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Comment by cjbgkagh | Hacker News Reader

Do we know for sure what has been reported is true, was it really only a few?

Perhaps we should consider that the goal wasn't to do a lot of damage but instead saber-rattling. It would seem wise for Iran to both to satiate the demands of their constituents desire for retribution without triggering escalation. That Israel was told to 'take the win' by the US seems to be as good as result for Iran as one could possibly hope for.

The cost of the attack seemed to be 1/10th the cost of the defense so that does appear to be a net win for the attackers.

I worry that the west will become over confident with our missile defence and use it as an excuse to push conflict as close to nuclear exchange as possible. To paraphrase Bertrand Russell; 'like teenagers playing a game of nuclear chicken'

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It's true. There's photo and video evidence plus confirmation from multiple separate sources (different countries).

You don't fire 300+ missiles and drones just as a "show of force". It's expensive. Their stated goal was to overwhelm the missile defense system and it clearly failed.

> The cost of the attack seemed to be 1/10th the cost of the defense so that does appear to be a net win for the attackers.

Not really. First, Iran is far worse off. Second, it showed that their missiles are crap. Many of them failed on launch and some crashed in Iraq (they intended to fire more).

But this was also a unique situation where Israel held back. In a typical case a firing would receive an immediate deadly response. E.g. planes and missiles from Israel returning the favor. Thus the cost for Iran would have been much higher.

Lastly, you should calculate the cost if the missiles would have hit the target.

> I worry that the west will become over confident with our missile defence and use it as an excuse to push conflict as close to nuclear exchange as possible. To paraphrase Bertrand Russell; 'like teenagers playing a game of nuclear chicken'

I partially agree with that notion. Still, as an Israeli I'd rather have that defense system over ideology. I can tell you that if a missile had hit anything important the outrage would have been terrible and the retaliation would have been immediate. In that sense at least, it gives the space to take a breath and deliberate.

>But this was also a unique situation where Israel held back. In a typical case a firing would receive an immediate deadly response. E.g. planes and missiles from Israel returning the favor. Thus the cost for Iran would have been much higher.

I feel like we are observing separate conflicts altogether. Israel whose conscript army is nearing its end in terms of endurance, who has been bogged down in urban guerilla warfare for 6 months, while responding to Houthi and Hezbollah strikes, who has also lost much of the goodwill and support it had from its international partners, who needed those partners that are starting to get sick of them to defend from a very early telegraphed missile strike.

You think that Israel would even consider an immediate deadly response to open a fourth front in a war they can't afford, a war the public is getting sick of, and a war that the very disliked leader of the nation is cynically prolonging to maintain his waning grip on power?

One thing I appreciate about HN the variety of perspectives I'd never be exposed to otherwise

FYI I probably won't be able to answer much since dang limited my account after I took offense at people who think my country shouldn't exist. But I'll bite.

Israel isn't remotely close to stretching its forces. The army is actually pushing hard for retaliation and most forces from Gaza are already at home by now. There's an importance of "perceived power" in this region. It's crucial to Israeli survival that it appears powerful.

This is also a much "easier" war for Israel as it can fight against a "normal" army. The Hezbolla and Hamas are problematic as they aren't official armies (although they do have battalions and structures), they hide in civilian populations and make combat difficult. Hamas never brought the army remotely close to its limits; during the entire campaign in Gaza many of the people drafted were actually up north waiting for Hezbolla.

Houthi missiles are just stupid, Yemen is too far away. The problem is the costs of far east goods that results from the blockade. But that's mostly an annoyance.

All three of these fronts (and Syrian sourced attacks) are really from one source: Iran. They have been pulling the strings as part of an ongoing shadow war. Some believe it would be best to attack the head of the snake.

All of the problems Israel is experiencing with its allies are the main reason it didn't retaliate (at least not yet).

Well, everything you say is quite surprising to me. But thanks for sharing your perspective. I've certainly never heard most of these points before.

It's pretty clear that Israel is stretching the extent it can take its conscripts to. Otherwise they wouldn't be debating drafting haredis (at great political risk). They wouldn't be pulling out of Gaza. Allies and the upper brass themselves wouldn't be saying the conscript army needs rest. And you wouldn't be seeing the big, news-making mistakes the conscript army is making after 6 months of urban warfare.

