Comment by wahern | Hacker News Reader

Comment by wahern | Hacker News Reader

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I think this misses an important distinction. The issue here isn't the extent to which Congress can delegate rule-making authority to executive agencies. Those bounds haven't been moved. The issue is how how much deference courts are to give agencies when deciding when an agency-made rule reasonably adheres to the purpose and function of a statute. In theory the degree of deference shouldn't matter--agencies' retain the same rule-making authority and flexibility as before--but as a matter of process it absolutely does.

SCOTUS invented the Chevron doctrine because it believed at the time courts were too quick to second-guess the logic behind agency rule making, and in doing so unnecessarily and improperly inserting themselves into technical debates as well as broader political debates. IOW, the court was primarily concerned with people using the courts to subvert executive prerogatives and electoral politics. The concern now, apparently, is that administrations are using agency flexibility to subvert electoral politics.

Then and now, by moving the threshold for when courts can second-guess federal agencies, it's effectively altering the rights and responsibilities between Congress and the President, as well as between those two institutions and the electorate more broadly.

> The concern now, apparently, is that administrations are using agency flexibility to subvert electoral politics.

That's very charitable. A less charitable view might be that their concern is that regulatory bodies and other executive agencies are standing in the way of personal and corporate profits, and that overturning Chevron means that the courts can now cripple the ability for federal agencies to function by overruling the reasonable interpretations of statute those agencies have been operating under all this time and instead limit them to only the most narrow interpretation of the law. Law that has, for decades now, been being written under the assumption that Chevron exists, and not with the expectation that an adversarial judge will try to undermine the intention of the laws being passed.

That's very charitable. A less charitable view might be that corrupt, know-nothing political friends use their ability to "interpret a gap" to make sweeping legislation with no accountability and in-house courts to adjudicate on their behalf, then use selective enforcement for de facto bribery in a revolving door of public-private scheme to extort the productive sector of our country, and give to the useless rent seeking politicians and their cronies.

Wouldn’t a system where you need bribe a large number of bureaucrats (who might have differing opinions and priorities) still be more robust than one where you just need to bribe a couple of corrupt Supreme Court justices like now?

> the useless rent seeking politicians and their cronies.

Courts are largely politically appointed. Why are judges necessarily more trustworthy in your opinion?

I was just bootlicking the Fox news narrative as hard as you are bootlicking the NYT. It was parody.

My real opinion is that no one is more trustworthy than the other. They're all people. But there are constitutionally delegated duties given to each branch that we've gradually eased over the past century, and between Jarkesy disallowing in-house courts for certain types of crime, the resurgence of the non-delegation doctrine and now the overruling of Chevron, SCOTUS thinks this delegation is not optional. I personally agree with them hesitantly, but predicting the future is hard, and there are some actions they take where I think the consequences are obvious, but this is not one of them, and I would have slept no more or less soundly if this case had come out the other way.

I feel like if instead of deferring to the EPA, the Chevron case was deferring to police departments interpretations of the law when the law was ambiguous, we would be cheering this decision as a return to sanity. I wouldn't want the default assumption of the courts to be that when the law is unclear, whatever the sheriff or the highway patrol decides is illegal this month is, and next month or next election it could be something else entirely. In such cases I would absolutely want the courts to evaluate that ambiguity by treating both sides of the argument equally and weighing the law as it stands. So it seems like it should be the same when it comes to regulatory rule making as well. If the law is unclear, deferring to the enforcers of that law seems no different than deferring to the cops. The court system and the government as a whole is already institutionally biased towards the government, without any need for an explicit policy to prefer the government's side.

> I feel like if instead of deferring to the EPA, the Chevron case was deferring to police departments interpretations of the law when the law was ambiguous, we would be cheering this decision as a return to sanity.

I doubt it. I think most people have some federal agency they aren't a huge fan of. Sure, the fact that Chevron helped to allow the EPA keep your air and water from being poisoned by greedy corporations who would do it in a second if it would make them more money helps to make it a more sympathetic cause, but it's not as if people aren't aware that the defense applied to every other agency too.

