> Done right, an LVT can actually increase land value.
Land value is a measure of supply and demand. But most of the demand isn't for land in particular, it's for indoor space. If you have LVT and don't have density restrictions -- or just don't have density restrictions regardless of LVT -- then people are going to build until the cost of indoor space falls to the construction cost. Then land values will be low because it's being used efficiently, and there is a de facto ceiling on the price -- if you want to add 100 stories of new space and land is dirt cheap then you might build a hundred single-story buildings, but if land gets even slightly more expensive than that you can just build twenty 5-story buildings instead, which is what people would do rather than paying for five times more land unless it's prohibited.
LVT increases this incentive even more, because not only would you have to pay for more land, you would have to pay the LVT on more land, so now it makes sense to build ten or twenty story buildings. Meanwhile if you're not going to build a ten or twenty story building (or in a place like NYC, a hundred story building), holding onto an underutilized lot will cost more than it's worth, so the land values become negligible. This ignoring the overall premise of LVT which is that the tax should be equal to the land value, so even if land values were high, the tax would just offset them and zero them out -- until the high tax incentivized even more construction.
But there is a different reason the argument doesn't apply to this -- or to any other tax. Governments have budgets. If they currently get money from a tax, and you propose to get rid of the tax, and your proposal is to cut spending, the people currently receiving the money (often politically connected corrupt industries or government unions) will fight you. If you propose to get rid of the tax without cutting spending by instituting or raising some other tax, the people you propose to tax instead will fight you. The status quo is sticky.