sorry, can someone explain this to someone who gave up on the article at the first bullet point, nor had enough sleep (and so is too lazy to look up everything)
thanks!
thanks!
But Congress did it anyway, and the SCOTUS has over the years upheld it. There was a landmark court case involving Chevron (the oil company). SCOTUS ruled there saying that the executive branch agencies responsible for rulemaking are experts in their fields, and we should mostly defer to them when their position seems reasonable, and when Congress hasn't passed a law that contradicts what they want to do.
Marbury is a much older case, that made precedent the idea that courts have the ability to strike down laws that they believe violate the constitution.
The current conservative-leaning SCOTUS is skeptical of what conservatives call the "administrative state" (basically: rulemaking done by the executive branch). They seem to not be a big fan of "Chevron deference", and are fully willing to exercise their Marbury-affirmed power to strike down executive actions that they don't believe are constitutional, or don't believe directly stem from laws Congress has passed.
SCOTUS invented the Chevron doctrine because it believed at the time courts were too quick to second-guess the logic behind agency rule making, and in doing so unnecessarily and improperly inserting themselves into technical debates as well as broader political debates. IOW, the court was primarily concerned with people using the courts to subvert executive prerogatives and electoral politics. The concern now, apparently, is that administrations are using agency flexibility to subvert electoral politics.
Then and now, by moving the threshold for when courts can second-guess federal agencies, it's effectively altering the rights and responsibilities between Congress and the President, as well as between those two institutions and the electorate more broadly.
That's very charitable. A less charitable view might be that their concern is that regulatory bodies and other executive agencies are standing in the way of personal and corporate profits, and that overturning Chevron means that the courts can now cripple the ability for federal agencies to function by overruling the reasonable interpretations of statute those agencies have been operating under all this time and instead limit them to only the most narrow interpretation of the law. Law that has, for decades now, been being written under the assumption that Chevron exists, and not with the expectation that an adversarial judge will try to undermine the intention of the laws being passed.
> the useless rent seeking politicians and their cronies.
Courts are largely politically appointed. Why are judges necessarily more trustworthy in your opinion?
My real opinion is that no one is more trustworthy than the other. They're all people. But there are constitutionally delegated duties given to each branch that we've gradually eased over the past century, and between Jarkesy disallowing in-house courts for certain types of crime, the resurgence of the non-delegation doctrine and now the overruling of Chevron, SCOTUS thinks this delegation is not optional. I personally agree with them hesitantly, but predicting the future is hard, and there are some actions they take where I think the consequences are obvious, but this is not one of them, and I would have slept no more or less soundly if this case had come out the other way.
I doubt it. I think most people have some federal agency they aren't a huge fan of. Sure, the fact that Chevron helped to allow the EPA keep your air and water from being poisoned by greedy corporations who would do it in a second if it would make them more money helps to make it a more sympathetic cause, but it's not as if people aren't aware that the defense applied to every other agency too.
> I wouldn't want the default assumption of the courts to be that when the law is unclear, whatever the sheriff or the highway patrol decides is illegal this month is
That isn't a fair characterization of the situation. Even forgiving that the police aren't a federal agency, first a question around the legality of what the police were doing would have to reach the court in the first place, then the court would have to determine that an ambiguity in the law existed, and then the court would have to decide if the interpretation of the law that the police has been using is reasonable and only if it wasn't would the court impose its own interpretation. That seems pretty fair even in the case of the police.
It's not about deferring to the enforcers of that law. It's about deferring to the law first, and only imposing a narrower interpretation if the enforcers of that law were already out of line. It just means that agencies aren't limited to the most narrow interpretation of the law as written.
There are of course federal policing agencies, such as the DEA, ATF and FBI, but it doesn't matter because the point wasn't about federal agencies as such. It was about deferring to the enforcers of a law about what the limits of their powers are, which just seems like a terrible idea at all levels of government.
Was the FBI spying (and more) on civil rights leaders part of their powers as federal law enforcement officers executing their duties? I have no doubt they would say so, and absent a specific law from congress telling them they couldn't, who is to argue that they were unreasonable? Surely we should defer to them as they're the experts in their field right?
If the secret service started shutting down cell towers within a 10 mile radius of presidential rallies, well that's just common sense protection against remote explosives and well within their directive to protect the president right? They are the experts on this after all and have wide latitude to do what's necessary. No need for the courts to review that action or the laws surrounding it.
