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Comment by pas | Hacker News Reader

how could/would they not?

everything is paid by the renters, and if the price is not high enough (to turn a risk-weighted profit) it will be removed from the market.

(if there's a high enough vacancy tax and/or security costs against squatting, then eventually it will be sold. which is a one time boon for the market, but it ends up crowding out new developments for a while, and altogether this just leads to crazy waitlists and the usual discrimination.)

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I don't know anything about the French rental homes market but in the USA there's ample headroom in lessor profits to take a haircut without triggering the second-order effect that you hypothesized. Landlord income as a share of GDP (again, in the USA) stands at a post-War high, having increased 15x from its low around 1990.

Landlords have a huge and largely unearned cashflow and the thing about taxes is it's best to try to raise them where the money is.

Rental supply is fixed in the short term. Therefore landlords have no pricing power unless they are colluding assuming theyre trying to maximize profit and not giving tenants a deal. Landlord goal is to rent every unit for maximum amount, that means renters set the price by competing with each other.

Kind of the same deal as rent control in a lot of ways, right? What you get is a short-term suppression of market rates that slowly get internalized by the supply-side until prices more/less return to the original equilibrium

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