IIRC his fund averaged around 30% gains per year, every year, over 30 years. (I'm going from memory here, too lazy to look it up). That is just such an unbelievable performance number.
Successful quant stratégies tend to hit capacity limits...
Eg selling insurance can be seen as a zero sum game, but it's a genuinely useful product for people, even when the expected value for them is negative. It works, because utility is not strictly proportional to money.
Similarly, market making delivers liquidity-on-demand for a fee.
In practice, people take out insurance even for events that would not put them out of business.
Btw, if you are talking about 'value-generating enterprises', ie businesses as buyers of insurance, then your argument doesn't really work either, or at least not without caveats:
When a business suddenly has a large liability, and it goes bankrupt, all that happens is that the equity owners are wiped out and the creditors take over. The underlying business can and often does continue uninterrupted, and has approximately the same value as a going concern as before.
Also, being able to run as a going concern is of finite value to a business. If your business can take a 51% chance of either doubling in value or alternatively going bust, then that _might_ be a good gamble to take if your shareholders are well-diversified. For example, if index funds are your main shareholders.
Humans need considerable better odds before they consider such a gamble. But people do regularly put their life on the line in return for very finite benefits. Eg every time you leave the house, and drive a car. Or even more stark, any time people conveniently 'forget' to put their seatbelts on.
I am not saying that ALL insurances provide values. Like any other kind of trades, you can lose values if you make a bad decision. That does not make insurance inherently zero- or negative-sum.
> When a business suddenly has a large liability, and it goes bankrupt, all that happens is that the equity owners are wiped out and the creditors take over. The underlying business can and often does continue uninterrupted, and has approximately the same value as a going concern as before.
This assumes the original owner brings no value to the business. Even in that case, the disruption itself is harmful, not to mention the assumption that bankrupted business can restructure rather than closing down.
Closing down the business doesn't necessarily mean very much: all the machines, and workers and real estate and building still exist, whether the business closes or not.
One of the genious thing that rentech did was long out of the money bonds, and short newly issued bonds. Seems like such a simple strat, but when you crank up the leverage you can make alot of money.
According to industry rumors, RenTech is somewhere between $10-20bn AUM (assets under management, i.e. the capital used for trading), and the profit that they make, they can't reinvest, they have to take it out as profit.
I know literally zero about this stuff!
This is of course a completely theoretical proposition, because in reality you don't know what the "fair price" is. You don't even have probabilities, because those are also unobservable, you only see one version of "history".
In practice, what happens is that if you trade "too much", "shit goes wrong". Both of these things require empirical estimation and are easy to get wrong.
The most obvious is the market liquidity, which you can observe at e.g. BitStamp TradeView [1] - there's only so many orders at a given price, so the more you trade, the worse price you get (the average/marginal trade).
No professional of course trades like that, especially not HFTs, but similar problems happen at every scale - you're competing with other traders, they might have better information, there's limited amount of stock in the market, the edge/alpha/expected profit you can earn decays over time as the price moves, if you trade too much you move the market and inform other participants who can then trade against you, ...
I guess you will not be getting a job there
But in seriousness, when you become so big relative to the market, you become the market.
It's easy to make a few high margin dollars, hard to make a lot of high margin dollars.
They also got into some tax trouble with uncle sam and had to pay 7b in back taxes (https://www.wsj.com/articles/james-simons-robert-mercer-othe...)
I guess the theoretical limit to how much money you could make in the market is "the sum of all volatility", but I wonder how realistically possible it would be to even dream of beating 62% yearly.
The returns of modern HFT market makers are even higher. With their unfair “business” advantages such as PFOF, privileged dark pool and block trade access, and military internet infrastructure.
Think 60%+, per year, at least. Over 10-20 years, of course.
They wouldn't hire me either!
The returns of a child's lemonade stand are even higher...
Market makers and lemonade stands are mostly about paying for labour (and ideas etc, but let's call that 'labour', too). Capital requirements are rather low. So taking all the profit and attributing it to capital returns tends to give you weird numbers.
Why does it matter? Returns are returns. Money in, money out.
After all, people compare HYSA bank interest with TreasuryDirect bond returns with equity ETFs like VTI and QQQ. Each with vastly different capital mechanics.
Good luck trying that with one of those very profitable market makers and funds: they don't want your capital; or at least they don't want it at the same price (= returns) that we are quoting here. Which suggests that those returns aren't attributable to that capital at all (even though for tax reasons they might structured it so that legally these are counted as capital returns, but that just obscures the underlying economic reality).
This is very similar to observing that a particular company pays a lot of money for some very simple job; but then we notice that the job is only available for the son of the CEO. We can conclude that the extra pay isn't really for that simple job.
Or when we notice that a government contractor officially charges 5000 dollars for a hammer. Unless you and me could rock up and steal market share by offering to sell hammers for 4000 dollars, it's very likely that the 5000 dollars aren't really for the hammer at all; but just some accounting shenanigans.