OpenVPN traffic, even encrypted, can look unique enough somewhere in the 'stream' (to borrow the IDS/IPS term) to be reliably idenitfied.
OpenVPN traffic, even encrypted, can look unique enough somewhere in the 'stream' (to borrow the IDS/IPS term) to be reliably idenitfied.
I'm talking about the part of the connection outgoing from the VPN, not the incoming traffic to the VPN, to be clear. I know for example that China can do deep packet inspection and that there are a number of projects to attempt to thwart this technique. But you seem to be saying that the part after the VPN can be identified?
I'm talking about the part of the connection outgoing from the VPN
your understanding is correct—that the 'segment' between VPN server and final destination/employer's public-facing infrastucture is no longer traversing a VPN tunnel and therefore could not be fingerprinted as VPN traffic.if using a public VPN service provider, it would be identified, however (quite easily and at very low technical cost mind you), based on source address, as public VPN service provider netblocks are well-documented.
see, for example: https://github.com/X4BNet/lists_vpn (first search engine result for me querying "vpn ip list")