The idea that a war against Iran would be easy is, quite frankly bonkers. It sounds like something Netanyahu would say to everyone's groans and disappointment. It sounds like Putin's hubris before he invaded Ukraine...

>Some believe it would be best to attack the head of the snake.

This reads like it's not serious about the practicalities of war. It honestly reads like Hamas propaganda talking about how they're going to directly kill Netanyahu when such a move is realistically impossible for them.

We're talking about this point in time. Not theory. Right now people who were drafted for military reserves in October are mostly home now. At this point Israel has manpower.

The drafting of Hasidim is a different issue altogether that's been going on for decades. It's reached a boiling point mostly due to unrelated circumstances. A supreme court ruling came in that effectively invalidated the current legal hack as discriminatory. Since Netnyahu's coalition relies on the Hasidic vote he is trying to find a solution. They demand complete, permanent immunity from the draft which is a red flag here. Especially at this point in time.

Right now numbers are reasonable but if the war develops into an all front war then yes, Israel will be stretched. Regardless, a war against Iran would employ mostly pilots and missile defenses. Those are different forces from the ones engaged in combat in other fronts. So saturation isn't linear.

> The idea that a war against Iran would be easy is, quite frankly bonkers.

I didn't say it would be easy. I said "easier" with quotes trying to convey nuance. War sucks. But a war against a "normal army" is something that is simpler and clear. Urban warfare is just terrible for any army.

In the case of a war with Iran Israel can rely much heavier on air superiority which is probably its strongest suit.

> >Some believe it would be best to attack the head of the snake. > > This reads like it's not serious about the practicalities of war. It honestly reads like Hamas propaganda talking about how they're going to directly kill Netanyahu when such a move is realistically impossible for them.

Notice this isn't my opinion but I understand where they're coming from. Proxy wars suck.

I do think that if Israel could destroy the Iranian reactor it would be a huge accomplishment and would ultimately be a good thing. Israel did that in Iraq and effectively blocked Saddam from having Nuclear weapons. It did it in Syria and stopped Assad from a similar accomplishment.

> It's pretty clear that Israel is stretching the extent it can take its conscripts to. Otherwise they wouldn't be debating drafting haredis (at great political risk).

Let me endorse the fellow commenter here - this is a misread of the situation. The army has pulled back most troops from Gaza, partially because they need rest, but also because they don't have anything to do right now. They're holding territory, but there's no planned next move - the army is waiting for the government on this. If a Rafah operation proceeds, then I assume more troops will re-enter Gaza.

As for the debate over drafting Haredi, as fellow poster said - this is an unrelated political thing that is cropping up now. Well, not entirely unrelated - this has been debated for decades, but it's probably being used now by people who oppose the current government. It's being used now partially because at this moment, the importance of the draft is more obvious, but also because the opposition is trying to bring down the government, and this is a way to do it.

It really has nothing to do with needing these conscripts for the current fight.

It seems like we basically agree actually.

> The army has pulled back most troops from Gaza, partially because they need rest

Right they need rest because they are stretched beyond what they're meant to endure as a conscript army. They also can afford a rest they need.

> s being used now partially because at this moment, the importance of the draft is more obvious

Right because the current army needs rest and could use fresh reinforcements.

So what's our disagreement here?

> You think that Israel would even consider an immediate deadly response to open a fourth front in a war they can't afford, a war the public is getting sick of, and a war that the very disliked leader of the nation is cynically prolonging to maintain his waning grip on power?

It's worth keeping in mind a few things.

The world's public might be "getting sick of" the war, but most Israelis are united around wanting to see the end of Hamas. They'd like things done faster, obviously, but aren't "sick of the war".

Also, almost everyone understands that the real enemy behind everything is Iran, and that the real threat to Israel is a nuclear Iran. There is a definite strain of thought that wants to take the Iran attack as an opportunity to do the one thing that is actually important for Israel's survival - try and stop Iran from getting a nuke.

As for the leader of the nation "cynically prolonging" the war, I'm personally conflicted on this. I definitely oppose Netanyahu and think he would do anything to cling to power... but it's not clear in what way the war could be "shortened", short of Israel just deciding to leave Hamas in power, which most Israelis oppose. (That's not to say I agree with anything else he is doing, or with other aspects of the war.)

