Why, yes, yes, I am. I've now changed my LinkedIn password, too, just in case.
Why, yes, yes, I am. I've now changed my LinkedIn password, too, just in case.
Edit: I wrote SHA1-Pass, so I'm biased, but I know what you mean about having trust issues with closed-source password tools. That's one of the reasons I wrote it.
Is it this: http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/natty/man1/sha1pass.1.ht... I don't see how you would use this the same way you'd use the other tools mentioned here. I can imagine a way, but it's no where near as convenient and still has it's own major usability problems.
What stops being hacked / keyloggered and them exfiltrating all your long, complex passwords?
After all, if my own system is compromised, I just get a lot of hassle. If LastPass ever gets hacked and leaks their passwords, they lose their business overnight. That's pretty good motivation for them to keep on top of their stuff.
I used to use 1Passwd, which stored the passwords in a local file, and that could be said to be marginally more secure, except that it generally uses something like iCloud or Dropbox to sync the passwords, so there's still a single point of failure... The main reason I moved away from 1Password was that they gave me a shitty response when I asked them if they were going to support Chrome. I decided at that point that I didn't want to give them my money anymore, and so I didn't upgrade to 1Password 3.
The key for your encrypted file stays in your head (and/or in your wallet), so even a full-on total breach of Dropbox/iCloud, your key is safe, and 8 million rounds of 265-bit AES and a good password (my current KeePass settings) is still unbreakable[1].
1: Unless (perhaps) you have the attention of certain governments. And they always have the option of using a $5 wrench on you, anyway.
[1] Or so they say. I've never MITMed their SSL, and their software is not open source AFAIK. This is not to say someone couldn't e.g. distribute a trojaned version of their browser extensions. If you poke around the developer(s) have at least revealed the encryption method for the your DB so you can verify how it is encrypted for yourself, which is a good sign if nothing else.
No. This is the strength of two-factor authentication, something you know, and something you have. If someone gets your 1Password keyfile, it's useless without your decrypting password.
[1] I find this easier than opening keepass and selecting the database from dropbox for some reason that might be as simple as dropbox having an easier to spot icon.
For my personal ones I'm keeping few algorithms in my brains. I'm using resource type (website/some server/device) and name (e.g. domain/model) as variables and after few steps in my head I always have different password for each kind of service.
Works excellently!
Having a fictional LinkedIn account can be amusing.
This central repository then becomes a very appealing target.
I say this as a LastPass user, as I think it is the best of the current offerings, but I'm uncertain how to shield this huge central list. I wish it had multiple logon PW so that you could at least segment the risk and reduce the time the high PW is used to when you really need it.
I think it's really humorous that people feel safe putting an encrypted file in something like Dropbox, but don't trust LastPass (who are doing the exact same thing, everything is local, client side encryption). Especially when you're missing out on all of the benefits of browser integration.
Please, take a whole 3 minutes and do a tiny bit of research. Your future self will thank you when people like swombat and myself get to laugh at LinkedIn, change our passwords and never think about it again.
I much prefer the security of being in control of my file, and having its online option controlled by someone else (Dropbox); and logging into Dropbox to then see my passwords 'online' on the go.
If Lastpass.com is compromised, the attacker can MitM compromise my credentials. If 1Password.com is compromised, that is not the case. (Yes, if Dropbox is compromised, they could capture my dropbox credentials, but it would be more difficult for them to then capture my 1password credentials)
Ref: LastPass Online Vault: http://helpdesk.lastpass.com/full.php 1Password Anywhere: http://help.agile.ws/1Password3/1passwordanywhere.html Services I use, and why: http://www.mikeschroll.com/blog/2011/12/07/services-i-use-an...
You can't even do that. You have to install a local client. Download the file, open it in your new client, edit it, manually reupload it. If you don't want to use the on-web LastPass vault, then don't, but it's still doing local decryption and you can still used the signed Chrome extensions to carry out ops if you don't trust LastPass.com proper.
>If Lastpass.com is compromised, the attacker can MitM compromise my credentials.
Which part of "local, client-side encryption" is confusing?
edit: 1PassAnywhere is the exact same thing as what LastPass is doing with it's LastPass.com-served Vault.
edit2: There's even multifactor auth available for it and the Online Vault feature.
It seems to me that instead of having several passwords in my head (i can remember random long strings of characters pretty well, and have a heirachy of randomness/longness depending on what I care about), I only have to remember one. But if that one's compromised, aren't all the rest then available?
Reminds me of the bit in hitchhikers guide to the galaxy (life the universe and everything i think) where passwords and biometrics etc had become really difficult and secure, so a datacube thing was created to store them all. Which was then found by a character before hilarity ensued.
thanks
1. Your physical machine, or the LastPass/Dropbox server.
2. Your master password
3. (optionally) a second-factor auth source
Then yes, they have access to all your passwords. But this is vastly superior to having one password that alone compromised grants access to all of your accounts, right?
I mean, the most secure way imaginable would be perfect biometric signatures, or humans smart enough that they could perform asymmetric encryption in their heads to sign challenges in a verifiable manner. Outside of that, this is decentish.
You could use a text file in a Truecrypt volume with keys that are stored on separate jumpdrives (but what if someone compromises a machine that you plug those drives into), etc, etc.