And what do you need to do to unseal it? And why cant the fake laptop relay that to the real laptop?
What do you mean with "relay"?
(All of this is trivially solved with glitter nail polish anyway.)
The same way the fake laptop can relay your password to me, i could also relay the generated TOTP code from the stolen laptop to the fake in front of you. As tried to convey, the fake laptop is basically a full MITM on your screen/keyboard.
Making a machine visuals non-reproducible helps that, but only if the attacker cannot easily switch the exterior parts (chassis, keyboard) between the two machines.
This is a hollywood level threat scenario.
It involves the attacker having intimate familiarity with the operating system, and having to break inn twice to even get this attack done.
If you do put inn the effort then I deserve to be hacked and can pick up sheep farming in the country side.
The OS does not matter? Grab the video output via HDMI/DisplayPort and insert the keypresses via USB. Thats likely gonna work. Basically what modern KVM switches do. And setup the fake laptop as VNC client. Same tech that companies can use to remotely manage servers.
Of course it does. You are replaying the logos and screens.
> Grab the video output via HDMI/DisplayPort and insert the keypresses via USB. Thats likely gonna work. Basically what modern KVM switches do. And setup the fake laptop as VNC client. Same tech that companies can use to remotely manage servers.
You believe you can boot up an entire VNC client to display something that would take most machines under a second to display?
Which the real machine happily gives me via HDMI/DisplayPort.
> You believe you can boot up an entire VNC client to display something that would take most machines under a second to display?
Do i need to? That the user presses the power button does not mean the machine will freshly boot. It could also be an unsuspend/wakeup or some regular ACPI event if the machine is only appearing to be off.
This is a completely imaginary scenario. I'd be amazed to see it pulled off.
EDIT: I hear Amazon is still getting pitches for Hacker 2. You might have a shot.
https://www.windowscentral.com/how-disable-windows-10-fast-s...
Of course, it's much easier to just pop the original laptop open and interpose on the keyboard. Even easier: use acoustics to snoop the keystrokes. The snooper could even be 5g/wifi/gps, assuming it's easy to steal some power from the mainboard. I guess fingerprint + camera ID make that attack harder. Still, the hypothetical device could stream HDMI at a few FPS if it was easy to splice into the display panel cable. (I haven't cracked a laptop recently, but those used to be socketed + unencrypted.)
Miniaturization is weird. The latter attack is probably easier to pull off these days than the former. If you wanted to swap my laptop, you'd need to replicate the dents and stickers. Good luck doing that!
This doesn't really mesh well with what the TPM-TOTP idea is trying to solve: trust in the machine you’re using.
Hyperbolic or fairly extreme-sounding scenarios are common when discussing this kind of thing, partly because it makes discussion about a fairly boring topic a little bit more interesting. Don’t get distracted by that.
That being said, using a TPM-based TOTP is pretty extreme sounding in and of itself.
It's not. They are very much intended to derail serious discussions around threat models.
> That being said, using a TPM-based TOTP is pretty extreme sounding in and of itself.
It's not. It's trivial to implement.
Buying the same model laptop and swapping it with your targets is an elementary level targeted attack