> The world's public might be "getting sick of" the war, but most Israelis are united around wanting to see the end of Hamas. They'd like things done faster, obviously, but aren't "sick of the war".

The Israeli public is getting sick of the war, mass protests against Netanyahu and against prolonging the war and not bringing back hostages are growing from 0 right after the attack to quite populated right now in front of our eyes.

Getting sick is a process. It doesn't mean over 50% think the war should end right now. But the part of Israel which can vote is getting sicker of the war than they were at the beginning.

As for Iran gaining nukes. They will likely gain them if they haven't already gained them. Same as Israel. Israel cannot extrajudicially assassinate Iranians forever. What they should avoid, instead of Iran getting nukes, is losing so many world allies that nuclear armed countries abandon them or begin to oppose them.

Lastly, Hamas will not be "eradicated" or "eliminated" the same way no amount of American might and force could "eradicate" or "eliminate" the Taliban. Hamas is unlike ISIS or other defeated jihadist groups and far more like the Taliban in that they have a liberation struggle other jihadist groups don't have. That is going to sustain them beyond any kind of prolongedilitary conflict Israel or especially its allies can stomach. None of this is what I want to happen, it's just the facts on the ground. You can't eliminate people's desire to be free or to secure their homeland. Israelis understand this when it comes to their own land, but fail to comprehend it when it comes to other people's land.

> The Israeli public is getting sick of the war, mass protests against Netanyahu and against prolonging the war and not bringing back hostages are growing from 0 right after the attack to quite populated right now in front of our eyes.

Eh. There's definitely less "enthusiasm" than in the beginning, but for the most part, even those who want a hostage deal don't see it as instead of the war, or at least not instead of removing Hamas from power. They mostly prefer the hostages to come first, but then Hamas to be dealt with. (I'm speaking of my general impression in broad strokes, but polls I believe back me up.)

> As for Iran gaining nukes. They will likely gain them if they haven't already gained them.

I don't think it's necessarily unavoidable, and I think it's well worth avoiding. Iran has repeatedly says it wants to wipe Israel out completely. If they have nukes, it will be incredibly hard to oppose them in a war, and they can much more easily make good on their threat.

It really is something that is an existential risk for Israel.

> What [Israel] should avoid, instead of Iran getting nukes, is losing so many world allies that nuclear armed countries abandon them or begin to oppose them.

I don't think it's an either/or. Especially since most of Israel's allies are also enemies of Iran, it's in fact quite the opposite - many countries are happy that Israel is doing the dirty work of actually dealing with Iran.

And you can see that in the unprecedented level of cooperation between Israel and some of its Arab neighbors, who had once been enemies of Israel themselves!

> Lastly, Hamas will not be "eradicated" or "eliminated" the same way no amount of American might and force could "eradicate" or "eliminate" the Taliban.

Maybe. It's a military and political question. I don't think it's a given. I think given enough time, and given a political solution for governing, Israel can effectively eliminate Hamas. At the end of the day, they are made up of specific people, possess specific weapons, etc. Once those are gone, they are effectively eliminated.

> You can't eliminate people's desire to be free or to secure their homeland. Israelis understand this when it comes to their own land, but fail to comprehend it when it comes to other people's land.

Most Israelis understand this. Hamas's desire isn't to be free or secure in their own homeland - Israel disengaged from Gaza in 2005, and Hamas could've turned its thoughts inwards on security and on building up Gaza. They absolutely had that option. They choose to use it to fight Israel.

I think everyone would've been better off, especially the Gazans themselves, if Hamas had actually tried to improve Gaza and had just... not fought Israel and not spent vast resources on this war.

Again, it's really interesting to get these viewpoints. Thanks for sharing them with me. I really have to say they don't seem to resemble the facts on the ground I have noticed. Just a few things I noticed that I can't imagine anyone I know saying:

1) most people want a quagmire war that will never end trying to defeat a populist force fighting for their homeland. The US has lost every single war of this kind in the last 60 years. Why would Israel win one?

2) Iran can be militarily stopped from getting nukes, or that it matters. I think our best shot was the JCPOA, and the fact that we haven't tried anything close to that since tells me that the US has given up trying to deter Iran's nuclear program. Even if Iran gets nukes, what will change? There is still MAD (there already was MAD between Israel's allies and Iran's allies). The whole world has largely moved past this issue, it seems, but you think it's very relevant.

