> Regarding sshd authentication bypass/code execution
> Arch does not directly link openssh to liblzma, and thus this attack vector is not possible. You can confirm this by issuing the following command:
> However, out of an abundance of caution, we advise users to remove the malicious code from their system by upgrading either way. This is because other yet-to-be discovered methods to exploit the backdoor could exist.
https://archlinux.org/news/the-xz-package-has-been-backdoore...
I'm not finding anything from Arch mentioning dpkg/rpm, the linked article above is the latest article about the xz compromise from the Arch homepage.
- https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/xz...
- There were some comments in the middle of the giant openwall mailing list thread I can't find now because they're in the middle of 30,000 replies
tl;dr they re-enabled the sandboxing previously disabled by Jia Tan.