us into a bad standard, and current PQC systems are too inflexible to allow for many use cases. The latter point means that if you want PQC, you might have to give up some features. E.g. multikey signature schemes, zero knowledge proofs, etc.

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There is a very good reason: efficiency. Do you want to have servers carry an extra megabyte of otherwise-useless key material for each incoming connection? What about the extra ~100-1000 microseconds of CPU time for each key exchange?

Now multiply that by 100,000 live connections and 10,000 per second, and you'll see that there's a big problem here.

A lot of cryptography arguments forget that people don't place unlimited value on cryptography (or even security in a general sense). These algorithms are costly, and if they do nothing, should not be used.

Kyber768, which is what I see most people using for hybrid PQC deployments right now, has 1kB keys and is actually faster than elliptic curve cryptography.

4 kB keys, you mean, right? You have to store your private key, too. It's pretty fast otherwise, yes.

You have to store 1 private key. You store/transmit/interact with millions of other public keys, so the concern over size is somewhat asymmetrical.

Many protocols use an ephemeral private key, and protocols like TLS that don't today are moving toward ephemeral private keys faster than they are toward PQC.

The ephemeral key gets signed with your long-lived private key, but that's all your long-lived key is used for.

> There is not any reason to NOT run hybrid cryptography schemes right now, when the use case allows for it.

This is reasonable, but runs contrary to the stance taken by CNSA 2.0.

Gee, I wonder why.

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