3) Hamas can be eliminated even though the Taliban weren't. These are really similar forces fighting really similar blockades, embargoes, and invasions, with very similar popular support. Why is this the albatross of the past 60 years of losing offensive wars against populist guerilla fighters?

4) Hamas doesn't want freedom or had some kind of opportunity to better a completely embargoed, blockaded, and dietary restricted Gaza. This is a pretty surprising take honestly. What incentive does anyone have to run a business or improve any lot in life when your mortal enemy controls every import and export into your territory and even how much food you can have? What is the point of money or progress in such a world? You can't bring more stuff in from the outside until you destroy the blockade around you... I'd think anyone on any side here could see that.

> Again, it's really interesting to get these viewpoints.

Thanks, that's why I comment - I want people to get an Israeli perspective on things. Though I am a very liberal Israeli compared to the majority of the population, which is why I sometimes try to represent the consensus viewpoint as I understand it and not just my own. (I call that out when I do that.)

> 1) most people want a quagmire war that will never end trying to defeat a populist force fighting for their homeland. The US has lost every single war of this kind in the last 60 years. Why would Israel win one?

This depends on what you mean. If by "fighting for their homeland", you mean what Hamas means, which is to rule all of Israel, then... the US can afford to lose these wars. Israel can't. Physically can't. If Hamas gets what it wants, there is no more Israel, and probably no more Israeli Jews.

So it's an entirely different situation.

> 2) Iran can be militarily stopped from getting nukes, or that it matters.

First, I have no idea if it can or can't be stopped. Israel and the US is acting like it can, so hopefully they're right

> Even if Iran gets nukes, what will change? There is still MAD (there already was MAD between Israel's allies and Iran's allies). The whole world has largely moved past this issue, it seems, but you think it's very relevant.

If Iran has a nuke, even leaving aside the apocalyptic scenario of it just arming a terrorist group to attack Israel with it (which is possible), there's still a huge issue: Israel will then be able to act much like Russia does, which is invade and conquer neighboring countries, with the world being very afraid of direct confrontation because they're (rightly!) worried about nuclear war.

I find it interesting that you think the "whole world" has moved past this point - you're ignoring the actions of all of Iran's neighbors, who are signing historic agreements to help each other because they're all terrified of Iran. So no, I don't think anyone who has any skin in this particular game would agree with your assessment (and this includes most US security/etc experts. Don't forget that Iran doesn't just chant "death to Israel", they chant "death to Israel, death to America"!).

> 3) Hamas can be eliminated even though the Taliban weren't. These are really similar forces fighting really similar blockades, embargoes, and invasions, with very similar popular support. Why is this the albatross of the past 60 years of losing offensive wars against populist guerilla fighters?

I answered this earlier, but Israel doesn't really have an alternative, and comparing to the US is a huge misread of the situation. The US is basically not threatened by any of these armed groups in a "direct" manner. It can't be invaded.

Hamas is a group that has quite literally invaded Israel 6 months ago and killed 1000 citizens, grabbed 240 hostages, shot rockets at Israel (and these are being shot from minutes away, mind you, at most). It has pledged to do this again and again.

Or let me put it another way - there are still around 100k I think Israelis who are internally displaced. They can't go home, because their homes are right on the border with either Hamas or Hezbollah. Do you think if Mexico decided to attack the US, killed thousands of its citizens, and 100k Texans had to relocate for fear or Mexico... that the US would "lose" a war against Mexico like it did against the Taliban?

> 4) Hamas doesn't want freedom or had some kind of opportunity to better a completely embargoed, blockaded, and dietary restricted Gaza. This is a pretty surprising take honestly. What incentive does anyone have to run a business or improve any lot in life when your mortal enemy controls every import and export into your territory and even how much food you can have? What is the point of money or progress in such a world? You can't bring more stuff in from the outside until you destroy the blockade around you... I'd think anyone on any side here could see that.

I think you're extremely underselling the degree of freedom and opportuniy that they had.

