Would you use a government-issued ID to prove your identity online?
abc.net.au
abc.net.au
There were two exceptions. One was Airbnb - and I understand them, they have to do some minimum verification of people given the history of abuse and the very nature of human interaction. The other was Hetzner - again, I understand they need to do their duty to protect themselves from spammers, scammers and other abusers. These were the only 2 exceptions in the last 20 years or so for me.
We can do a lot of paperwork online, it's great when it works. I belive is one of the few "internet stuff" that wasn't just regarded as a waste of money. (we had a scandal about a simple site that costed millions).
You can pay taxes and other services, change your family doctor, see documentation related to unemployment/social security, etc
The "verification" is done by a few online private providers via Webcam or you can do it at the post office (still private but the line is blurred).
The name is "IO", a wordplay on Imput/output and the fact that "io" means "me" in Italian
I'm talking about the portal where you can do stuff, the verification/identity is a system called "SPID".
With the way Digid works, I'm not too sure if I'd trust the system that much either, to be honest. Allowing the government to track what citizens visit what websites when seems like a massive privacy infraction. There are technologies that can fix these shortcomings, but I don't think the government cares about them.
I don't think the Australian system introduced in the linked article is comparable to the card-based Digid system; the risks and benefits of a system where companies can authenticate people using government ID are very different from just authenticating to (semi) government.
This is not theoretical. Services that use GitHub auth do this regularly.
Not saying credit card is not valid option for streaming. Or having someone like Klarna in online shopping. But when we think of phone, landline-internet, electricity and so on strong authentication does make some sense and is acceptable.
Mygovid as it stands is a cluster. It insists you have a single email address as your one true name, if insists you use that one true name everywhere you use mygovid to authenticate, if you upgrade your phone it throws away the ID. It's unreliable, as in the app have race conditions with it's internal state and external requests to identify yourself. Those race conditions cause it to not identify you at all, not notify you there is ID request and various other indeterminate states.
As a cherry on the top, mygovid is used in to authenticate against my.gov.au (the closeness of the two names is so confusing they have to put big red warnings not to confuse the two), and my.gov.au has been the victim or rampant identity fraud to the tune of $0.5B.
As others have mentioned here, there were far better thought out identity schemes around when mygovid was introduced. They chose to roll their own instead.
I hope this is an improvement, but there are few grounds for hope. The bill moving this forward is based on what the government needs - so although they allow for many ID providers the bill repeatedly mentions just one, I presume they want one true name and a centralised data store. Amusingly at first glance the bill looks devoid of technical details and I'm guessing that's because the lawyers think they left the design wide open so the subject matter experts can implement something that works. In reality and probably unwittingly, they've already set the technical foundations in stone, and they've chosen the wrong ones. Nonetheless if it defrauded like the present system has been, they'll blame the implementers.
I think there might be a fly in that ointment.
Beside that I criticize two aspects:
- many state (at least here in EU) have chosen private companies to provide identity services at least for eIDAS level two authentications (user+password + OTP, essentially) witch can't be trusted and generally impose Android/iOS macrospy devices, so something insecure and untrustworthy by default;
- many states have introduced smart-card BUT with proprietary middlewire and crappy crapplications to use them;
both trends MUST be demolished from the ground before digital identities became the norm for all serious things. We need instead to build a chain of trust model where the public sign a citizen subkey as a proof valid for the public, and private parties might agree something similar each others for their customer/purposes.
In Norway and Sweden they also have something similar called BankID.
It's not KYC I mind as much as having to give them a residential address. I don't want that leaked across the internet. I hate giving out a residential address. The government can have it, I don't care so much about that, but private companies don't need to know where I sleep to know who I am.
What if some random sentence I say on the internet becomes the subject of a death threat? What if a startup I found becomes hated by a small group of armed individuals? I'm not a billionaire and don't have the $ for 24/7 security. I really don't anyone to be able to just look up where I sleep.
Social security number and some kind of ID number (license, passport) should really be more than enough for KYC purposes.
If something is going to be too difficult to work around, and it’s a total requirement, then I suppose I will be forced to go with the flow if it means that I will starve or have no bed to sleep in.
I mean, people apparently willingly upload pictures of their driver's license to facebook already.
But on the other hand, who would have though 10 years ago that VPN’s would catch on so much that they plague the YT advertising and often run on commercial TV and radio?!
For checks like: age > 18
Permitted services could request minimal data tokens, verified by one or more instances of choice, and the user would see the data being exchanged and with what party the data is being exchanged exactly.
In my opinion, this beats a lot of current implementations, which redirect to either a plain government login or bank login, where the backend does all the data exchange.
I have to admit that I haven't done anything with this tech myself because I can't be bothered filing a request for access for such a system. Still, I can see the potential here.
The "eAusweise" app allows people to "prove" others their age without giving away any more data:
https://www.digitalaustria.gv.at/eng/services/eServices/Proo... (German only:) https://www.oesterreich.gv.at/eausweise/haeufige-fragen/haeu...
> Senator Gallagher called the senators "conspiracy theorists" and accused the Coalition of appeasing them.
The government denouncing elected officials voicing the smallest of concerns over privacy as "conspiracy theorists" should set off a lot of alarm bells.
The Australian government has a history of spying, often illegally, on citizens for such 'crimes' as being Muslim or caring about the environment.
Some examples:
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-25/victoria-forests-agen...
https://adi.deakin.edu.au/australian-muslims-experiences-of-...
Would you allow your face to be scanned by a government system to prove your identity online?
If to other governmental agencies, I might do it if it were essential and there were literally no other option.
If to anybody, then no.
we created unions because although employment is technically a free choice, a few companies hold huge power on negotiations relative to one tiny, individual worker. similarly, this may be a "voluntary adoption" but in practice is not. privacy has no value to companies and destroying it is worth 50% lower fraud
i don't have a good philosophical basis for this but am actually a strong believer in leaving open the possibility to commit crimes. so we should go back to circulating large-denomination bills, reduce the burden of KYC, and not create this non-falsifiable new ID regime
You can use it to log into bank account pages, file taxes, book appointments with dentists, place orders in (private) pharmacies, check your electricity company account and many more. Any reasonably serious company could request integration.
There has to be some other reason, unless it's to encourage fraud?
The type of in-person voter fraud that can be identified by an ID is very low, and trying to change an election this way would be very expensive. More people have gone to trial because while they were legally entitled to vote they were unable to get appropriate ID.
Other types of voting fraud, like registering in and voting in multiple districts, is much more common.
The people who for decades fought against requiring ID for so many things said it was a slippery slope. Now you are on the slope, thinking it flat.
Fraud of this sort is incredibly rare.
> Existing research and evidence shows that voter impersonation is extremely rare. Between 2000 and 2014, there were only 31 documented instances of voter impersonation.[3][4][5] There is no evidence that it has changed the result of any election. In April 2020, a voter fraud study covering 20 years by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found the level of mail-in ballot fraud "exceedingly rare" since it occurs only in "0.00006 percent" of individual votes nationally, and, in one state, "0.000004 percent — about five times less likely than getting hit by lightning in the United States." - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voter_impersonation_in_the_Uni...
Mail-in ballots don't require id, and still have a low rate of fraud.
We can easily find cases of people unable to vote because they did not have id and were unable to get id.
https://www.norden.org/sv/info-norden/rostratt-i-sverige
> För att kunna rösta ska du kunna styrka din identitet. Du styrker din identitet genom att visa upp en giltig id-handling eller genom att en annan person kan bekräfta din identitet. Då måste den som bekräftar din identitet kunna uppvisa id-handling och ange sitt personnummer.