The export is important in case you want to move to a different service or password manager.
Some of the physical security devices even doesn't support exporting private keys. You ask something (encrypt/decrypt/sign) with a mailbox interface and you get the results. Key is never (and can't be) exposed outside of the secure enclave. Said keys are generated in an isolated RNG inside the key, too. So the system is completely self-contained.
I understand the desire of flexibility and convenience, but this is a tradeoff on a slider. Some designs are full-in on security others are not. We should make choices according to that.
My thinking is always if you do passkeys for phishing protection or potentially UX improvements then there is no harm syncing keys. (I would argue the security is increased by adding phishing protection over password/2fa) If you do it for security, then you do not want to sync keys and rely on key storage that do not allow extraction (most secure will be "offline" key stores like YubiKeys). I guess the latter is more important in enterprise/business scenarios rather than in b2c context.
A little OT but it will also be fun in b2c explaining customers that there keystore is full on the hardware key. (of the top of my head YubiKey 5 have a limit of about 25 keys)
But if it's the only factor, I can't see a difference between password reuse and passkey reuse. If I can recover it in any way, then it's (very) game over.
So I'm not mad that you can't sync a passkey if it's the single factor. Because as we don't reuse app passwords for multiple devices or normal passwords for multiple sites, we shouldn't use the same private keys on many devices, allowing a more granular and better approach.
Of course this is my view and some people won't agree. I prefer a good multi-layer system, not a single passkey opens the whole world style one.
You will not use the same passkey for multiple application/service.
You will generate a passkey per application/service.
I will certainly though not disagree on security... if that is your thing then do not sync private keys around, but the tradeoff is always there. If security would be critical, I would favor client certs with smartcards, but browsers do not support that "too well"
If I have "n" private keys for an account, I can use another private key and revoke the lost/compromised one. It's that simple.
Your secure enclave is not much different electronically from a smart card with a biometric password actually. People think Passkeys as SSH keys on disk, but it's more of a long private key on a single-way secure enclave. This is why people cry "platform lock-in". It's platform lock-in, but it's a secondary effect. It's actually a "proper HSM, but integrated".
Providers will most of the time allow to register multiple passkeys or other authentication means, hopefully ;-) which has its own downsides.
I am well aware how the internals work of keystores. But the benefit with "client certs" is that on mTLS you get added benefits besides where the key is stored. And that is that you can "prevent" mitm attacks.
But I guess that is a subject for another thread.
I don't think that we should target MIL-xxx standards for daily use, but my security is comparably important to me as military's missile codes are important to them.
So, I don't want my passkey-based services to have a security theater in the name of convenience. There should be some friction to force a baseline security.
Make the fallback too lax and you might as well not bother with 2FA/Passkeys at all.
For those kinds of keys extraction is sort of meaningless: the private keys maybe aren't even stored at rest, they are re-derived as necessary. You can sync the encrypted shared secret and all the site-specific salt/pepper/hashes even to devices that can't decrypt them. (That's how secure but consumer-friendly syncing is built, and that's a part of how recovery pathways get built.) But it isn't useful on its own without the hardware keys that you can't themselves export.
You can have syncing with the root keys being exportable/extractable. That's already how many of the consumer solutions are being built. That's part of where the consumer-friendly security is for Passkeys.
So, I had to manually migrate TOTP secrets from 30+ accounts back then, by removing 2FA, and re-enabling it with a new secret.
As I said before, it's a sliding scale trading off between security and convenience. Select your poison and its dosage, and do your own cocktail.
Or, providers will develop a workflow to migrate or add new devices easily. Like "validate on another validated device to add this new passkey" scheme.
But I view passkeys as more for the low-hanging fruit. All the crap accounts that every webshop and news outlet makes you create these days. I have 500+ accounts in my current password manager. Not being able to migrate that away to another service would be a nightmare. Being locked in with a big tech company would be too.
What my ideal would be is to have the master key on multiple HSMs (like multiple yubikeys) so they are safe but mobile.
Also, if software password managers don't offer export options it doesn't mean it's impossible to export. They just don't want to make it possible. But an adversary could. The only way to really make it impossible is hardware tokens which is great for important stuff but not really for those thirteen in a dozen accounts.
That would be glorious. It would be great if it was standards-based, too, to prevent vendor lock-in.
Syncable means that the provider can backup your passkey to someplace under their control, from whence they can restore it to a different device of yours where you also have that provider's client software.
Here's how Github explains it [1]
> Many passkeys support syncing, where your passkey is backed up by the provider's account system (iCloud, Google account, password manager, etc.). If you ever lose your device, you can recover your synced passkeys by signing in to your passkey provider.
BTW, the flag on Github should probably say "Syncable" rather than "Synced".
[1] https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/authenticating-wit...