I Don't Trust Matrix Developers to Produce a Secure Protocol

In summary, the two "clown shoes" vulnerabilities found in 2022 causes the (cryptography professional) author to not trust their protocol development.

> But please abandon Olm and Megolm and work with the cryptography community to build something actually secure. MLS is a good start.

Since it's somewhat burried in the comments on that Gist: Matrix is working on MLS: https://matrix.org/blog/2023/07/a-giant-leap-with-mls/

I'm curious how much resources are spent on MLS.

> @ara4n: Also, this issue only applied to file transfers and secret storage in Matrix - not Olm or Megolm traffic.

When the author just ranted about Olm, arguing that it was other parts of the protocol that were vulnerable is a bold strategy. :)

> @ara4n: For context: Olm is a clone of Signal’s Double Ratchet, and Megolm is the protocol used to exchange message keys for group communication over Olm. Room management is done via the Matrix layer (not Olm or Megolm), which doesn’t yet authenticate events by the user.

It would be interesting to hear how Signal solved this, in comparison.

(I'll continue to use Matrix.)

By the same author: https://soatok.blog/2024/05/14/its-time-for-furries-to-stop-...