No, we are merely returning to the pre-photography state of things where a mere printed image is not sufficient evidence for anything.
We still need a way to establish truth. It's important for security cameras, for politics, and for public figures. Here are some things we could start looking into.
* Cameras that sign their output. Yes, this camera caught this video, and it hasn't been modified. This is a must for recordings being used in court evidence IMO. Otherwise framing a crime is as easy as a few deep fakes and planting some DNA or fingerprints at the scene of the crime.
* People digitally signing pictures/audio/videos of them. Even if they digitally modified the data it shows that they consent to having their image associated with that message. It reduces the strength of the attack vector of deep fake videos for reputation sabotage.
* Malicious content source detection and flagging. Think email spam filter type tagging of fake content. Community notes on X would be another good example.
* Digital manipulation detection. I'm less than hopeful this will be the way in the long term, but could be used to disprove some fraud.
I’ve always had a suspicion that governments and large companies would prefer a world without hard cryptographic proofs. After wikileaks they noticed DKIM can cause them major blowback. Somehow general public isn’t aware all the emails were proven authentic with DKIM signatures and even in fairly educated circles people believe the “emails were fake” but it’s not actually possible.
You say this as if it were not a big deal, but losing a century's worth of authentication infrastructure/practises is a Bad Thing which will have large negative externalities.
In a few years time when (if) faking realistic footage becomes trivial, I suspect this kind of video will have a much, much higher level of scrutiny or only be accepted from certain sources such as government owned traffic cameras.