Yes, there was a necessary blockade since Hamas promised to keep attacking Israel. A promise it almost immediately kept by firing rockets at Israel. So for one thing, it could've just... not done that, promised to stop attacking Israel, and tried to get an actual diplomatic peace with Israel. That's exactly the opposite of the purpose of Hamas, but a group that actually wants to improve its lot in life could've done that.

Secondly, Gaza received tremendous amounts of aid, and despite the blockade, did receive imports and had a not-terrible quality of life. This despite the fact that Hamas spent probably billions of dollars of its resources not to help Gazans, but to wage war (and to fatten the pockets of its leaders, who are literal billionaires).

Just look at the videos Hamas proudly put up of it taking water pipes, sent to Gaza to help get water to the people, and converting them to rockets to fire at Israel. They are literally taking aid that is supposed to help improve Gaza and using it to wage war.

Gazans incentives to improve Gaza is because they live there. They could choose a path of improving Gaza, making its economic conditions better, making their daily lives better, stop attacking Israel, and a few years of peace later, negotiate with Israel and Egypt to get some restrictions lifted. They actually did that to some extent, but all the while planning the massive October 7th attack, which has reset all expectations of them acting in a peaceful or rational manner.

Hamas has made it clear that they only care about attacking and destroying Israel. In that sense, I agree with you - if that is your only goal, then you don't have any incentive to improve Gazan's actual lives. I just think that that goal is fundamentally evil and stupid, and everyone's lives would be better if Hamas didn't pursue it.

Israel needs the support of the US to continue operating as it does. The US support of Israel was already on a demographic timer, the unwavering support of boomer evangelicals is dying out with them and even the new evangelicals have an net unfavorable view of Israel. The Gaza conflict has simply sped up this already seemingly inevitable decline. Losing popular support causes a cascade loss of other support; political, economic, and then military. There has already been unprecedented pushback against Israel from Joe Biden who is clearly worried about his own reelection chances. I.e. the loss of public support is already causing a loss of political support.

Acquiring nukes keeps getting easier, improvement in material science, electronics, etc. Even North Korea has them now, in my view the only thing keeping Iran from getting nukes is the ability to use them as a bargaining chip. Unless it's Israelis plan to completely destroy Iran then taking away that bargaining chip would just end up with Iran getting nukes.

To be honest I'm not sure how Israel survives this.

You might be right about all of that. I think waning support from the US to Israel makes sense - most Israelis no longer support the current Israeli government!

That said, US and Israeli interests are incredibly aligned. They have basically the same enemies (Iran, to some extent Russia and China, and Islamic fundamentalists in general), and the same outlook on the world. This isn't necessarily recognized by all citizens, but it's actually true about the world. I think the truth eventually overrides momentary episodes of changing public support.

> There has already been unprecedented pushback against Israel from Joe Biden who is clearly worried about his own reelection chances. I.e. the loss of public support is already causing a loss of political support.

I'm a fairly liberal Israeli on these issues, but I think it's worth mentioning that the "unprecedented" pushback also comes after the unprecedented support Biden gave Israel. And the pushback is in essence, mostly correct.

> Acquiring nukes keeps getting easier, improvement in material science, electronics, etc. Even North Korea has them now, in my view the only thing keeping Iran from getting nukes is the ability to use them as a bargaining chip. Unless it's Israelis plan to completely destroy Iran then taking away that bargaining chip would just end up with Iran getting nukes.

Yeah. That's a problem. I have no idea. I'm hoping Israel and the US have actual plans to stop Iran getting nukes, but what do I know?

I will mention that the fact that getting dangerous weapons in general is getting so much easier, is making me very scared for humanity as a whole. (See e.g. the issue I think most of humanity should be worried about, which is reducing existential risk, with the most obvious current problem being AI safety.)

I view things through a realism/realpolitik lense. China was supposed to be US ally against Russia in order to have a Chinese - Russian conflict to keep both week. But China became too powerful in their own right and the Ukraine conflict has now created a strong alliance between China and Russia. Much of realpolitik is to keep both your enemies and allies in constant conflict with each other, even secretly pitting allies against other allies, and secretly weakening allies by promoting the worst in them. Suitably paranoid hegemons consider peace to be a time where countries build up strength for later use against them. On that basis I consider Israel an ally of convenience with the actual intent of using the 'unsinkable carrier' in preventing peace in the middle east and keeping the region in a weakened state. I guess unsinkable carrier is better than the reason of the baptists support of Israel. To remind people, it is so the jews can all die there in another holocaust to fulfil a biblical end-times prophecy and usher in the apocalypses where the baptists will ascend to heaven. Of course it's in Israel's interest to go along with both of these - for now.

