Windows: Insecure by Design
theregister.com
theregister.com
I'll give Linux a stab here: half the stuff I can run can write to my ~/.profile if it wants to. Anything which can read ~ is a problem because there's where all my important shit is...
Sure it is. Features like Recall, which the article mentions, are insecure by design.
> the ACL and security model
I'm not sure how this is any more secure than "Unix side". But in any case the security holes in Windows are not problems with its filesystem (at least not now that FAT is no longer used).
> Anything which can read ~ is a problem
Which in a properly configured Unix system is your user and root, and that's it. So don't run things you don't trust as your user or root. Which should be obvious common sense to anyone who uses a computer.
I'm going to be honest: I'm not bothered about Recall security. It'd be on a single user machine which contains my data anyway. There are many more tasty morsels out there if a keylogger gets on it. Like the contents of my Keepass DB or my online banking PIN, neither of which Recall would be party to but anything that runs as my user shouldn't be able to see. Plus I'd probably turn it off anyway. I mean I do appreciate people kicking them in the balls which is due.
I'm not sure how this is any more secure than "Unix side". But in any case the security holes in Windows are not problems with its filesystem (at least not now that FAT is no longer used).
As for ACLs, check NT kernel architecture, particularly object security descriptors. Particularly Windows 2000 onwards. Quite elegantly put together, but with layers of crap over them.
>Which in a properly configured Unix system is your user and root, and that's it. So don't run things you don't trust as your user or root. Which should be obvious common sense to anyone who uses a computer.
So I'll have to create another user account to run a web browser, my mail client, a software package manager or a compiler?
Don't you agree that the data was in the initial version accessible by all local users on the same machine? Would you consider that a security leak?
Anything which could be exploited will be exploited, the only question is how long it takes.
If you can't trust those you have bigger problems than them reading your home directories. If you're paranoid use flatpak.
I don't think this is a good solution, both because the so-called "sandboxing" isn't all it's cracked up to be, and because you now have to depend on each individual app vendor to push you security updates, instead of just your Linux distro.
The really paranoid would probably be using BSD with jails, which AFAICT is one area in which the BSDs are ahead of Linux.
Not if you trust those things. And if you don't trust them, you shouldn't be using them.
> or a compiler?
On my personal machine, yes, I have a separate user account for development, such as compiling programs. Creating new user accounts on a Unix machine is pretty simple.
Better is subjective. It's maybe more capable. It's also easier to create confusing DACL structures that do not do what you think they do or leave surprising gaps in coverage.
> and grew to a huge size and surface area and that is hard to fix retrospectively.
We added network cards to everything at the same time networks finished moving from being isolated to being permanently globally interconnected. Machines that had a multi user capability (that didn't cost thousands) fared this transition better than those that did not.
> Anything which can read ~ is a problem because there's where all my important shit is...
It wouldn't matter if it's ~ or not. The software runs as you and so can access anything anywhere you have rights to. Which is why chroot, namespaces and pledge all exist, and windows really does not have equally secure equivalents to these technologies. To the extent it does, commercially available software does not seem to take any advantage of it.
Then again, running an agent that actively screen shots your desktop periodically and then saves those unencrypted to any part of the hard drive is a bad idea regardless of the imputed confidence you have in the security of the operating system itself.
There is nothing confusing about it at all. The problem tends to be poor understanding and poor default configuration in all these things. I mean the same can be said for the average linux user, who ambles on in and 777's everything.
We added network cards to everything at the same time networks finished moving from being isolated to being permanently globally interconnected. Machines that had a multi user capability (that didn't cost thousands) fared this transition better than those that did not.
I've run windows terminal services for about 20 years on and off. They did fine. Hell half our clients are still running citrix and terminal services.
It wouldn't matter if it's ~ or not. The software runs as you and so can access anything anywhere you have rights to. Which is why chroot, namespaces and pledge all exist, and windows really does not have equally secure equivalents to these technologies. To the extent it does, commercially available software does not seem to take any advantage of it.
Windows has full virtualization at service and process level if you want to have it. Device guard/credential guard and app-v for example. I agree with your last point that commercial software doesn't take any advantage of it, but neither does firefox which will quite happily shit on your ~/.profile...
Hey I rather like the idea of taking screenshots and dredging them for info. It'll immediately stop MSPs writing all their clients' passwords in a .txt file on their desktop (I've seen this several times)...
It comes up as an item in our internal corporate audits all the time. The fact that parent and child can have independent access is a surprising one in most mental models and a problem that just doesn't exist in the simpler unix model.
The ability to create permissions for things that don't even exist yet is another surprising thing that catches administrators up. It does not help that the windows GUI tooling is exceptionally inferior compared to the command line tooling.
This is on production servers in sensitive environments. That linux home users chmod 777 is one thing, but I don't see the same types of problems in professional linux environments; granted, you don't see as many comparable linux environments at all. Likewise, explorer makes it easy to just "give permissions to Everyone" and I've seen that just as much in home installations. In any case, these are probably not great comparisons.
I'm trying to solve this issue by using both of these tools with NixOS [1], where I can choose how much security I want for each package, like limiting the files that they can access and/or the entire dbus (practically simulating Flatpak). I mostly use it on proprietary software, like Games, as they have a history with RCEs...
In the end, security is a tradeoff with convenience.
this above, and the corporate behaviour, is why im a not windows guy
These days most people should be using Chromebooks and iPads, which are far and away more secure.
Page 53: “The evaluator will conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the OS is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.”
Maybe at some point we will start believing what they achieve in their certifications rather than what their marketing spews.
[1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/security-...
[2] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/PP_OS_V4....
The recent "insecurity" pushes are more of getting microsoft to "catch up" to google/facebook in terms of making their users a product they can sell. I'm sure they feel left out as chromebooks have eatin' into their market and supply such nice metrics for advertisers.
The US government should be investing billions in Linux to harden it and make it more usable and appealing.
So should Intel, amd, Qualcomm, because that keeps their processors compatible with a rapidly patched mainstream os.
So should the EU.
But... They won't. Surely as long as 90 year old presidents are what we are stuck with.
If you're security concerned, the OS stack is quite a... secondary issue to you.
You will have to consider switching to an open RISC architecture (Risc-V someone ? Strangely enough or not, EU seems quite fan of this on-the-rise-again architecture) AND a linux distribution.
For sure, for sensitive applications, having a cheap, secure and versatile architecture would be better than making DSPs or issuing hardly scalable and pricy FPGA solutions (well, lots of communication equipements' mainboards still uses them)
One obvious thing for the government to do would be to stop buying Microsoft products due to national security concerns. The NSA, AFAIK, already runs Linux.
When it comes to Microsoft and others, their active business strategy always seems to be overlapping sectors of power and software just happens to be the vehicle to do it. Recall is just the latest tentacle of the strategy.
If a capitalist company with a specific product focus, within a specific market is a healthy cell, I see this type of company as a cancer and think we should treat it just the same. Starve it or destroy it, and if we can't destroy the company then we can imprison investors for this kind of monopolistic behavior.
Knowing hacker news likes myopia and not discussing such concepts as power, my ask to you is how many years do we tolerate this same overreaching behavior from the same places? I'm at 25 now for Microsoft specifically.
I mean of course Microsoft Recall. This delightful AI addition to the next generation of Windows PCs would have taken regular snapshots of everything you do on your computer.
Security and privacy are not the same thing. I get the frustration about Microsoft's security practices, but equating those two is a mistake.