At this point, I can't even tell if this is sarcasm.
At this point, I can't even tell if this is sarcasm.
As the salt is guessable (as it is in your examples) it just turns into a cat-and-mouse game that the crackers win every time (since for every one of you there are probably 2 or more of them).
Although I'm unsure to how useful and widely used pre-generated rainbow tables are with modern computing.
As an example, yesterday user rorrr posted this comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4076840.
> > MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, et al, are not "password hashes." By all means use them for message authentication and integrity checking, but not for password authentication.
> Bullshit. MD5 is just fine, as long as you use the salt. Here, hack this:
MD5(password + salt) = "b520542710812f347432232b2a1fba83"
salt = "MD5 rules"
Self chosen salt, unknown password, known MD5 hashing method. Fire up a password cracker and feed it in a decent dictionary, and you get the password = "Spiderpig1". $ echo -n "Spiderpig1MD5 rules" | md5sum
b520542710812f347432232b2a1fba83 -
No rainbow table needed.If your password is "password_linkedin", it's fairly obvious what the salt is. However, most released passwords are not heavily scrutinized. It's most likely that those using exposed passwords will instead try user@email.com / password_linkedin elsewhere.
You can also easily change self-salt so it doesn't fit any obvious pattern. What I do is a strong base password, then self-salt with the domain name. For example:
Mk3+e1_T2iei
I'm using "Mk3+e1_T" as the base password, "2" as a divider, and "iei" are the first 3 vowels of a domain name (LinkedIn in this example).