The unprecedented support was assumed, the unprecedented pushback is new. And now Israel has been prevented from re-retaliating against Iran. This is a Suez Canal moment, where the 'special bond' between UK and US in effect ended and it led to a deep crisis of confidence in the UK and an deep sustained economic downturn. Unlike Israel the UK wasn't surrounded by hostile entities seeking their destruction.

Iran has been playing a long game for a long time, just like Israel was with Gaza. There may not be any good options left, I did think that a quick and decisive war against Iran to be the last viable option but Israel is apparently being prevented from doing so. On a balance of probabilities I don't think Israel would have won that conflict but there was at least some chance which I think is more of a chance than they have now.

I always viewed Oct7th incursion as a trap to invoke the exact response it did, I think by overestimating their support Israel has now found themselves in a position they're unable to get out of, hense trapped. I could be wrong, but I don't know how yet, and I am interested to see how it pans out. Sadly it seems that I wasn't wrong about Ukraines chances against Russia. Maybe a rapid de-escalation preceded by scapegoating Netanyahu is still possible?

You wouldn't.

That's not a meaningful claim about what other people would or wouldn't do.

The juice looks entirely worth the squeeze from here. Iran now knows exactly the saturation point of your defenses with all allies engaged.

You're entitled to your opinion.

I'm not making a claim on what people would do. That's just standard military practice when a missile is fired you fire back at the source to prevent additional firing.

Iran has no clue about the saturation point and got nothing. First, this was 100% synthetic since Israel knew about the attack and was very prepared. It got help from Jordan, US, UK and even the Saudis. According to army sources Israel already practiced for missile volumes with double the intensity. The fact that a couple went through doesn't indicate saturation, it just indicates the complexity of the problem space.

Also, this is relevant to a point in time. Missile defenses are easy to bolster with additional resources. Right now light dome isn't even active yet and might be a game changer (energy based interception). Software and sensors improve very rapidly and additional deployments are easy.

What we do know is that a large number of Iranian missiles crashed in Iraq and Iran because they are so badly made... Anyone in the market for Iranian tech now understands the quality of their product and its usefulness.

> Anyone in the market for Iranian tech now understands the quality of their product and its usefulness.

No matter, Putin is desperate enough to buy anyway.

I believe the US is struggling to reach production of 650 Patriots a year. Given the shambolic state of our industrial base, I strongly doubt that any of the other platforms are in better logistical shape.

I am deeply concerned that the US armories will be empty in two years at this rate.

>You don't fire 300+ missiles and drones just as a "show of force". It's expensive.

The reality is 300+ ordnances is chump change.

US attack on Syrian in 2018 consisted of 100 TLAMs/tomahawks with alleged ~70% interception rate on generations old RU hardware. The ability to intercept subsonic munitions at this point is basically known (hence why US pushing hard for stealth subsonics that are harder to engage), and being able to shoot down drones and cruise missiles is table stakes for any advanced military. Even more so with advanced notice. So Israel + co being able to take out 100% of subsonic munition is given, considering HOW MUCH MORE defense capabilities it has relative to Syria on 8x less land coverage*. The real kicker is the number of ballistics that slipped through, especially with US alleging 50% were duds that never launched properly. Assuming half of IR ballistics were duds, we're looking at ~10/50, 20%+ interception failures on small salvo (50-100 missiles is small), by one of the most sophisticated and dense anti missile networks in the world. The that ghetto salvo of 300 ordnances mix from Iran can penetrate that is the real news, how missile defense has surely improved, which is great against small states with limited capabilities, but not nearly enough for any adversary that can throw high 100s-1000s. Defense analysts suggest this was a calibrated retaliation because 300+ missiles and drones is really not that much.

* Should be noted a carrier strike group with defensive DDGs screening the carrier 100km+ away constitutes larger defensive perimetre larger than the size of Israel. Consider if a carrier group has more defense than the entire country of Israel with US+UK+Jordan help from local basing and DDGs. Consider what 10 ballistics do to a carrier. IR demonstrated that sending cheap garbage with 50% dud rate is enough to satuate the best defense that (a lot of) money can buy.