It's a fantasy to think that this will mean state spying powers will be reduced.
> absent a specific law from congress telling them they couldn't, who is to argue that they were unreasonable?
The courts are! They always have been, even under Chevron. If at any point a judge thought that the FBI, ATF, DEA, NSA, or <insert three letter agency here> interpreted the law unreasonably, or extended their authority beyond what was allowed that judge had the power under Chevron to impose the court's own interpretation of the law on that agency.
The Chevron defense said that if the court agreed that an agency had an interpretation of an ambiguous law which was reasonable and permissible the court couldn't impose a more narrow standard on them. Because it's been overturned it now doesn't matter if the court thinks that what the agency was doing was reasonable and permissible, the court can inject it's own interpretation anyway.
Chevron prevented the court from forcing the most narrow interpretation of the law on a federal agency in cases where the court couldn't justify doing it. That's it. Now that protection is gone and I promise that it's not going to make you more free or better off. It means that any and all of the rights and protections you have today thanks to federal agencies are at risk of going away as soon as a case goes in front of an activist judge
Never said that it would, I said allowing enforcers to set the extent of their own powers is a bad idea.
>Chevron prevented the court from forcing the most narrow interpretation of the law on a federal agency in cases where the court couldn't justify doing it.
Federal agencies (indeed any government agency) should always be subject to narrow interpretations of the law when the extent of their authority and powers are in question. If that interpretation is too narrow for Congress, then Congress needs to be more explicit about their intent. The law needs to be as clear as possible. Ambiguity is a flaw not a feature and the fact that ambiguities can lead to problems means we should make better law, not throw our hands in the air and let whoever's in charge this week decide what the policy is. If we want a massive federal agency to oversee something then the extent to which that agency is empowered and what that agency is empowered to do had better be explicitly spelled out.
The law, in most cases, is about the practical application of an ideal (the law) to reality (the case).
If things weren’t so lopsided and blatantly partisan, then yes, the theory would matter. It would probably be a prosaic and boring decision.
This court is not only engineered to lean heavily in one direction, it is also being fed cases based on that common agenda.
In addition - we cannot avoid ambiguities unless we have powers of foresight that make the entire governing edifice irrelevant.
No one could predict the capabilities or failures of this generation of LLMs for example. There is no better “law”, unless it is an act that gets updated on a near monthly or quarterly basis.
This is a timeline that a congress is not suited to manage. This is definitely something that an agency of some sort would.
Finally - Saying that bureaucrats and experts are biased, but to leave out the bias of the courts feels unfair.
What’s more, these agencies—particularly the ATF—love to make up, out of whole cloth, completely new rules that are contrary to their own previously-expressed rules that have the effect of retroactively turning millions of law-abiding people into felons overnight.
In the original context of the 1984 Chevron case, environmentalists were arguing that the EPA had redefined "source" in an overly narrow way, much narrower than Congress had originally intended in passing the Clean Air Act, thereby enabling companies to emit more air pollution. The Chevron decision was seen at the time as a loss for environmentalists and win for the corporate sector and conservatives.
It's funny how the tables have turned – a decision which was originally praised by conservatives and condemned by liberals and environmentalists, eventually ends being condemned and overturned by conservatives, while being defended by liberals and environmentalists. Both the 1984 case and the 2024 case had a conservative majority, and were perceived at the time as furthering conservative political objectives.
I think what's really happened: in 1984, the federal judiciary was widely perceived as liberal-dominated, while the federal bureaucracy was seen as relatively more conservative, so liberals wanted the judiciary to be more powerful than the bureaucracy, conservatives wanted the opposite. In 2024, the situation is reversed: now the federal judiciary is perceived as being increasingly dominated by conservatives, while the federal bureaucracy is viewed as being more liberal, so now liberals want to defend the bureaucracy's power against judicial encroachment.
It looks to me like the only thing that's constant here – on both sides – is "the ends justify the means".
Also worth noting is that the head of the EPA at the time was Anne Gorsuch, mother of Justice Neil Gorsuch.
By "long ago" the delegation was first mentioned (AFAICT) in 1825:
> It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. [23 U.S. 1, 43] But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.
* https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/23/1.html
The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Ruth Bader Ginsberg, sided with NRDC. But the Supreme Court reversed, ruling in favor of the EPA (and Chevron). The Supreme Court said that the court had to defer to the EPAs interpretation of the word “source,” even if the court thought that wasn’t the best interpretation of the law.