> I wouldn't want the default assumption of the courts to be that when the law is unclear, whatever the sheriff or the highway patrol decides is illegal this month is

That isn't a fair characterization of the situation. Even forgiving that the police aren't a federal agency, first a question around the legality of what the police were doing would have to reach the court in the first place, then the court would have to determine that an ambiguity in the law existed, and then the court would have to decide if the interpretation of the law that the police has been using is reasonable and only if it wasn't would the court impose its own interpretation. That seems pretty fair even in the case of the police.

It's not about deferring to the enforcers of that law. It's about deferring to the law first, and only imposing a narrower interpretation if the enforcers of that law were already out of line. It just means that agencies aren't limited to the most narrow interpretation of the law as written.

>That isn't a fair characterization of the situation. Even forgiving that the police aren't a federal agency, first a question around the legality of what the police were doing would have to reach the court in the first place, then the court would have to determine that an ambiguity in the law existed, and then the court would have to decide if the interpretation of the law that the police has been using is reasonable and only if it wasn't would the court impose its own interpretation. That seems pretty fair even in the case of the police.

There are of course federal policing agencies, such as the DEA, ATF and FBI, but it doesn't matter because the point wasn't about federal agencies as such. It was about deferring to the enforcers of a law about what the limits of their powers are, which just seems like a terrible idea at all levels of government.

Was the FBI spying (and more) on civil rights leaders part of their powers as federal law enforcement officers executing their duties? I have no doubt they would say so, and absent a specific law from congress telling them they couldn't, who is to argue that they were unreasonable? Surely we should defer to them as they're the experts in their field right?

If the secret service started shutting down cell towers within a 10 mile radius of presidential rallies, well that's just common sense protection against remote explosives and well within their directive to protect the president right? They are the experts on this after all and have wide latitude to do what's necessary. No need for the courts to review that action or the laws surrounding it.

> Was the FBI spying (and more) on civil rights leaders part of their powers as federal law enforcement officers executing their duties?....Surely we should defer to them as they're the experts in their field right?

It's a fantasy to think that this will mean state spying powers will be reduced.

> absent a specific law from congress telling them they couldn't, who is to argue that they were unreasonable?

The courts are! They always have been, even under Chevron. If at any point a judge thought that the FBI, ATF, DEA, NSA, or <insert three letter agency here> interpreted the law unreasonably, or extended their authority beyond what was allowed that judge had the power under Chevron to impose the court's own interpretation of the law on that agency.

The Chevron defense said that if the court agreed that an agency had an interpretation of an ambiguous law which was reasonable and permissible the court couldn't impose a more narrow standard on them. Because it's been overturned it now doesn't matter if the court thinks that what the agency was doing was reasonable and permissible, the court can inject it's own interpretation anyway.

Chevron prevented the court from forcing the most narrow interpretation of the law on a federal agency in cases where the court couldn't justify doing it. That's it. Now that protection is gone and I promise that it's not going to make you more free or better off. It means that any and all of the rights and protections you have today thanks to federal agencies are at risk of going away as soon as a case goes in front of an activist judge

>It's a fantasy to think that this will mean state spying powers will be reduced.

Never said that it would, I said allowing enforcers to set the extent of their own powers is a bad idea.

>Chevron prevented the court from forcing the most narrow interpretation of the law on a federal agency in cases where the court couldn't justify doing it.

Federal agencies (indeed any government agency) should always be subject to narrow interpretations of the law when the extent of their authority and powers are in question. If that interpretation is too narrow for Congress, then Congress needs to be more explicit about their intent. The law needs to be as clear as possible. Ambiguity is a flaw not a feature and the fact that ambiguities can lead to problems means we should make better law, not throw our hands in the air and let whoever's in charge this week decide what the policy is. If we want a massive federal agency to oversee something then the extent to which that agency is empowered and what that agency is empowered to do had better be explicitly spelled out.