You're mixing cruise missiles and ballistic missiles which are very different things to intercept. Also comparing the volumes the US is able to fire with the volumes for an embargoed poor nation like Iran is probably not at the same scale.

300+ is more than was fired in a single attack against any country ever. Calling it small is disingenuous. It's possible that many of the duds weren't part of the initial tally published but it's unclear from the reports.

The significance here is the time-frame. This was done rapidly at a relatively short distance. As long as the defending side has enough missiles the volume doesn't matter (admittedly this is a big ask) what matters is the concurrent intensity required to overwhelm the defenses. But this is a pretty bad example regardless.

First, Israel is tiny. Its a smaller area to defend and that means fewer deployments/radars etc..

Iran is still just far enough to defend against. Missiles fired by their troops in Lebanon are much harder to intercept. There's just not as much time.

There was an intelligence warning and everyone was prepared.

>cruise missiles and ballistic missile

No I'm not, I distinguished between the different ordnances and known interception probabilities, as known as what info is publically available if one follows the space. Cruise missiles / TLAMs / tomahawk equivalents, aka subsonic munitions, not ballistic mach1-<mach5 or >mach 5 hypersonics, are "easy" to intercept. Even with 30 year old Russian hardware, S200-300s (as seen against US tomahawks in Syria). Older platforms shot down U2s 50 years ago, they can shoot down cruise missiles. Indeed all of those were shot down along with subsonic drones. Likely garbage subsonic drones, without any stealth shaping nor TERCOM/terrain hugging. Which is expected. What penetrated was ~10 ballistics, out of 50/100 depending on dud rate, ~10-20%. That's really the new revelation, we only know from past 10 years US FTM tests that missile defense has consistently intercepted against 1-2 < mach5 ballisitcs, but couldn't extrapolate at scale.

Now we know againt allegedly crude Iranian ballistics (if dud rate true), with forwarning, 10%-20% made it through. Which is a great number mind you relative to where we were 10 years ago, but it's also pretty terrible stats with respect major assets like carrier survival. Or in IL case, IR calibrating future attacks to satuate defense. People see 80%-90% ballistic interception, are thinking missile defense strong, which it is true relative to powers that can't coordinate large strike packages (which granted is most of the world), but people who see 10-20% ballistic penetration see dead carriers and MIRVs deliverying nuclear payloads.

>300+ is more than was fired in a single attack against any country ever.

Coalition air strike during Gulf war hovered between 800-100 sorties per day, with planes carrying multipe munitions. Thousands of essentially uncontested fires. This is the first time a "decent" size salvo was directed at western missile defense. 300 mixed salvo is small, even smaller since we're really talking about 50-100 ballistics. Like US sent ~100 tomahawks against IIRC 3 targets in Syria with fraction of anti missile coverage. AKA even against shit tier Syria, US weaponeer were throwing 3 digits to shut down a few targets. Hence IMO 300 mixed ordnance against IL who is definitely 3x more capable than Syria capabilities is "calibrated" not to be big. Like IR probably expected more to penetrate, but just demonstrating a strike package like this was enough penetrate western/IL defense is enough, even if west wants to spin it as embarrassment.

>Calling it small is disingenuous.

It's small in the sense that 50-100 ballistics is close to floor of what modern anti missile defense networks are designed against, i.e. a loaded carrier group with 5-6 DDGs ~500 VLS tubes is designed to intercept 100s of ballistics. 50-100 ballistics maybe substantial relative to Iranian capabilities, but it's small relative to missile defense capabilities western (well US/IL) hardware is designed for. For reference PRC H6 salvo against a carrier group would have 200-300 antiship ballistics. Double that with hypersonics from land. That's what a large salvo a dense missile defense network is calibrated against. Another comparison, estimates of disabling PRC bases in SCS is like 300-400 tomahawks for just major installations on Spratlys and Woody Island. So measured against targets with less missile defense density than Israel, with forwarning, and assistance, the 300 ordnance mix IR planned, of which only 100 had serious chance of penetrating, is indeed "small".

