This is easy to change:
https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/#replacing-passwordless...
and
https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/replacing-passwordless-root-wit...
See also: https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/passwordless-sudo-selinux-under...
Although I'm convinced that passwordless sudo helps a lot to make life easier for new Qubes users.
> For QubesOS reasoning for not needing hardened templates to make sense, I would need to have a completely separate AppVM for each application and I don't think QubesOS was meant to be used like that.
This is not necessary. You can group your apps with the same trust level in the same VM. Again, it's especially helpful to the new users. Advanced users like you, with strict threat models, can use minimal VMs to compartmentalize much more.
If somebody can compromise my user account, compromising root is pointless and trivial. More so on Qubes OS, where only breaking out of the VM really matters.
SELinux isn't usable in a strict mode because it's config is so ungainly that devs rarely create profiles. So only the opt-in mode is common and that's pretty pointless. Especially compared to using containers.
> I would need to have a completely separate AppVM for each application and I don't think QubesOS was meant to be used like that.
I think that’s a decent starting point, actually. Not only that, but also separate disposable VMs for individual tasks, like reading a PDF.