Tillich's "ambiguity" was very approachable in my youth, but today I find it extremely dangerous from a moral and philosophical perspective. There is truth in what is said, but unless you have the context in which it is said you can quickly spin it to your heart's delight. My primary takeaway as a youth was "this is great and very theological/intellectually stimulating while not morally demanding of me whatsoever, hooray!" which is why, as a stubborn young adult, certainly found it attractive.
FWIW, if anybody wants a great challenge that seeks to bridge classical theology with modern/personalist/subjective thought, you should read Man and Woman He Created Them by John Paul II. It is as rewarding as it is dense and gave me the bridge between "old" and "new" philosophy/theology that I find lacking in many moderns.
It’s really hard for me to see how any theology—or any text—could be any less ambiguous than any other.
E.g. quantum mechanics is arguably the least ambiguous theory ever devised, because it gives results of the most specific agreement with experiment. But nevertheless has an ever-increasing number of interpretations, none of which can be ruled out—to all appearances hopelessly ambiguous to what it actually means.
When it comes decisions you have to make, either individually or as a society, even the most verbose and specific moral codes suddenly seem to be ambiguous. Some examples:
1. Are we morally obliged to either support or oppose Obamacare?
2. Is a 50% tax rate moral or immoral? What is the exact tax rate which is “most moral”?
3. Is it Moral to support a president who boinked an intern? Or a president who payed hush money to hookers?
4. Should it be illegal to smoke? Or sell fruit-flavored vapes?
5. How old should somebody be before they are allowed to (fill in the blank here…vote, have sex, drive a car, drink, drop out of school?)
We certainly look to our cultural polestars—-religion, tradition, precident—to help us out with these sorts of questions, but by no means does any of them give us any definitive answers.
"Virtual base classes are instantiated in the order specified by the depth-first, left-to-right traversal of the directed acyclic graph of all base classes." That is a very precise, unambiguous statement if you know what virtual base classes are. (The sentence went on to define what "left to right" meant in this context.) You don't even need to know what a directed acyclic graph is in a formal way to be able to clearly, unambiguously understand what that sentence is saying.
Compare that to, I don't know, the worst sentence from your CEO's quarterly yay-us message to the company. Or the worst sentence from a politician's campaign speech, or from a political debate where they're trying to dodge the other side's point.
Yes, statements can be less ambiguous than other statements. (Even in politics - compare George Bush's "Read my lips: No new taxes" with the statements many politicians make.)
If I never had to create the virtual table, would it be a violation of the spec if I didn’t do it?
We are so good at handling ambiguity that we don’t even notice its existence most of the time. But specs, especially specs which specify the semantics of an expression—are infinitely ambiguous as to how to that expression is actually calculated.
Ideally, the spec, for c++ or another language is deliberately made ambiguous, just because it leaves room for creative interpretations—-also known as “optimizations”.
Generally: no. Most such specs have a phrase along the lines of “externally observable effect”.
In other words, the compiler can do anything as long as the programmer or external systems can’t tell that anything is different.
Processors do this all the time, reordering instruction execution but then arranging things so that it’s impossible to tell that this occurred.
This is why I don't like using "ambiguous" as a term of abuse. Ambiguity isn't inherently bad. Languages are ambiguous for a reason.
a = 2 * b + c * d;
writeToDisk(a)
e = b + b - a;
sendToNetwork(e)
Naively, you would expect the compiler to emit CPU instructions that perform the computations left-to-right, top-to-bottom. In pseudocode assembly: mul 2, b -> a
mul c, d -> reg1
add a, reg1 -> a
push a
call writeToDisk
mov b -> reg1
add b, reg1 -> reg1
sub a, reg -> e
push e
call sendToNetwork
The externally observable effects may be considered to be the function calls. If you're dealing with I/O devices then it would be some similar specific hardware event such as writing to a GPIO register.It should be immediately obvious that the compiler can compute 2*b just once, cache it in a register, and use it to compute both 'a' and 'e', even though the formulas are different and interspersed with function calls. Similarly, it can noticed that e has a 2b-2b in its overall formula and hence eliminate some computations entirely.