> was done rapidly at a relatively short distance

By distance I think you mean terminal interception which is the easiest/most technically mature form of interception, but generally missile defense wants to move away from terminal, to more difficult midcourse because terminal is constrained by prepositioning of hardware, which since Israel is small is less of an issue. If anything because Israel is small, it has disproportionate density of sensors and overlap in shooters coverage. Like it shouldn't be controvesial to suggest Israel has the densest anti missile coverage in the world. More than most carrier deployment only gets 1-2 DDGs escorts - 180 VLS of which only a fraction is dedicated to missile defense. Israel small size = almost any hardware in it, is within interception range, especially considering they'll be prepositioned against IR direction. IMO that's really how this event should be interpretted. How the geographically densest and most advanced missile defense network in the world allowed 10-20% of ballistics from sanctioned country with limited industrial base through.

>has enough missiles the volume doesn't matter

Which is really crux, this is the unknown unknown territory. If IR missiles penetrated, either 10/50 went through before IL ran out of inteceptors, meaning IL only had enough inteceptors for 40-80 or so ballistics, or interceptor performance is 80-90% effective. Either way, IR showed it can penetrate IL missile defense with pretty medioore hardware (again relative to what missile defense is designed against), without hezbollah running interference. It's not a win in the sense that they probably expected more damage, but it's not a loss either considering what it revealed about current state of the art missile defense and the implications there of. Like PLA bomber/rocketforce weaponeers are adjusting their spread sheet formulas. Question is which direction.

Pure ineffectual saber rattling. If it wasn’t, they’d first hit air defense installations. They know where they are. Iran wanted Israel to not intercept just a few of the things it knew it couldn’t intercept. It’d be absolutely moronic for Israel to respond to something so obvious. Next time they might not be so “lucky”.

50M in offensive spend to burn through 1.3BN in defensive munitions seems highly effective to me. Great intel-gathering op.

That was far more than 50M. Heavy ballistic rockets aren’t cheap even in Iran. And Iran could have used them to cause several times the amount of damage just by hitting a couple of AD deployment points. I think Israel understands that too, hence the difficulty with deciding how or whether to respond

So am I off by one order of magnitude or three?

Definitely at least one order of magnitude off. For comparison, one Patriot battery can cost over a billion dollars, and they hit none. Not because they couldn’t (it doesn’t intercept hypersonics, which Iran has) but because they chose not to.

Apparently they provided 72 hours advance notice to neighbors (who probably tipped off the US and Israel, given the US warnings of an imminent attack). The Iranians presumably expected the information to leak. The US also had naval and air assets parked in the region to assist. It's hard to imagine a more favorable scenario for the defender. That makes it rather dangerous to try to generalize the performance in this instance to future events.

It also makes this whole exercise seem like dramatic saber-rattling rather than a serious effort to damage Israel's military capabilities.

> Iraqi, Turkish and Jordanian officials each said Iran had provided early warning of the attack last week, including some details.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-notice-att...

They needed to do more damage. iran looks really bad when after such a large attack they hit to little. Iran didn't suceed in any retribution. (other than money spent on a defense test)

Iran has no great options available to them, and of the terrible options on the table I think they picked the best one for them. Now if Israel wants to attack Iran directly they have to make a mountain out of a molehill and it’ll cost Israel public support at a time where public support for Israel is rapidly waning.

Iran has the option of not inciting violence.

Of course, there would be no war if the other side would just surrender

Iran is a third side and they are enticing people who could learn to get along to not,.

As far as I understand from what I've read, Iran even separated the attack times of missiles and UAVs to make them easier to monitor and shoot down without overloading air defense systems. For example, Russia deliberately syncs these attack with large numbers of aerial weapons to overload Ukraine's air defenses beyond their capacity—Iran could not have been unaware of this tactic, but it chose not to.

Right after the attack Iran's permanent representative to the UN stated that "The matter can be deemed concluded. However, should the Israeli regime make another mistake, Iran’s response will be considerably more severe". It looks convincing that Iranian pyrotechnic show is more of a reputational response, given that some of the targets were shown in propaganda videos days before the attack (if not directly leaked to Western counterparts so that Israelis had time to prepare and/or evacuate personnel).

they separeted the launch times so that slow and fast things would arrive at once. That meant the world had hours to shoot down slow drones.

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