To support what Autoexc is saying - this is effectively an argument about the theory on one side, and the practical reality of intentionally skewed judiciaries, a grid locked and obtuse congress - which in turn is driven by groups with a common cause.

The law, in most cases, is about the practical application of an ideal (the law) to reality (the case).

If things weren’t so lopsided and blatantly partisan, then yes, the theory would matter. It would probably be a prosaic and boring decision.

This court is not only engineered to lean heavily in one direction, it is also being fed cases based on that common agenda.

In addition - we cannot avoid ambiguities unless we have powers of foresight that make the entire governing edifice irrelevant.

No one could predict the capabilities or failures of this generation of LLMs for example. There is no better “law”, unless it is an act that gets updated on a near monthly or quarterly basis.

This is a timeline that a congress is not suited to manage. This is definitely something that an agency of some sort would.

Finally - Saying that bureaucrats and experts are biased, but to leave out the bias of the courts feels unfair.

> There are of course federal policing agencies, such as the DEA, ATF and FBI, but it doesn't matter because the point wasn't about federal agencies as such. It was about deferring to the enforcers of a law about what the limits of their powers are, which just seems like a terrible idea at all levels of government.

What’s more, these agencies—particularly the ATF—love to make up, out of whole cloth, completely new rules that are contrary to their own previously-expressed rules that have the effect of retroactively turning millions of law-abiding people into felons overnight.

That’s a good example, but it goes even deeper than that. Chevron itself was a case that reversed a judgment in favor of an environmental organization written by Ruth Bader Ginsberg (when she was a D.C. Circuit judge), and siding with the Reagan EPA.

I don't think people will appreciate it when they have to buy bottled water because all the aquifers and lakes are full of heavy metals from manufacturing upstream. It really is part of Project 2025 and has been in the works for a while now. If they don't like the bureaucracy, Congress has full powers to remove it there was no reason to gut all regulation so they can be tied up indefinitely in court and our courts are overwhelmed by challenges so that every decision takes 15 years to work its way through court.

> I feel like if instead of deferring to the EPA, the Chevron case was deferring to police departments interpretations of the law when the law was ambiguous, we would be cheering this decision as a return to sanity.

In the original context of the 1984 Chevron case, environmentalists were arguing that the EPA had redefined "source" in an overly narrow way, much narrower than Congress had originally intended in passing the Clean Air Act, thereby enabling companies to emit more air pollution. The Chevron decision was seen at the time as a loss for environmentalists and win for the corporate sector and conservatives.

It's funny how the tables have turned – a decision which was originally praised by conservatives and condemned by liberals and environmentalists, eventually ends being condemned and overturned by conservatives, while being defended by liberals and environmentalists. Both the 1984 case and the 2024 case had a conservative majority, and were perceived at the time as furthering conservative political objectives.

I think what's really happened: in 1984, the federal judiciary was widely perceived as liberal-dominated, while the federal bureaucracy was seen as relatively more conservative, so liberals wanted the judiciary to be more powerful than the bureaucracy, conservatives wanted the opposite. In 2024, the situation is reversed: now the federal judiciary is perceived as being increasingly dominated by conservatives, while the federal bureaucracy is viewed as being more liberal, so now liberals want to defend the bureaucracy's power against judicial encroachment.

It looks to me like the only thing that's constant here – on both sides – is "the ends justify the means".

I'd just love to see them keep this same energy when dealing with the actual police and end qualified immunity. They won't. But it would be the right thing to do.

It seems that congress is much quicker and more willing to correct overreach by the executive branch through legislation compared to overreach by the judiciary — especially at the Supreme Court level.

LOL. Have you seen the state of congress in the last decade? A rotten dead fish would be quicker to correct about any overreach than the US congress.

Yes. I simply meant a relative comparison between the two. Agreed otherwise

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