As long as the inputs to the functions don't change and the order of their calls aren't modified, "all is fine" and the compiler is free to do this.
In fact, modern compilers can completely eliminate function calls, inlining them if they perform pure computations or have no side-effects! This is done to such a point that it makes benchmarking challenging: merely timing some computations will often take 0 time unless the result of the computation is written to the console or some similarly externally-visible destination.
Compilers are allowed to this even for abstractions like virtual functions or interfaces. The JVM does this regularly. If it notices there's only a single implementation of an interface, it'll inline it, possibly eliminating the call entirely if it turns out to be a no-op.
For example, you can type the input/output to these functions in any font or size you want. You don't have to use ASCII. The results on the screen can be glowing green phosphorus, red phosphorus, or a glorious retina display.
etc etc. Wherever the specs end, the ambiguity begins.
The logical positivists (and analytic philosophers in general) were very concerned about this.
The original ones like Carnap thought it was a problem because of fascists, who are, you know, pathological liars. So the problem wasn't ambiguity, moreso that they were propagandizing and he hoped to defeat this by showing that it wasn't true. As it turns out, this didn't work, so they had to give up on it.
Analytic philosophers do it because they're mad at obscurantist French people like Derrida. Which is also a noble goal if a smaller problem.
People like me want nice-sounding, undemanding ideas that makes them look good and feel good. We desire ideas that shift with words, ideas that lack solid form and the logical consistency that would ward off our own desires.
Like you said, it's dangerous because people think ambiguous philosophy as a vitamin, when really it's an intellectual candy. Tasty and sweet, but no nutrition for the soul, and certainly it gives no energy for its exercise.
And what's more, while God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens is a conclusion we can arrive at philosophically (and thus unaided reason with no appeals made to revealed knowledge), we also find Scriptural antecedents, such as Exodus 3:14 (where God gives his "name" to Moses as "I Am"; God is not this god, or that god, but is).
> It is as rewarding as it is dense and gave me the bridge between "old" and "new" philosophy/theology that I find lacking in many moderns.
You might find Betz's recent book[0] interesting.
[0] https://stpaulcenter.com/product/christ-the-logos-of-creatio...
(I ask this actually because I remember Ratzinger raising this possible objection in Introduction to Christianity (some of which I read long ago, though I don't have the text with me anymore), presumably to rebut it, though I don't remember his rebuttal.)
You don't even need to squint that hard to see a commonality between Tillich's notion of discussing God symbolically and Aquinas's notion of doing so analogically, not to mention the contrast between finite humans and an infinite God who is beyond understanding. And not to mention that apophaticism – the idea that positive knowledge about God is impossible – has been a feature of Christian theology since the beginning.
So much of this can be taken in ways that not only aren't outside the bounds of Christian orthodoxy, but also align with more sophisticated Christian philosophical understandings of God.
That much, of course, is not why Tillich is controversial!
To be more specific: if the Universe (existence itself) can be described by mathematics, and mathematics is timeless (beyond mere physical existence), then essentially the physical Universe is inevitable and in some sense "created by" mathematics. In this view of creation, mathematics plays the role of God.
When Tillich says "The courage to be is rooted in the God who appears when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt" he is describing the psychological process the seeker undergoes. In his case, he identifies God with the open, reflective cast of mind in which one engages with the unknowable, ineffable, combinatorally-explosive possibilities that are found at the horizons of our understanding. The "state of being grasped by an ultimate concern" is one in which we are trying - and necessarily failing - to see beyond the horizon. And yet, something sustains us in the effort, which is faith in God.
Doubtless this really is a very different kind of faith than other self-described Christians might have, whose faith might be rooted in a different mode of being and engagement with the world. And, to be clear, Tillich's description is very much "what it's like" to have his variety of faith, and not a metaphysical claim about the workings of the universe. A different Christian might hold much stronger claims about God's precise nature and existence, but for Tillich those beliefs were unsustainable.
But isn’t that the whole point of Christianity, that Jesus was God in human flesh and actually existed like you or I exist while also being fully God?